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Abstract
This thesis comprises five Chapters on the impact of regulation after the
crisis of 2007 in the UK and US. The analysis considered different aspects
of the crisis as reflected in the three main chapters of this thesis that in­
cludes the impact of regulation on the probability of a financial crisis, The
impact of regulation on systemic risk, and contagion, interdependence, and
the impact of regulation. Chapter 1 introduces the main themes within the
thesis. It provides an outline, scope, and brief discussion of thesis contri­
butions.
Chapter 2 starts by providing the thesis’s theoretical background after set­
ting out key themes (e.g. early warning models, theories of regulation and
banking regulation) that form the research basis. The chapter analysed the
impact of regulation on the probability of a crisis, i.e. it assessed the extent
that recent regulation has reduced the chances of another crisis occurring.
We employ an early warning signal method – Logit model and Bayesian
model average to establish this impact. Our results have shown recent
regulation has reduced the probability of financial crisis both in the UK and
the US and concluded with the proposal of adding Basel III liquidity thresh­
olds variables to the ‘early warning signal’ literature.
Chapter 3 examines the interaction between systemic risk and bank­level
variables that were the target of regulation after the crisis. The analysis
shows the level of impact that some of the Basel III (an international reg­
ulation) and other national regulations (e.g. Ring Fencing in the UK) are
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having on systemic risk. We employed ∆CoVaR as the proxy for systemic
risk and estimated CoVaR using quantile regression and the Garch model
before applying Kupiec (1995), Christoffersen and Pelletier (2004), and
Lopez (1999) tests to establish the accuracy of our results. Our result
shows that the variables that capture Basel III regulation have a signifi­
cant impact in reducing systemic risk. In contrast, UK­specific regulation
indicates little to no impact in reducing systemic risk. Chapter 4 investigate
the impact regulation has had on CDS indexes. In so doing, we established
the existence of contagion before the implementation of regulation and In­
terdependence after that. We then employed Regime dependent Impulse
Response Functions to show the indexes that react most to shocks from
the system. Finally, chapter 5 concludes and summarises the thesis and
provides a discussion of policy implications.
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“to restrain private people, it may be said, from receiving in payment the
promissory notes of a banker, for any sum whether great or small, when
they themselves are willing to receive them, or to restrain a banker from
issuing such notes, when all his neighbors’ are willing to accept of them,
is a manifest violation of that natural liberty which it is the proper business
of law not to infringe, but to support. Such regulations may, no doubt, be
considered as in some respects a violation of natural liberty. But those
exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, which might endanger
the security of the whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained by the
laws of all governments, of the most free as well as of the most despotical.
The obligation of building party walls, in order to prevent the communication
of fire, is a violation of natural liberty exactly of the same kind with the
regulations of the banking trade which are here proposed” —Adam Smith.
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The crisis of 2007 and the implementation of new regulation soon after­
wards is not particularly an isolated case in history1. The frequency of
crisis will suggest sufficient economic understanding and solutions. How­
ever, this is not empirically the case. Therefore emphasising the need to
understand the nature of the economic/financial crisis with its associated
response overtime. Hence, the questions that remain are; what is the right
type of regulation? Should there be a regulatory response from the gov­
ernment at all? Does regulation have any meaningful impact? This thesis
serves as a contribution to answering some of these questions.
1 Recent financial history has shown between 1976 to 2007 there has been around
147 systemic banking crisis across the world Laeven, L. & Valencia, F. 2012. Systemic
banking crises database: An update.
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As pointed by Alan Greenspan in 1997, ”It is critically important to recog­
nize that no market is ever truly unregulated. The self­interest of market
participants generates private market regulation. Thus, the real question
is not whether a market should be regulated, rather the real question is
whether government intervention strengthens or weakens private regula­
tion” (Born, 2011). This follows the “capture” theory of regulation that sug­
gests as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and
operated primarily for its benefit (Stigler, 1971). Contrasting argument is
the Public interest theory of regulation that suggests; regulation is supplied
in response to demand by the public to correct inefficient and inequitable
market practices (Ugochukwu Uche, 2001). As echoed by Michel (1998),
Capital itself has no inherent capacity for producing positive effects only
(given its unbounded ability to accumulate more), and if left unchecked it
can lead to concentration of wealth in the hands of a few at a cost to the
society. Highlighting regulation as a necessary part of creating a fair soci­
ety.
Understanding the proponents of regulation’s arguments also requires re­
stating traditional economic theory that suggests there are three primary
purposes of regulation. These are; 1. To constrain the use of monopoly
power and the prevention of serious distortions to competition and the
maintenance of market integrity 2. To protect the essential needs of or­
dinary people in cases where information is hard or costly to obtain, and
mistakes could devastate welfare and 3. To shield, where there are suffi­
cient externalities that the social, and overall costs of market failure exceed
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both the private costs of failure and the extra costs of regulation. It2 also
highlights a lack of sufficient macro objectives that is more relevant to the
current global nature of economics/finance. The combination of these and
the reality of new set of regulations also justifies empirical analysis on the
impact recent regulation.
The Turner (2009) review highlights that the crisis has raised important
questions about the intellectual assumptions on which previous regula­
tory approaches have largely been built upon. The review shows that part
of regulation’s theoretical challenges lie within the neo­classical economic
theory that states financial markets can be both efficient and rational. Us­
ing this, the regulatory approach to financial market becomes removing the
impediments that produce inefficient and illiquid markets as vast amount
of literature has shown that share prices in well­regulated liquid markets,
follow ‘random walks’3. Therefore, with rational market participants, prices
tend towards rational equilibrium. The implication for regulatory approach
is that: market prices are good indicators of rationally evaluated economic
value. However, there has always been scepticism about this idea.
The general theory of employment (Keynes, 1937) suggested that equity
prices are not necessarily driven by rational assessment of available in­
2 Economic theory of regulation.
3Note that the finding of ‘random walks’ (i.e. the nonexistence of chartist patterns)
does not imply that the determinants of the price movements are random and irrational,
but rather that they are determined by flows of relevant information which, since they arise
in a fashion unrelated to past price movements, will result in apparently random but in fact
entirely rational price movements.
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formation 4 . Minsky (1986) argues that financial markets and systems
are inherently susceptible to speculative booms which, if long lasting, will
inevitably end in crisis. Again, The Turner (2009) review asserts that finan­
cial market theory in the last 20 to 30 years suggests (i) efficient and liquid
financial markets deliver significant allocative efficiency benefits by making
possible a full range of contracts. Thus, enabling providers and users of
funds to more effectively meets their risk preferences, return and liquidity.
(ii) Markets are sufficiently rationale to justify a strong presumption favour­
ing market deregulation and (iii) that even if markets are theoretically capa­
ble of irrational behaviour, policymakers will never be able to judge when
and how far they are irrational with sufficient confidence to justify market
intervention.
This idea that suggests deregulation is further supported by Friedman and
Schwartz (1986). They examine the inflationary surge in the U.S. between
1960s and 1970s, and suggested the poor performance of the monetary
authorities reinforce the conclusion that leaving monetary and banking ar­
rangements to the market would have produced a more satisfactory out­
come thanwas actually achieved through governmental involvement. They
concluded that government failure might be worse than market failure.
4Keynes likened investing in financial instruments to ‘those newspaper competitions
in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from 100 photographs,
the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the
average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick
not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch
the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same
point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which to the best of one’s judgment are
really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest.
We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligence to anticipating what
average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who
practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees’
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Such an understanding ushered the era of “de­regulation” in the 1970’s
after much of the regulations of 1930’s. This might suggest the public the­
ory of regulation argument as weak, since deregulation has proved gener­
ally beneficial in many sectors of the economy (Greenspan, 2005, Robson,
1998, Winston, 1998). However, The Turner (2009) report assessed the
efficient and rational markets assumptions and concluded that; empirically
and theoretically the theory is either inconclusive or lacks a significant abil­
ity the fit with reality.
Within this framework, our approach is empirical. We argue here that regu­
lation or deregulation would not necessarily produce the optimal outcome.
That is, in the absence of a regulatory authority that understands the chang­
ing phases of the business environment and implement the right type and
level of regulation/deregulation that reduces risk, improve economic de­
velopment without hampering innovation, provides growth and incentives
for the right type and amount of risk that businesses are ready to take;
theoretical arguments will remain inconclusive. We therefore statistically
analyse some of the recent regulations implemented after the financial cri­
sis of 2007 in answering the question; has regulation made an impact after
the crisis? Our study recognises that there are several dimensions to the
crisis and different regulations aimed at the multi­faceted parts of the crisis.
Therefore, our analysis (within this and other chapters) covers the impact
of regulation on crisis probability, systemic risk and contagion.
Considering the impact of the crisis globally, the US/UK suffered the ef­
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fects of the crisis the most. However, they applied relatively different types
of regulation. There was also an international response to the crisis (Basel
III) that both adopted with subtle differences—making it important to estab­
lish the impact these regulations have on the common crisis phenomena
of the probability of a crisis, systemic risk, contagion and interdependence
in both countries.
Overall, the thesis objective is to provide answers to the questions; has
Basel III (the international regulatory response) impacted the probability
of another crisis happening again? Was there evidence of systemic risk?
Has regulation reduced systemic risk? Was there a contagion? Through
which channels did contagion spread? Has regulation changed contagion
effects to interdependence? To answer these questions, we applied sta­
tistical methodologies base on the theoretical underpinning of (i) Probabil­
ity of crisis using Bayesian model average and Logit model (ii) Systemic
risk using Conditional Value at Risk and Garch models, and (iii) Conta­
gion/Interdependence using Markov Switching Value at Risk and Garch
models. Our models prove robustly sufficient in capturing the impact of
regulatory changes impact on mentioned crisis phenomena highlighted.
22
1.2 Thesis outline
This thesis consists of three main chapters, which are independent but
closely related. The central theme that runs through all chapters is the
impact of regulation after the crisis. We analysed crisis from three main
features, i.e. crisis probability, Systemic risk and contagion. The concept
of the probability of a crisis is closely related to systemic risk. That is,
the crisis only burst after the existence of systemic risk. In the same light
systemic risk occurs due to the high level of interdependence that turns
into contagion. The subtle but important difference between these con­
cepts meant that we had to use different models in each chapter to effec­
tively capture the impact of regulation. In addition, we use the appropriate
variables in each chapter that regulation affected in order to capture each
stylised impact that provides a fairly holistic understanding of the regula­
tions implemented in the UK and US.
1.2.1 Chapter Two: Scope and Contribution
This chapter examines the impact of recent regulation in mitigating the
probability of financial crises. We employ an early warning signal method
– The logit model to show this relationship. Furthermore, we apply the
Bayesian model average for robustness checks. This is similar to Barrell et
al. (2009) and Davis and Karim (2008). However, we contributed by sam­
pling our data to reflect changes in regulation and, therefore, its impact.
We also use empirical Basel III data as opposed to assumed increases to
23
Basel III threshold in previous literature. Thus, allowing us to establish the
Basel III variable as part of an early warning system model.
24
1.2.2 Chapter Three: Scope and Contribution
Using quarterly delta conditional value at risk (∆CoVaR; a proxy for sys­
temic risk) from 2000­Q1 – 2019­Q4, with bank­level panel­data, we anal­
yse the impact of regulation after the financial crisis of 2007 on systemic
risk in the UK financial system. We estimated CoVaR using quantile regres­
sion and the Garch model before applying Kupiec (1995), Christoffersen
and Pelletier (2004), and Lopez (1999) tests to establish the accuracy of
our results. Our result shows that the variables that capture Basel III regu­
lation have a significant impact in reducing systemic risk, while UK specific
regulation shows little to no impact in reducing systemic risk.
Our main contribution to the literature is analysing the impact of regula­
tion using our systemic risk measure (∆CoVaR) against bank­level targeted
variables. Our second contribution relates to the analysis of systemic risk.
Previous pieces of literature (e.g. Girardi and Ergün, 2013, Huang et al.,
2012a, Tobias and Brunnermeier, 2016) have used both models (i.e. Co­
VaR and Garch) as applied here when estimating systemic risk. However,
what we have added is the application of accuracy tests to show the model
that is more accurate when estimating systemic risk (on bank regulatory
variables). This study also considers variables that were either newly in­
troduced (such as ring­fencing) or those that are calculated differently (e.g.
leverage ratio, regulatory capital) because of changes in the regulation.
Therefore, providing a clear understanding of the impact, these policies
have created on systemic risk.
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1.2.3 Chapter Four: Scope and Contribution
Using a Markov Switching VAR, we investigate the impact regulation has
had on CDS indexes in the US and UK. In so doing, we were able to show
the existence of contagion prior to the implementation of regulation and In­
terdependence thereafter. We then employed Regime dependent Impulse
Response Functions to show the indexes that react most to shocks from
the system. We also applied DCC­GARCH to check the robustness of our
results.
This chapter’s first and main contribution is the impact regulation has had
on credit default swap indexes in reducing contagion. The second con­
tribution of this analysis establishes (using credit default swap spread), if
there was contagion or interdependency within sectors of the economy in
the US and the UK during the crisis and if this has changed after introducing
regulation. The third contribution shows through which channel contagion
occurred. That is, which CDS index contributed to the propagation of risk




Impact of Regulation on the
Probability of Financial Crisis
2.1 Abstract
This study examines the impact of recent regulation in mitigating the prob­
ability of financial crises. We employ an established early warning sig­
nal method – The logit model to show this relationship. Furthermore, we
apply the Bayesian model average (BMA) for robustness checks. Re­
cent financial history has shown between 1976 to 2007, there have been
around 147 systemic banking crises across the world (Laeven and Valen­
cia, 2012). This figure is exclusive of other types of crisis like debt, infla­
tionary, sovereign types of crisis.
Using the logit model, we ran seven regressions to capture the regulation’s
impact on another crisis probability. Using a sample of lagged variables to
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avoid the endogenous effect, our data from 1970 to 2009 captures the re­
lationship between crisis probability and explanatory variables. Data from
2010 to 2018 highlights the change in the relationship due to new regu­
lations. Our results show an inverse relationship between real economic
growth and the probability of a crisis occurring and a positive relationship
between an increase in house prices and crisis probability. This follows
the theoretical relationship assumptions between the existence of bubbles
and these variables. Equally, the Basel leverage ratio behaves inversely
to crisis probability, as shown further in the analysis, while traditional bank
leverage (debt to equity ratio) has a positive relationship. The study shows
that at a 10% level of significance, the interest rate is significant in explain­
ing the crisis. This is similar to Demirguc­Kunt and Detragiache (2005) ’s
work, where they found that crisis occurred in periods of low GDP growth
and high interest rates. Our BMA results show that the estimates from
Basel III thresholds are robust.
Furthermore, margins analysis that allows us directly infer from regression
coefficients showed Bank liquidity ratio to reduce the crisis ratio by 1.5%
over the period, while the Bank leverage ratio increased the crisis probabil­




An Economic crisis is arguably the next most disruptive challenge that na­
tions continue to face after a security crisis. The literature (e.g. Barrell
et al., 2010b, Barrell et al., 2010a, Davis and Karim, 2008, Laeven et al.,
2016, Laeven and Valencia, 2018, Duffie, 2017) suggests different fac­
tors such as derivatives, moral hazard, shadow banking activities, informa­
tion asymmetry, credit ratings, GDP, credit/liquidity, high leverage to have
caused the crisis of 2007. While any of these variables or all of them may
have contributed, there is a synonymous agreement that lack of proper reg­
ulation that reflects the changing climate within the financial and banking
sector has contributed to the occurrence of the crisis (Turner, 2009). This
led to regulations that deal with the crisis as it happened and put in place
long­term measures that can reduce the probability of a crisis occurring
moving forward.
The definition and understanding of systemic banking crisis, its severity,
its onset, and its duration is a matter of judgement and debate (Demirgüç­
Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). Therefore the definition that serves the pur­
pose of this analysis is the one given by Cashin and Duttagupta (2008).
They defined a systemic banking crisis as an episode involving banking
sector problems that resulted in; exhaustion of much of the capital and clo­
sure, mergers, large­scale nationalisation of banks, extensive bank runs;
or large­scale liquidity support by the central bank to avoid a run on deposit
institutions.
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Understanding the recent crisis and regulations taken is essential to the
smooth functioning of the financial sector and the whole economy. It is
even more critical when we consider the number of times crisis have oc­
curred and their associated cost. Furthermore, every time a crisis of this
nature has happened in the past, it was not the case that there were no reg­
ulations at the time. Therefore, it is imperative to understand the theories
that inform these regulations, the nature and justifications of the regula­
tions, how they have functioned in the past to inform academic discourse
and policymakers.
Studies within the early warning signal literature focus on establishing the
variables that can serve as signals for a looming crisis to policymakers. The
importance of such studies is apparent. However, the focus here goes be­
yond such, even though the analysis does provide such contribution. The
focus here is establishing the impact regulation has had on crisis probabil­
ity. While many countries have put different regulations in place to safe­
guard the banking system further, this chapter is looking at some part of the
Basel III regulation. In particular, we analyse the impact of the new Capital
adequacy ratio, Leverage ratio and Liquidity ratio on crisis probability. Al­
though Basel III has made significant progress in tackling issues beyond its
traditional scope of monetary/capital thresholds, these thresholds remain
the cornerstone of Basel regulation. Therefore, we are focusing on these
thresholds and their impact on reducing the probability of crisis going for­
ward.
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The literature concerning measuring causes of crisis can be attributed to
the seminal work of Demirgüç­Kunt and Detragiache (1998), where they
measured the variables that had an impact on the probability of a crisis
occurring. This chapter’s major contribution is establishing the impact of
regulation (Basel III) on the probability of a crisis. Another contribution is it
established the relationship between the new Basel III leverage ratio and
crisis probability, We also applied margins analysis to further establish the
impact of regulation on crisis probability and the inclusion of Basel III liquid­
ity thresholds to EWS literature. Unlike other related literature, e.g. Barrell
et al. (2009) and Davis and Karim (2008), where assumed liquidity require­
ment impact was undertaken, this chapter uses regulatory data to establish
the impact on crisis probability. This chapter also analyses a two­sample
period to show the impact regulation has had on crisis probability that is
not in previous studies.
We use the work of Laeven and Valencia (2010) to justify our choice of
sampled nations. They showed the UK and US to be the only countries in
the 2007 ­ 2008 crisis to have experienced the extreme form of systemic
banking crises. This is a situation where both countries experienced all
five conditions of 1. Banking extensive liquidity support, 2. Direct bank re­
structuring costs, 3. Asset purchase outlays, 4. Guarantees on liabilities,
and 5. Bank nationalisations.
A systemic banking crisis requires only any three of these to exist. These
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countries consistently ranked amongst the highest to have experienced
the effect of the crisis in market capitalisation, fiscal cost, increase in pub­
lic debt, and output loss. They also have put regulations in place soon
afterwards as much or more than most countries that experienced a sys­
temic crisis. These reasons provide the justification and the rationale why
the focus of the analysis is on limited to these two countries.
There is an implicit assumption here that suggests; recent regulations in­
tend to bring about stability that reduces crisis probability. The analysis
starts by providing the intuition behind using early warning signal meth­
ods to measure crisis alongside the literature review. To properly position
this research within the literature, a summary of regulatory theories is pro­
vided along with justification for the existence of financial intermediation
and its regulation. This forms the basis for the regulation of the financial
sector after the crisis of 2007, where an overview of Basel and detailed
discussion of Basel III is undertaken. The rationale for the data sets used
within the analysis is provided, alongside definitions of our dependent and
explanatory variables. To measure the regulatory impact on crisis proba­
bility, we apply the Logit model together with the Bayesian model Average
for robustness check. Results of the analysis are then provided. Finally,
a conclusion that shows the relationship and impact of regulation on crisis
probability is drawn.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 to Section 2.2.1 provides
an examination of early warning signal literature, regulation and the im­
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portance of Banks. Section 2.3 to Section 2.3.2 provides an overview of
the regulation after the 2007 crisis, Basel and detailed Basel III. Section
2.4 looks at methodology literature. Section 2.5 Describes the data used
for the analysis. Section 2.6 Is the methodology discussion, and Section




2.3.1 Early Warning Models
Barrell et al. (2009) used a logit model to estimate the net benefit of tighter
bank regulation in the UK with respect to assumed increase in banks’ capi­
tal and liquidity ratios. Their model showed an increase in these ratios by 1
percent would likely reduce crisis probability by about 6 percent. The work
of Demirgüç­Kunt and Detragiache (1998) is one of the earliest and most
frequently cited literature concerning ‘Early Warning Signal’ to model crisis
probability (de­Ramon et al., 2012). They used a multivariate panel logit
model to show what variables were significant to crisis probability and to
what extent these variables played a role in determining the crisis across
different countries. As used by Davis and Karim (2008) and Barrell et
al. (2009), their model’s variant forms the starting point for the analysis
here. Demyanyk and Hasan (2010) analysed methodologies used to ex­
amine banking/financial crisis. They showed that intelligence­modelling
techniques such as support vector machine­neutral network have helped
shed light on the fuzzy clustering and self­reorganising classification tools
used to identify potentially failing banks. Whereas, for regulatory purposes,
the use of the logit method is more frequently used for modelling, signalling
and crisis prediction purposes.
Caggiano et al. (2016) also mentioned that the recent global financial cri­
sis has stimulated a new wave of policy and academic research aimed at
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developing empirical models. They reviewed EWS as used by Demirgüç­
Kunt and Detragiache, 2005; Babecký et al., 2013; and Kauko, 2014. .
Showing the EWS for systemic banking crises has come up with two dom­
inant analytical techniques for predicting signs of banking distress, namely
the signals approach and the binomial multivariate logit framework. The
signals approach, first developed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and
adopted, among others, by Borio and Lowe (2002); Borio and Drehmann
(2009) and Drehmann and Juselius (2014), considers the impact of covari­
ates in isolation and benchmarked against specific threshold values. The
fluctuation of covariates beyond a threshold level chosen to minimise the
noise­to­signal ratio suggests a threat to financial stability. However, bino­
mial multivariate logit as used by Demirgüç­Kunt and Detragiache (2000);
Davis and Karim (2008a, 2008b) and Alessi et al. (2015) amongst oth­
ers, shows that; crisis probabilities estimated through the binomial multi­
variate logit exhibit lower type I (missed crises) and type II (false alarms)
errors than the signals approach, and therefore provide a more accurate
basis for building an EWS. This is despite recent attempts to integrate the
two approaches to analyse interaction effects of macro­financial variables
through, for example, the use of the binary classification tree technique
(Davis and Karim, 2008b).
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2.3.2 Theories of Regulation
While an agreement is absent when it comes to the exact definition of the
term regulation, Koop and Lodge (2017) adopt the definition provided by
Selznick (1985), of regulation being a “sustained and focused control ex­
ercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by the commu­
nity”. And that of Black (2002), as regulation being “the sustained and
focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to defined stan­
dards and purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified out­
come or outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of standard­setting,
information­gathering and behaviour modification”. These Captures the
essence of the various definition of the term regulation within social sci­
ences without delving into extensive details of differing opinions.
Michel (1998) also stated, ‘regulation theory is concerned with heteroge­
neous economic processes in which necessity and contingency, the con­
straint of the past and the creation of the new are intertwined. It deals with
processes that emerge, are reproduced, and then wither away under the
effects of the unequal development inherent in capitalism’. He went on
to suggest that given the potent nature of capital, along with its ability to
produce great good, also comes the capacity for creating negative impact.
Capital itself has no inherent capacity for producing positive effects only
(given its unbounded ability to accumulate more), and if left unchecked, it
can lead to the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few at a cost to
the society as was the case during the proletarian period. He concludes
36
that the extent to which capital can be steered for productive purposes lies
within societal constructs and organisations that reflect societal values at
any time.
This suggests that regulation needs to be dynamic, alongside changes
within the financial system, innovations and society as a whole. Although
this is not suggesting regulation is not without a cost or is necessary a
more efficient alternative. The consensus that absence or poor regulation
contributed to the recent crisis of 2007 does not take away the reality that
even at the time of the crisis, the financial industry has regulation in place.
The understanding at this point is that the problem was not the absence of
regulation in itself. But regulations that were not reflective of the changes
that occurred within the financial system at the time or even more to that is
the possibility of regulation based on theories that do not reflect economic
realities of the time. Forcing us to now question and have a more critical
look at both nature and economic theories used to inform regulation before
the crises.
UgochukwuUche (2001) Shows that there are twomain conflicting theories
of regulation that are commonly used to explain the origin, rationale and
practice of regulation. These are the Public interest and Capture theories
of regulation. The former is based on the understanding that; regulation is
supplied in response to demand by the public to correct inefficient and in­
equitable market practices. The argument here is that this view holds given
the historical cases that it can reasonably explain. The establishment of
the Securities and Exchange Commission is an example of a crisis­driven
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regulation in the US. An example of crisis­inspired legislation in the UK in­
cludes the Royal Exchange and London Assurance Corporations Act (Bub­
ble Act) of 1719.
On the other hand, there will always be a cost to the provision of data and
information. Therefore, the idea of the government acting as a costless
and reliable body to alter markets have not been without questions. Other
costs of regulation raised include the impact it can have on management
style, firms’ flexibility to change the business environment, etc. These is­
sues led some to go as far as stating that the cost of regulation outweighs
any benefit to correcting market inefficiencies in a market­based allocation
of wealth.
Den Hertog (2010) summarises that the public interest theory of regulation
assumes the occurrence of comparative analysis of institutions for efficient
resource allocation of scarce resources in the economy. This theory is
mainly based on the premise of prevalent market failures, the existence
of an efficient political process, efficient regulatory institutions, and benev­
olent regulators, i.e. the absence of cost to provide regulation. Such a
premise has not always been empirically the case. This idea lends sup­
port to Stigler (1971), who asserted that ’as a rule, regulation is acquired
by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit’. This
understanding is the general idea of the proposition termed as ‘Capture
theory’ of regulation. This comes from the understanding that regulation is
sought­after by special interest groups, and regulatory agencies are cap­
tured to influence and enact such regulations to protect the interest of the
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few but powerful groups. Other explanations to capture theory also include
that; instead of focusing on correcting market inefficiencies, regulation fo­
cused on affecting wealth transfers in favour of industries in exchange for
political support.
Generally, both theories agree that economic regulation should aim to counter
the negative effect of market imperfections arising from the negative con­
sequences of dominant firm effects, market abuse, information asymmetry
and instability in other market processes. In the light of the different per­
spectives above, recent regulations, including Basel III, are more closely
in line with public interest theory.
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2.3.3 Importance of Banks and their Regulation
Although banking is a private business that aims at increasing investors
profits, they play a significant and central role within any economy that
sets them apart from other private businesses due to the nature and func­
tions of the activities1 they undertake. Freixas and Santomero (2003) con­
cludes that to gain a good understanding of banking regulation, such anal­
ysis needs to understand why all forms of financial intermediaries exist and
apply such implications to banking in order to understand its regulation, as
carried out by Bhattacharya et. al (1998).
Fama (1980) argues that banks exist due to the economies of scope that
exist between transferring claims on property and offering investment op­
portunities, while Santomero (1984) provided an explanation for bank ex­
istence using the transaction cost theory2, which he viewed to be more
relevant to financial intermediation as opposed to traditional explanations
offered. Furthermore, Boot and Thakor (1993) showed that another ratio­
nale for banks’ existence is the service of monitoring loans after borrow­
ing funds to customers that they provide. In comparison, Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) perspective suggests that agents face uncertainty on their
consumption timing; therefore, they are better off in a banking contract that
allows for some ex­ante insurance than buying financial securities.
1 This analysis does not make a clear distinction between financial markets, shadow
banking and traditional banking (even though it exist) activities due to developments that
have caused the distinctions for the purposes of regulatory analysis to blur overtime as it
shall be made clear later. Hence, they would be referred to interchangeably.
2 Financial Intermediaries are facilitators of risk transfer and deal with the increasingly
complex maze of financial instruments and markets.
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A recent explanation of financial intermediation assumes some information
imperfection in the market that makes it possible for intermediation to exist.
Most of these theories argue that financial intermediaries develop endoge­
nously due to different types of information asymmetries in order to improve
the imperfection that exists within financial markets, which means that fi­
nancial institutions exploit markets for their own economic gains. In other
words, financial intermediationmainly arises where conditions proposed by
Modigliani Miller theorem (the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency
costs, and asymmetric information within an efficient market) do not exist
(which is most of the reality of the financial sector). If this is correct, then it
becomes rational for a government to react with regulations to correct such
imperfections (even though, on occasions, these interventions are not al­
ways the optimal resolution). Hence, the reality of imperfect markets, as
described above, justifies the existence of regulation. This again confirms
the understanding of regulation from a public interest theory perspective.
Schumpeter (1934) analysed money creation through credit as the fun­
damental function via which banks make it possible for entrepreneurs to
adopt new factor combinations. New bank money consists of claims on
services and goods yet to be produced by the economy. These functions,
taken altogether, make the banking sector a very sensitive and important
part of the economy and society that justifiably need to be supported to
function as efficiently as it can be possibly achieved. The consequences
of bank failures or crisis has overtime established how vital this industry is
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to a well­functioning economy, given the spillover effect it has at a micro
and macro level, and recently global impact. This concern underscores
the contagion impact from the banking sector onto the real economy and
establishes reasons for bank regulation. Where it not for this contagion ef­
fect, then there might be no reason for standard or minimum requirements
set within the industry. However, issues like the protection of depositors’
wealth is yet another reason why regulation might be necessary.
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2.3.4 Regulation after Financial Crisis of 2007 – 2009
Brunnermeier et al. (2009) pointed out that although there exists a body of
financial regulation already in existence (when the 2007 crisis occurred).
They argue; these regulations are usually incremental in nature and of­
ten brought about because of a loophole that became apparent within the
system due to fraud or crisis. This can be historically traced to the most im­
portant regulations of the past, such as the crisis of the 1930s that brought
about Glass­Steagall and Deposit Insurance, Basel I, after a local bank
crisis in Germany and Sarbanes­Oxley after the Enron fraud.
A rational assumption is that regulators and regulatory agencies have taken
steps to better understand all factors stated to have contributed to the cri­
sis, such as; low liquidity as compared to the risk undertaken and use such
information to guide the new framework of regulations now in place. The
focus of this analysis3 would be on the United States and the United King­
dom for the reasons earlier stated. While both these countries have specific
regulatory changes in place, what is shared between both is the new Basel
III framework.
3 This chapter will only focus on Basel III, and other regulations that are particular to
the US and UK (Dodd­Frank Act and Ring­Fencing respectively) will be briefly highlighted




King and Tarbert (2011) concluded that Basel III is without a doubt a di­
rect response to the 2007 crises, just like what happened in 1974 when
apparent issues with international banks lead to the creation of the Basel
I accord. For comprehensiveness, before looking at Basel III, a general
outline of the Basel overview should be understood at this point.
From a generic and historical point of view, banking is a business involved
with leverage. It is a situation where companies (banks) borrow/receive
money from the surplus and lend it to the economy’s deficit sectors (at
least in theory). There is an inherent assumption within this model that
banks can get back their loans, make profits and pay back depositor. In
practice, the amount banks lend out mostly exceeds its deposits, therefore
creating a mismatch. This mismatch has the capacity of a ruinous impact
on banks and the economy at large. Hence, the rationale for liquidity or
bank capital regulation is to provide a cushion against such mismatches
that comes with high cost.
Consequently, in 1974, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
was formed to advise national financial regulators on a common capital re­
quirement for internationally active banks. There was also a perceived fail­
ing of deregulation around the time that further informed the Basel commit­
tee’s need. Part of this was that deregulation allowed internationally active
banks to take advantage of differences in national treatment of similar as­
sets for capital requirement purposes. Deregulation also made it possible
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for national standards not to always link capital requirements to actual risk
levels, i.e. not taking into account exposures beyond those reflected within
the four corners of the balance sheet. Consequently, a regulatory consen­
sus started to build around a set of global standards that would provide
guidance on internationally active banks’ proper capital levels. The result
was Basel I accord in 1988.
By the late 1990s, it became apparent that the regulatory standard, as set
out by Basel I accord, was not sufficient to overcome the continued crisis
that marred the banking system. Therefore, the Basel Committee, seeking
to offer a more comprehensive and risk­sensitive approach to capital reg­
ulation, formally adopted the new framework of Basel II in 2004. Basel II
involved three so­called “pillars”: minimum capital requirements, the super­
visory review process, andmarket discipline. Basel II’s significant contribu­
tion was its wholesale revision of Basel I’s rudimentary “bucket” approach
to Risk­Weighted Assets (RWAs).
However, the recent financial crises have proved again that the standards
set by Basel II (even with an emphasis on risk assessment models) are
not sufficient in several areas. For example, Banks were able to take ad­
vantage of the rather loose definition of Tier 1 capital (left largely intact
from Basel I) by structuring financial products that enabled them to com­
ply with Basel II at a lower cost of capital. Likewise, banks managed to
structure their liabilities in a manner that the accord failed to capture. They
were able to keep capital requirements for trading book assets and se­
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curitisations under Basel II comparatively low, especially when compared
to assets registered on the banking books. Equally, the financial crisis re­
vealed critical flaws in the risk management models used by the majority of
banks, especially the famous ‘Value at Risk’ model that is criticised for be­
ing backward­looking and unable to capture risk as presumed. The crisis
also showed the inadequacy of credit rating agencies and raised questions
about their credibility. Another flaw of Basel II, even according to the Basel
Committee, was the “failure to capture major on­ and off­balance sheet
risks, as well as related derivatives exposures”.
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2.3.6 Basel III
Basel III’s central focus is on increasing the quality and quantity of capital
banks must hold. Alongside this is an extensive reassessment of risk cov­
erage guidelines and the creation of a set of system­wide macro­prudential
measures. Basel III introduces a set of tools and standards at the macro­
prudential level, such as; a countercyclical buffer and a universal leverage
ratio. This is to address systemic risk within the global financial system.
On its face, Basel III maintains the requirement that a bank’s “Total Capi­
tal” must be at least 8 per cent of RWAs as was set by Basel I and remained
essentially unchanged in Basel II. However, Basel III requires that at least
75 per cent of a bank’s Total Capital consist of Tier 1 capital, with only up
to 25 per cent of Total Capital consisting of Tier 2 capital.
Tier 1, also referred to as ‘going concern’ capital, is to provide the bank
a secure equity cushion, while Tier 2 capital, also referred to as ‘gone­
concern’ is to serve in providing sufficient loss absorption capital in peri­
ods of insolvency. Furthermore, Basel III has two additional capital buffers
intended to serve as further defences against future losses: a capital con­
servation buffer and a countercyclical buffer. The common principle under­
lying both buffers is that banks should build up pools of capital during “good
times,” i.e. periods of strong growth that can be used during the inevitable
“bad times” when unexpected losses may occur. Basel III requirement also
pointed out the flaw with the notion of capital requirements solely based on
RWAs. Before the crisis, several banks and other financial institutions built
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up leverage that was seen as excessive while still showing strong capital
ratios as measured against RWAs. Hence, a “leverage ratio” is introduced
to overcome this challenge. Its calculation is made by comparing Tier 1
capital with “total exposure” without reference to RWAs. The overall target
is a leverage ratio of at least 3 per cent (i.e. Tier 1 capital should be at least
three per cent of total exposure).
Acharya (2012) explained that the purpose of the Basel accords was to
provide a common risk­based assessment for bank assets and required
capital levels. To achieve this, Basel III categorised risks into two parts
that can cause a financial firm to fail. First is solvency or capital risk. This
is where the market value of the firm’s assets falls below its obligations.
Second is liquidity risk, where the firm cannot convert assets into cash to
pay off its obligations because asset markets have become illiquid. Stated
differently is where the firm is unable to roll over its maturing debt obliga­
tions with immediacy to some point in the future.
He further highlighted that; there is still no focus on measuring quantities
that actually reflect systemic risk, such as; the change in the value of a fi­
nancial firm’s assets given a macroeconomic shock and the impact such a
shock has on its liability and funding structure. In the same vein, whatever
capital and/or liquidity requirements are placed on banks, it is highly likely
that the financial activities affected by these requirements will just move
elsewhere in the shadow banking system. That is, without the understand­
ing that the complete financial system must have unison treatment, Basel
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III will run into the same shadow banking issues that arose with Basel I and
II. Therefore, underscoring the importance of this analysis.
With another look into the accord, Hannoun (2010) states that Basel III
has substantially improved the coverage of risks in areas related to lever­
age ratio that provides the benefit of safeguarding against risk and any
attempts to circumvent the risk­based capital requirements. It (leverage
ratio) achieves this by measuring the bank’s Tier 1 capital as a % of its as­
sets plus off­balance sheet exposures and derivatives. Finally, While some
in the financial community are sceptical about the usefulness of a leverage
ratio, the Basel Committee’s Top­down Capital Calibration Group recently
completed a study that showed that the leverage ratio did the best job of
differentiating between banks that ultimately required taxpayer support in
the recent crisis and those that did not.
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Table 2.1: BASEL III Capital Adequacy Standards
CAPITAL TYPE Year to Regulation Adherence
2013 2019
Minimum equity capital ratio (pure
stock)
3.5% of RWAs 4.5% of RWAs
Minimum tier­1 capital 4.5% of RWAs 6.0% of RWAs
Minimum total capital (plus new capital
conservation buffer)
8.0% of RWAs 10.5% of RWAs
Notes: source Bank for International Settlements. 2010(b). Group of Gov­
ernors and Heads of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital
standards, Annex 2 (press release). Basel, Switzerland.
While Basel III has been broadly accepted as a right step concerning Capi­
tal regulation, Acharya (2012) showed some fundamental issues surround­
ing it, especially with respect to the recent crisis. He highlighted how the
idea of risk­weighted assets (RWAs) has conceptual flaws as a macro­
prudential tool. That is to say, while macro­prudential regulation is con­
cerned with system­wide risk, Basel capital regulation is concerned with
individual firm risk. This idea of individual risk has the potential of increas­
ing system risk, in the sense that these institutions would consume any
asset class with higher risk weight encouraged by Basel. In so, instead of
increasing diversification, it actually reduces it, and by so doing increasing
risk.
Again, RWAs regulation aims at relative prices for lending and investment
banks rather than directly restricting amount or asset risks. Regulators—
in the absence of price discovery provided by day­to­day markets—have
little hope of achieving relative price efficiency that is sufficiently dynamic
and reflective of underlying risks and the dangers that risks will change.
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In contrast, concentration limits on asset class exposure for the economy
as a whole, or simply leverage restrictions (assets–equity of each financial
firm not greater than 15:1, for instance), or an asset risk restriction (loan­
to­value of mortgages not to exceed 80%, for example), are more likely to
be robust and countercyclical macroprudential tools. They do not directly
address systemic risk but at least offer hope of limiting risks of individual
financial firms and asset classes.
Acharya (2012) argues that instead of admitting these flaws, the commit­
tee offered a new set of rules and guidelines that, in many ways, mirror the
previous two attempts. While the Basel III process focuses on using more
stringent capital requirements to get around some of these issues, it ig­
nores the financial system’s crucial market and regulatory failures. Haven
highlighted both pros and cons of Basel III; we now move to analyse the
impact it has had on crisis probability.
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2.4 Methodology Literature
Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006) used a logit model to analyse crisis. They
emphasised the difference between using a fixed­effectsmodel and a random­
effects model. Showing how fixed effects are equivalent to country dum­
mies and focused on the within information only. As such, they constitute
a loss of information, but the estimates are unbiased. Whereas Fragoso et
al. (2018) suggested using random effects as it providesmore efficient esti­
mates because they do not consider country effects as fixed but as random
and combine more efficiently the between and the within information. How­
ever, they concluded results could be potentially biased as it assumes that
individual­specific effects are uncorrelated with independent variables. To
help us decide what model (i.e. fixed­effects or random­effects) is a better
fit for data collected in this research; the Hausman test was carried out.The
Hausman test is sometimes described as a test for model misspecification.
In panel data analysis (as the case here), the Hausman test can help us
to choose between fixed effects model or a random effects model. The
null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects; The alternate
hypothesis is that the model is fixed effects. Essentially, the tests looks to
see if there is a correlation between the unique errors and the regressors
in the model. The null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between
the two. We also applied marginal effects analysis to help with final inter­
pretation of analysis (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).
It is important to highlight at this point that there are specific problems with
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the logit regression in situations when there are many potential explanatory
variables. Firstly, putting all possible variables in one regression can signif­
icantly increase the standard errors when irrelevant variables are included.
Secondly, the use of sequential testing to exclude irrelevant variables can
lead to misleading results since there is a possibility to exclude a relevant
variable every time the test is done. Equally, estimation results are often
not robust to small changes in model specification, making credible inter­
pretations of the results hazardous. Proper treatment of model uncertainty
is clearly essential. One such treatment is model averaging, where the in­
vestigator aims not to find the best possible model but rather to find the best
possible estimates. Each model contributes information about the param­
eters of interest, and all these pieces of information combine to take into
account the trust we have in each model based on our prior beliefs and
the data. In a sense, all estimation procedures are model averaging algo­
rithms, although possibly extreme or limiting cases.
One of the ways to overcome these problems is the implementation of the
Bayesian model averaging (BMA). This will be used for robustness check
of our logit analysis here as it takes into account the uncertainty of mod­
els, considering their combinations and weighting them in accordance with
their performances. This technique has been used in relation to early warn­
ing models by Cuaresma and Slacik (2009), who studied currency crises,
and then Babecký et al. (2012) did a research dealing with banking, debt
and currency crises. Babecký et al. (2012) also highlighted that putting
all potential regressors ( as done with the logit model) would likely inflate
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standard errors when irrelevant variables are included in the model. Us­
ing sequential testing to remove variables that are not important can cause
misleading results due to excluding important variables. Overcoming these
issues requires the use of BMA, which takes into account model combina­
tions and weighting variables according to their model fit.
Echoing above, Hoeting et al. (1999) stated that the earliest use of model
averaging relates to a study base on airline passengers. He showed the
use of BMA for model selection could be attributed to the work of Leamer
et al. (1978). It highlighted that the fundamental idea of BMA accounts for
uncertainty associated with model selection. The application of BMA was
also used by Fernandez et al. (2001) and Doppelhofer and Miller (2004)
in growth regressions. It is showing that the Bayesian model averaging
provides a formal probabilistic framework to deal with model uncertainty.
Ho (2015) also highlighted the importance of using BMA in dealing with
model uncertainty. Raftery and Zheng (2003) also mentioned that BMA
has important statistical properties that address not only the inflated t­
statistics but also maximises the predictive performance while minimising
the total error rate when compared to any individual model. BMA attraction
lies in the fact that it addresses questions such as: what is the probability
that a model is correct? How likely is it that a regressor has an effect on
the dependent variable? BMA does this via the Posterior Inclusion Prob­
abilities (PIP) that result from summing up posterior model probabilities
across all models that included the regressor. Chow (1979) and later re­
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fined by Kass and Raftery (1995) developed a general rule that shows the
effect­thresholds for posterior inclusion probabilities. They showed PIP
with <50% are seen as evidence against an effect or weak effect of the
regressor, whereas anything above 50% can be accepted to have a posi­
tive and robust effect. More recently, Taha Zaghdoudi (2016) restated that
the robustness of a variable in the explanation of the dependent variable
can be captured by the probability that a given variable is included in the
regression. For this, the posterior inclusion probability is used. It captures
the extent to which the robustness of the relationship of a potential explana­
tory variable to the dependent variable can be ascertained. Variables with
large PIP can be considered as robust determinants of the dependent vari­
able, while variables with low PIP are deemed not to be robustly related to
the dependent variable.
Fragoso (2018) also shows that Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) is an
extension of the usual Bayesian inference methods in which one does not
only models parameter uncertainty through the prior distribution but also
model uncertainty obtaining posterior parameter and model posteriors us­
ing Bayes’ theorem and therefore allowing for direct model selection, com­
bined estimation and prediction.
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2.5 Data
The macroeconomic movements that crystallise risks particular to banking
systems, e.g. interest rate, credit, liquidity and market risk, have been the
key determinants of banking crises in the last 20 years (Emre and Thom­
son, 2005). Going by this, then it is logical that variables for this analysis
to measure the probability of a crisis occurring would encapsulate those
mentioned above in some manner. In order to capture developments in
the economy prior to the crisis and to avoid endogenous effects of crises
on the explanatory variables, all variables are lagged by one period, apart
from real house price growth, which has three lags (Barrell et al., 2009).
It is probably the case that house price growth is a proxy for other driv­
ing factors, which is why it has a longer lag than the other variables. The
growth rate of some of the variables were also taken where stationarity is
not achieved after taking first difference (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).
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2.5.1 Dependent Variable
The literature has shown that even after identifying important variables that
can predict the crisis, there still remain the inconsistency in the banking
crisis dependent variable, which is necessarily defined with a degree of
subjectivity as shown by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Demirgüç­Kunt
and Detragiache (1998) and Eichengreen and Arteta (2002).
There is no unique quantitative variable for a banking crisis (Bussiere and
Fratzscher, 2006). The problem lies in the fact that a banking crisis is an
event, so proxies for banking crises do not necessarily have a perfect cor­
relation with banking crises themselves. For instance, if we were to use
a measure for banking insolvency, such as aggregate banking capital, we
would need to define a lower bound threshold for a crisis event. However,
government intervention or deposit insurance could prevent a crisis while
the threshold is still be violated. Another issue is that not all crises stem
from the liabilities side. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) showed problems
in asset quality could also erode banking capital so that a single proxy vari­
able would not pick up all crisis events. As a result, a dummy is constructed
based on several criteria, which vary according to the study and often us­
ing accurate, post­crisis data. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) focused on the
solvency side of a crisis and defined a systemic crisis as an event when “all
or most of the banking capital is exhausted. They identified 93 countries
as having experienced systemic crises between1980 ­ 2002.
Demirgüç­Kunt and Detragiache (1998), used a more specific set of four
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criteria, i.e. where achievement of at least one of the conditions was a re­
quirement for a systemic crisis; otherwise, bank failure was non­systemic.
The dependent variable takes a value of one if at least one of the four con­
ditions are satisfied: (1) The proportion of non­performing loans to total
banking system assets exceeded 10%, (2) Public bailout cost exceeded
2% of GDP, (3) Systemic crisis caused large­scale bank nationalisation,
(4) Extensive bank runs were visible, or if not, emergency government in­
tervention was visible.
This definition of the crisis dependent variable has been adopted as a
mainstream definition that was adopted by the international monetary fund,
World Bank, and work of Laeven and Valencia (2018) with the addition
of Deposit freeze and bank holidays that captures conditions when the
government placed restrictions on deposit withdrawals or a bank holiday.
Therefore, it is reasonable given broad consensus to equally adopt the
same here, less the 5th addition by Laeven and Valencia (2018) given it
occurred in Iceland, a country not part of current study.
By way of depicting the progress of the crisis or the dependent variable as
described above: Graphs 2.1 and 2.2 below showed how the capitalisation
of major financial institutions in the UK and USwere affected between 2007
– 2009. Some of them failed within the period, while others experienced a
variation of the other conditions used to define the dependent variable.
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Figure 2.1: Market Capitalization (UK)
Notes: Market Capitalization, capturing event surrounding dependent vari­
able in the UK. There were about 46 financial service firms failure, and
all UK banks needed some assistance, while UK government engaged in
Quantitative Easing program from 2009 to 2016 that stood at £435 billion
(all banks met the criteria set out by the dependent variable). Source: Au­
thor.
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Figure 2.2: Market Capitalization (US)
Notes: Market Capitalization, capturing event surrounding dependent vari­
able in the US. There were 168 banks failures in the US within this time
period, despite Troubled Asset Relief program that pumped about 475 bil­
lion under Dodd­Frank Act to stabilize the economy. Outside the 168 failed
banks, most financial institutions benefitted from TARP, meeting the criteria
set by dependent variable). Source: Author.
It is noteworthy to mention that Demirgüç­Kunt and Detragiache (1998),
admitted to relying on the judgement if there was insufficient evidence to
support their crisis criteria. On that basis, they established 31 systemic
crises in 65 countries over the 1980–1994 period. They further conducted
a follow­up study and extended the sample to 1980–2002. Using the same
criteria as before, they found 77 systemic crises over 94 countries.
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2.5.2 Explanatory Variables
The explanatory variables chosen are based on previous literature and the­
ory about the factors that caused the crisis, as already discussed earlier.
Real GDP and real short­term interest rate are used to capture macroeco­
nomic and non­performing loan shocks that affect the banks. Real interest
rates also captures the banking sector liberalisation, which in turn captures
the fragility of the sector because of increased opportunities for excessive
risk­taking. Inflation (as associated with nominal interest rate) is used to
capture macroeconomic mismanagement that fuelled the bubble due to
excessive credit.
Barrell et al. (2010b) equally showed that when considering the variables
that are important for measuring the cause of the crises, then the current
account deficit should be included. This is because it has led to the growth
of global imbalances that is deemed as part of the determinants of the cri­
sis. Due to such pressure, global real interest rates fell after 2001Q1, and
real long­term rates were probably 100 or more basis points below their
level of the previous decade. This in turn contributed to rapid credit ex­
pansion and rising asset prices which preceded the crisis”. A number of
potential links are traced from current account deficits to the risk of bank­
ing crises. For example, deficits may accompany monetary inflows that
enable banks to expand credit excessively, and they may accompany an
overheating economy. This may both generate and reflect a high demand
for credit, as well as boosting asset prices in an unsustainable manner.
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Equally, McKinnon and Pill (1997) also showed capital inflows in a weakly
regulated banking system with a safety net may lead to over­lending cy­
cles, consumption booms, rising asset prices and further increases in cur­
rent account deficits.
In terms of macroeconomic indicators, as discussed by Beck et al. (2006),
variables such as the growth of real GDP, changes in terms of trade and
inflation can be seen to capture macroeconomic developments that affect
banks asset quality. The vulnerability of banks to sudden capital outflows
may be indicated by the ratio of their deposits to foreign exchange reserves.
Credit growth may indicate lax lending standards as well as potentially trig­
gering an asset boom. A laxmonetary policy, as indicated by the short­term
real interest rate may also induce lax lending and feed asset bubbles. Fis­
cal deficits may also affect the risk of crises by overheating the economy.
A large fiscal deficit also reduces the scope to recapitalise banks should
difficulties emerge, making a systemic crisis more likely. Institutional vari­
ables such as a deposit insurance scheme may lead to greater moral haz­
ard for banks. Structural features of bank regulation, legal framework and
economic freedom (Barth et al. 2004) may also be used as institutional
controls.
Following the discussion above, I include macroeconomic, banking­sector
and policy variables from the existing literature as potential predictors. Be­
sides the current account/GDP ratio, macroeconomic variables are real
GDP growth, inflation, and real house price growth. Banking variables
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are the ratio M2/Foreign Exchange Reserves, real domestic credit growth,
Banking sector leverage, Liquidity ratio, as captured by Basel III threshold
ratio’s (capital adequacy ratio, leverage ratio and liquidity ratio) have been
added. Policy variables are the real interest rate and the fiscal surplus/
GDP ratio (%). The databases used for this research include the IMF sec­
tor soundness indicators, World Bank WDI, BvD BankScope, SNL Banker,
Federal Reserve and Bank of England databases. It is also important at
this point to mention that Basel III ratios were used alongside previous
Basel ratios that were supposed to come to effect around the crisis period
that started in 2007 to measure the impact of Basel thresholds on crisis,




Table 2.2 shows the frequency of the crisis period (yearly basis) recorded
from 1970 to the period of the recent crisis in 2008 in both UK and US.
Where ‘1’ signifies the occurrence of a crisis and ‘0’ shows the absence
of crisis. In total there were 17 years in the UK (1973 – ‘76, 1981 – ‘84,
1991–’93, 1995, 2000 – 2003, 2007 – 2008) that meet the crisis criteria set
out above and 23 years in the US (1973 – ‘75, 1977 – ‘82, 1984–‘91, 2000
– 2003, 2007 – 2008) Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). Table 2.3 describes the
statistics for all independent variables covering the same period as Table
2.2. It takes into account the number of observations used for analysis after
lagging the respective variable(s). The table also shows the mean, stan­
dard deviation, minimum andmaximum values for these variables. Consis­
tent with the analysis undertaken, further descriptive statistics are captured
in Tables 2.4. These effectively capture the changes that have occurred in
independent variables that highlights the lead up to the crisis and period
that regulation was implemented.
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Notes:Descriptive statistic of systemic banking crisis from 1970 to 2008.
The table shows 43 years without crisis, while 35 years had some kind
of crisis that ranges from banking, stock­market, currency or debt crisis
between UK and US.
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Cap. Adeq. ratio overall 4.058 5.392 0.000 14.000 76
between 0.589 3.625 4.458 02
within 5.376 ­0.400 14.433 38
Liquidity ratio overall 6.537 12.043 0.000 31.180 78
between 9.244 0.000 13.073 02
Within 10.087 ­6.537 24.643 39
Leverage ratio Overall 2.730 3.612 0.000 9.900 76
Between 1.158 1.878 3.516 02
Within 3.517 ­0.786 10.752 38
Inflation Overall 5.551 4.572 0.797 24.207 76
Between 1.200 4.703 6.400 02
Within 4.492 ­0.051 23.359 38
Real interest rate overall 3.149 3.594 ­12.172 8.720 76
Between 1.991 1.741 4.556 02
Within 3.303 ­10.765 7.846 38
Priv.sect.credit/GDP overall 3.319 7.067 ­19.132 31.788 76
Between 0.809 2.746 3.891 02
Within 7.043 ­18.560 31.216 38
Real Property growth Overall 58.408 22.375 22.874 114.409 72
Between 21.313 43.338 73.479 02
Within 16.441 37.945 113.223 36
Real dom. credit
growth
Overall 0.054 0.251 ­0.723 0.892 76
Between 0.052 0.018 0.091 02
Within 0.248 ­0.759 0.855 38
M2/foreign exch. res Overall ­0.111 1.301 ­3.768 1.958 76
Between 0.070 ­0.161 ­0.061 02
Within 1.300 ­3.719 2.008 38
Fiscal surplus/GDP Overall ­0.145 0.891 ­2.361 2.180 76
Between 0.024 ­0.162 ­0.128 02
Within 0.890 ­2.344 2.197 38
Real GDP growth Overall ­0.176 2.416 ­8.972 6.543 76
Between 0.014 ­0.186 ­0.167 02
Within 2.416 ­8.963 6.534 38
Notes:Descriptive statistic of explanatory variables with total observations,
variations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum figures from
1970 to 2008. The between variation shows variation ’between’ each vari­
able in the panel, while ‘within’ shows variation of a variable overtime.List of
all explanatory variables with full definition, source, frequency and lagging
details in appendix.
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Table 2.2 shows about 45% crisis occurrence, supporting the rationale to
cover the historic period, not only to provide a balanced approach to the
analysis but also in line with previous literature when analysing crisis pe­
riod. While there are 11 regressors, the focus here remains on those vari­
ables with statistical significance within the model and Basel III regulatory
variables. Comparing the capital adequacy ratio from Table 2.3 above and
that of Table 2.4 below confirms the earlier highlighted fact that financial
institutions within the UK/US have taken steps to meet the new regula­
tory requirements. The Capital adequacy ratio had a mean of 4.058 and a
maximum of 14 in Table 2.3 and 14.625 and 19.62 in Table 2.4, showing an
increase in the ratio that highlights the impact of the new regulation. Bank
liquidity ratio mean and maximum figures rose from 6.537 and 31.180 to
25.634 and 36.530 respectively, and Bank Leverage ratio from 2.730 and
9.9 to 7.327 and 9.580 respectively. The Leverage ratio increase reflects
the change in how the leverage ratio is calculated and had the greatest
impact on reducing the crisis probability. The statistics for GDP shows that
over the period, the mean value of GDP growth has improved from ­0.176
to ­0.048, while the maximum growth has remained the same at 6.54. The
mean value for Real house price growth, as expected, has increased from
55.50 to 66.199, possibly reflecting the bubble within the housing market.
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Cap. Adeq. ratio overall 14.625 2.840 9.440 19.620 22
between 2.209 13.063 16.186 02
within 2.347 11.002 18.058 11
Liquidity ratio overall 25.634 10.368 0.000 36.530 22
between 10.888 17.935 33.333 02
Within 6.738 7.699 37.469 11
Leverage ratio Overall 7.327 1.734 4.413 9.580 22
Between 2.151 5.806 8.848 02
Within 0.763 5.879 8.546 11
Inflation Overall 2.155 1.052 ­0.356 3.839 22
Between 0.230 1.992 2.318 02
Within 1.039 ­0.193 4.002 11
Real interest rate Overall 1.279 1.882 ­1.481 5.249 22
Between 1.723 0.060 2.498 02
Within 1.409 ­0.263 4.074 11
Priv.sect.credit/GDP Overall 1.270 11.298 ­19.132 23.099 22
Between 0.287 1.068 1.473 02
Within 11.296 ­19.334 23.302 11
Real Property growth Overall 78.421 9.432 86.139 117.950 22
Between 2.962 96.326 100.515 02
Within 9.185 84.045 115.855 11
Real dom. credit
growth
Overall ­0.071 0.261 ­1.000 0.336 22
Between 0.027 ­0.090 ­0.052 02
Within 0.260 ­0.981 0.355 11
M2/foreign exch. res Overall ­0.053 2.129 ­4.931 3.194 22
Between 0.187 ­0.185 0.079 02
Within 2.124 ­4.844 3.326 11
Fiscal surplus/GDP Overall 0.113 0.924 ­1.875 2.046 22
Between 0.279 ­0.085 0.310 02
Within 0.901 ­1.678 1.978 11
Real GDP growth Overall ­0.048 2.213 ­3.715 5.882 22
Between 0.018 ­0.061 ­0.036 02
Within 2.213 ­3.703 5.895 11
Notes:Descriptive statistic of explanatory variables with total observations,
variations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum figures from
2009 to 2018. The between variation shows variation ’between’ each vari­





The use of EWS has been applied on many empirical literatures to explain
crisis such as those applied by Berg and Patillo (1999), Demirgüç­Kunt
and Detragiache (1998), Eichengreen and Arteta (2002), Furman et al.
(1998), Honohan (1997), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) amongst others.
EWS has two main approaches to dealing with crisis explanation, i.e. 1,
Signal method and 2, use of econometric techniques. The former is a non­
parametric method, and a variable has a threshold that, if breached, acts as
a signal for an impending crisis, as used by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
While the latter allows the use of multivariate explanatory variables to es­
tablish the relationship between dependent crisis variable and independent
variables. It employs the use of probabilities to show the relationship be­
tween discrete dependent variables (Tularam and Subramanian, 2013).
We use a logit model to achieve such end here.
The logit model is a binary dependent variable model. Where its simplest
form is a linear probability model (LPM). It is based on the assumption that
the probability of an event y occurring is linearly related to a number of
explanatory variables say; X1, X2, X3…Xk, Hence, the linear probability
model can take the form
y = p(y = 1)=β1+ β1X2+β1X3+ · · ·+β1Xk+µ (2.1)
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Where, y = is the dependent variable, and is made up of a series of zeroes
(0’s) and ones (1’s) i.e. the chance of the event occurring or not. Although
this can then be estimated using standard ordinary least square regression,
and the fitted values in equation 1 becomes the estimated probabilities of y
= 1 for each observation. The slopes are then interpreted as the change in
the probability that the dependent variable will equal 1 for a one­unit change
in a given explanatory variable, holding the effect of all other explanatory
variables fixed (Brooks, 2019). The only problem with this is the fact that
the probability value outcome can be outside the desired value of zero or
one. To overcome this problem amongst others associated with LPM, we
use a logit model. It applies an S shape type function to allow the probability









Where z is any random variable and e is an exponential within the logit






Where: P is the probability that y = 1, and 0 and are asymptotes to the
function as suggested by the graph 1 below. Showing that the probabilities
never reach exactly zero or one.
Equation 2.2 also show that as z tends to infinity, e−z tends to zero and as
1
1+ e−z moves to 1, z moves to minus infinity. Therefore, to estimate the
model, maximum likelihood method rather than OLS is required.
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Figure 2.3: Logit graph
Notes: Logit model, showing a bounded outcome between one and zero.
Source: UCLA (2021).
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The multivariate logit form used by Davis and Karim (2008) and Barrell et
al. (2009) and adapted here is of the functional form;




Accordingly, the dependent binary variable; a dummy of crises, takes a
value of zero (0) when there is no crises and the value of one (1) when
crises occurs and is denoted by;
Yit is the independent variable for country i at time t, therefore
y = {1 with probability p, or 0 with probability 1­ p}.
P (i, t) denote the probability dummy variable for crises occurring as one
and zero otherwise in i country (US/UK) at time t (1970 – 2017).
β is the vector of coefficients hypothesizing whether a crisis occur or not
Xit serves as the vector of explanatory variables and
FβXit is the cumulative logistic distribution function.






















The sign on the above coefficients are then interpreted directly to show: a
positive or negative relative relationship with the crisis probability; however,
interpreting the values are not as straightforward. Davis and Karim (2008)
highlighted that the parameters obtained by maximising the function above
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are not constant marginal effects of Xit on the crisis probability. Since the
variable’s effect is conditional on the values of all other explanatory vari­
ables at time t, rather the coefficient βi represents the effect of Xi when all
other variables are held at their sample mean values.
Therefore, to directly compare the individual contributions of each variable
to crisis, their marginal effects can be computed for their mean values
as shown by Greene (2000) or at a specific year before a crisis unfolds.
Furthermore, Cameron and Trivedi (2009) stated results interest for the
purposes of interpretation from logit models need lie in determining the
marginal effects of change in a regressor on the conditional probability that
y =1. Given the interest here is understanding the impact of some partic­
ular explanatory variables, calculating the marginal effects is necessary








2.6.2 Bayesian Model Average
The basic idea of BMA from above as used within EWS literature and here
is that: when there are many plausible models, inference should be based
not on a singlemodel, but rather on the average of all models. Thismethod­
ology avoids the a­priori selection of a subset of regressors. By making
inferences based on a weighted average over the model space, the result­
ing estimates can better reflect the uncertainty in the estimates (Babecký
et al., 2013). Given that Basel III liquidity ratios have been added to the
explanatory variables, further statistical test would be appropriate to estab­
lish if they should remain within the final model. The essence of using BMA
here is for robustness checks on these regressors, i.e. if the regressors of
Basel III are relevant in the model via the calculation of posterior inclu­
sion probabilities (PIP) % as explained above. Essentially, BMA provides
further robustness for the analysis. This is especially important since we al­
ready know that small changes in any particular model leads to estimation
results that are not robust, such that final credible interpretation becomes
uncertain. BMA, therefore, provides not only the best possible model but
also the best possible estimates. This is because each model contributes
information about the parameters of interest, and all these pieces of infor­
mation take into account the trust we have in each model base on our prior
beliefs and on the data.
Given that we are interested in crisis probability denoted as y. Then the
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kPr(y |Mk,D) Pr(Mk|D) (2.7)
This is an average of the posterior distribution under each of the model
considered, weighted by their posterior model probability. In equation (2.7),
M1... Mk are the models considered. The posterior probability for model
Mk is then given by;
Pr(Mk |D) =
pr [D|Mk] pr [Mk]∑k





pr(D|θk, Mk) pr(θk|Mk) dθk (2.9)
equation 2.9 becomes the integrated likelihood of the model Mk.
θk is the vector of parameters of modelMk (e.g. for regression θ = (β, σ2))
Pr(θk|Mk) is the prior density of θk under model Mk
Pr(D|θk, Mk) is the likelihood
Pr(Mk) is the prior probability that Mk is the true model (given one of the
models considered is the true model) and all probabilities are condition on
M, i.e. the set of all models being considered (Hoeting et al., 1999).
BMA estimation, therefore, proceeds by initially estimating the parameters
conditional on a selected model. Thereafter the estimator is computed
as a weighted average of these conditional parameters. To achieve this
averaged model: the posterior model probabilities are used as considered
75
under the Bayes’ theorem:
P (Mi |y,X)α x P(y |Mi,X) x P(Mi) (2.10)
Where P (Mi |y,X) represents posterior model probability, which is propor­
tional to the marginal likelihood of the model P(y |Mi,X) multiplied by the
prior probability of the model P(Mi).
The robustness of a variable in the explanation of the dependent variable
is then captured by the probability that a given variable is included in the
regression via the calculation of Posterior Inclusion Probability (PIP).
PIP captures the extent to which we can evaluate the robustness of the
relationship of a potential explanatory variable to the dependent crisis vari­
able. Variables with large PIP can be considered as robust determinants
of the dependent variable, while variables with low PIP are deemed not to
be robustly related to the dependent variable. As earlier explained, for the
purpose of this research, we remain focused on the impact of Basel thresh­
old variables, hence informing why they have been added to the model as
focused variables (knowing that other variables could potentially have a
greater PIP outcome than these variables).
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2.7 Results
To capture the impact of regulation on the crisis probably; the data is di­
vided into 2 sample periods. Part of the rationale for this is that the cri­
sis dependent variable extended to 2010 period. This explanation comes
from the actions of Bank of England quantitative easing (QE), a large stake
in major banks ownership, Federal Reserve’s troubled asset relief pro­
gram (TARP), in the absence of other earlier events such as bank clo­
sures/failures. Equally, Basel III became operational in 2013 and the thresh­
olds in question fully complied with in January 2019. The adjustment period
allowed banks to meet these thresholds, and the data collected showed the
required thresholds are mostly met at the time Basel III was announced
in December 2010 when the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS) announced a package of reforms known as Basel III (BCBS, 2010b).
As such, the first sample covers the whole period, as done by most of the
previous works of literature, which is 1970, while the subsample is from
2010 to 2018. This sample allows the analysis to provide a clear impact
with the regulation has had on crisis probability.
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2.7.1 Model Interpretation
In total, we ran seven logit regressions. In order to capture developments
in the economy prior to the crisis and to avoid the endogenous effect of
crises on the explanatory variables, all variables are lag by one period.
Models ‘A’ to ‘D’ are referred to as full regressions, in the sense that they
cover the whole sample period (1970 – 2018), while models ‘E’ to ‘F’ covers
the period from 2010 to 2018 (justification for sample already mentioned
earlier). This is similar to Demirguc­Kunt et al. (2013), when examining the
impact of banking regulatory variables and crisis had on stock returns. At
each stage, the variable(s) that are not statistically significant are removed
from the next regression. Regression A is used for the Hausman post
estimation test to determine if a random or fixed effect model is more ap­
propriate. Further, a marginal analysis test is applied to assess the impact
of each explanatory variable on the probability of a crisis, similar to Barrell
et al. (2010a). Finally, BMA is used for explanatory variables robustness
check, complementing previous empirical application of BMA as used by
Ho (2015), Christofides et al. (2016), Babecký et al. (2012), Hamdaoui
(2017), and Cuaresma and Slacik (2009).
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Table 2.5: Panel multivariate logit model (Models A – D)
Variable Model A Model B Model C Model D
Capital Adeq. ratio ­0.395*** ­0.436*** ­0.098*** ­0.024**
­0.002 ­0.006 ­0.006 ­0.042
Liquidity ratio ­0.129*** ­0.117*** ­0.084*** ­0.015**
0.003 ­0.003 ­0.003 ­0.016
Leverage ratio 0.615** 0.603** 0.252** 0.058*
0.042 0.032 ­0.033 ­0.048
Inflation 0.000 0.054 – –
­0.627 0.312 – –
Real interest rate 0.072* 0.112*** – –
0.061 ­0.021 – –
Priv.sect.credit/GDP ­0.055 – – –
­0.253 – – –
Property price 0.064* 0.066* 0.059*
0.003 0.000 0.000
Domestic credit ­1.095 – – –
­0.351 – – –
M2/FRX reserves ­0.303 – – –
­0.154 – – –
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.051 – – –
­0.889 – – –
Real GDP growth ­0.351*** ­0.346*** ­0.374 –
0.007 0.003 ­0.428 –
constant ­3.421 ­3.101 ­2.702
0.027** 0.001*** 0.001***
Crisis Variable: Y = 0 (no crisis), Y = 1
(crisis)
Notes: The panel logit probability model estimated in this table is Banking
Crisis probability; (Country = j, Time = t) = a ­ b1 capital adequacy ratio j,
t ­ b2 bank liquidity ratio j, t + b3 bank leverage ratio j, t + b4 inflation j, t
+ b5 real interest rate j, t + b6 credit as a % of GDP j, t + b7 real house
price growth j, t + b8 broad money as a % of foreign reserve growth j, t +
b9 government deficit/surplus as a % of GDP + b10 government current
account as a % of GDP + b11 real GDP growth + e j, t. The dependent
variable is a crisis variables with two outcomes: Yj,t = 1 for year of crisis
and Yj,t = 0 years not categorized as crisis period.
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Looking at Table 2.5, the logit model’s log­likelihood ratio iteration shows
that the model converged and themodel is different from zero. Themodel’s
statistical significance is also established as our Prob > chi2 = 0.0243
is less than 5%. Meaning that our model is able to provide explanation
with respect to crisis probability using the explanatory variables within the
model.
Although some of the variables in model ‘A’ have not proved statistically
significant, the observed relationship of all variables from earlier theoretical
assumptions to crisis probability are all as expected. Model A shows an
inverse relationship between real economic growth and the probability of a
crisis occurring and a positive relationship between growth in house prices
and crisis probability. This follows the theoretical assumption on the rela­
tionship between the existence of bubbles and these variables. Equally,
the leverage ratio has a positive relationship to crisis probability, as it in­
dicates more risk. However, a point to note here is bank leverage, as
traditionally defined, is different from Basel III bank leverage (tier 1 capital
dividing unweighted total average asset). Hence Basel leverage ratio be­
haves inversely to crisis probability, as shown further in the analysis, while
traditional bank leverage (debt to equity ratio) has a positive relationship,
and given we have much more data points (1970 – 2009) from this sample
that is not Basel leverage defined (2010 – 2018), the relationship is posi­
tive.
The Model also shows that at a 10% level of significance, the interest rate
remains a significant variable in explaining the crisis. This is similar to
Demirguc­Kunt and Detragiache (2005) ’s work, where they found that cri­
80
sis occurred in periods of low GDP growth and high interest rates. Model
B shows that real house price growth, GDP and Basel III ratios remain sig­
nificant explanatory variables for the crisis, while real interest rate ceases
to be a significant predictor for the crisis. An explanation for this is that
interest rate as a joint predictor alongside other variables is significant but
not independently. This is similarly reported in the work of Davis and Karim
(2008). Model C shows that real house price growth continues to provide
an explanation for the crisis. It is probably the case that house price growth
is a proxy for other driving factors. It is likely serving as an indicator of
potential bad lending and hence of the wave of consequent defaults that
frequently develop as a consequence of a house price bubble. Model D
shows the importance of the new Basel III variables to crisis probability.
They have remained significant throughout, showing that regulation has
taken an important step towards reducing crisis probability.
The Hausman test, that test whether the unique errors (u) are correlated
with the regressors was undertaken. The result suggest otherwise, i.e.
differences across the panel have some influence on our crisis dependent
variable as expected. Further supporting the use of random effects model
instead of fixed effect.
Giving the interest in Basel thresholds, the Bayesian Model Average test
is undertaken using the data set from regression A. This is appropriate,
as it further confirms variables in model D remain robust in explaining the
crisis. The real house price growth and real GDP growth were used as
certainty variables within the model. At the same time, all the remaining
were subject to a traditional 50% PIP acceptance level. Interesting all new
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regulatory variables have above 50% PIP. This is further confirming the
importance of these variables as useful regulatory measures in dealing
with the crisis.
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Table 2.6: BMA model (1970 ­ 2018)
CRISIS Coef. t pip pip­rank
Real GDP growth ­0.063 ­3.264 1
Property price 0.009 2.620 1
M2/FRX reserves ­0.025 ­0.260 0.141 5
Capital Adeq. ratio ­0.039 ­1.642 0.876 1
Liquidity ratio ­0.011 ­1.171 0.69 2
Leverage ratio 0.028 0.600 0.511 3
Inflation 0.002 0.174 0.123 6
Real interest rate 0.002 0.241 0.490 5
Priv.sect.credit/GDP ­0.001 ­0.250 0.141 5
Domestic credit ­0.027 ­0.731 0.511 4
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.002 0.152 0.110 7
Notes: The Bayesian model average with real house prices and real GDP
growth chosen apriori due to statistical significance in model A and con­
sensus from theory. The table shows the ranking in order of statistical
significance for each variable within the model.
Generally, the BMA results show that the estimates from Basel III thresh­
olds are robust, i.e. all three variables have a PIP above 50%. It also
shows that fiscal surplus to GDP ratio to be an important variable within
the model that was not picked up by the logit model even though the the­
ory has earlier justified why it was initially included. The interest rate is
also just below the 50% mark, further supporting the theory on why it was
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included and the logit model’s result. The margins analysis that allows us
directly infer from coefficients (table 2.8 below) on regression D showed
the Bank liquidity ratio to reduce the crisis ratio by 1.5% over the period,
while the Bank leverage ratio increased the crisis probability by 5.7%. The
capital adequacy ratio minimises the probability of crisis by about 2.4%.
Table 2.7: Average marginal effects (1970 ­ 2018)
Variable Coefficient






Notes:The coefficients from this table are interpreted just like normal re­
gression, with an important caveat of the β’s above show probability impact
on crisis dependent variable
Logit Models E, F and G in Table 2.9 are for the sample period from 2009 to
2018. All variables that were significant in the full sample have remained as
such in the shorter period sample. Comparing Basel coefficients between
models D and G shows a clear improvement in the regulatory variables
probabilities to reduce crisis. Where the regression from the full sample
shows a modest relationship of 2.4%, 1.5%, and 5.7% for capital adequacy
ratio, bank liquidity ratio, and bank leverage ratio to crisis dependent vari­
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able, respectively, the shorter sample for the same variables shows 7.01%,
5.2% and 9.7% respectively—highlighting the importance of sampling the
data to capture the recent regulatory effects more accurately. The results
also show an improvement over those of related literature such as Barrell
et al. (2010a).
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Table 2.8: Panel multivariate logit model (Models E ­ G)
Variable Model E Model F Model G
Capital Adeq. ratio ­0.395** ­0.436*** ­0.702**
0.025 0.006 0.019
Liquidity ratio ­0.129*** ­0.117** ­0.052***
0.003 ­0.003 ­0.008
Leverage ratio 0.615** 0.603** ­0.969**
0.042 0.032 ­0.047
Inflation 0.000 0.055 –
­0.627 – –
Real interest rate 0.072 0.112 –
0.061* ­0.102 –
Priv.sect.credit/GDP ­0.055 – –
­0.253 – –
Property price 0.064*** 0.066*** –
0.003 0.000 –
Domestic credit ­1.095 – –
­0.351 – –
M2/FRX reserves ­0.303 – –
­0.154 – –
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.05 – –
­0.889 – –
Real GDP growth ­0.351*** ­0.346*** –
0.007 0.003 –
constant ­3.419** ­3.101*** –
0.027 0.001 –
Crisis Variable: Y = 0 (no crisis), Y = 1
(crisis)
Notes: Panel multivariate logit model (2009 ­ 2018).The panel logit prob­
ability model estimated in this table is Banking Crisis probability; (Country
= j, Time = t) = a ­ b1 capital adequacy ratio j, t ­ b2 bank liquidity ratio j, t
+ b3 bank leverage ratio j, t + b4 inflation j, t + b5 real interest rate j, t + b6
credit as a % of GDP j, t + b7 real house price growth j, t + b8 broad money
as a % of foreign reserve growth j, t + b9 government deficit/surplus as a
% of GDP + b10 government current account as a % of GDP + b11 real
GDP growth + e j, t. The dependent variable is a crisis variables with two
outcomes: Yj,t = 1 for year of crisis and Yj,t = 0 years not categorized as
crisis period.
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The robustness check of variables in Table 2.10, follows the same pattern
as table 2.8. The results are not significant different, with the exception
of Bank leverage ratio posterior inclusion probability that is slightly below
50% level.
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Table 2.9: BMA (2009 ­ 2018)
Variable Coef. t pip pip­rank
Real GDP growth ­0.059 ­3.030 1
Property price ­0.192 ­0.961 1
Capital Adeq. ratio ­0.033 ­1.280 0.783 1
Liquidity ratio ­0.009 ­1.011 0.630 3
Leverage ratio ­0.023 ­0.520 0.479 5
M2/FRX reserves 0.007 1.470 0.787 2
Inflation 0.001 0.17 0.130 7
Real interest rate 0.003 0.324 0.181 6
Priv.sect.credit/GDP ­0.001 ­0.222 0.133 7
Domestic credit ­0.035 ­0.841 0.510 4
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.004 0.171 0.111 8
Notes:The Bayesian model average with real house prices and real GDP
growth chosen apriori due to statistiscal significance in table A and con­
sensus from theory. PIP = posterior inclusion probability.
We have this far built on the main objective i.e. to establish the impact of
recent Basel III capital requirement, bank liquidity ratio and leverage ratio
have had so far with respect to reducing the probability of crisis so far.
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Table 2.10: Average marginal effects (2009 ­ 2018)
Variable Coefficient






Notes:The coefficients reflect the inverse impact Basel III thresholds
have had on the probability of crisis so far.
The final regression G shows these variables are statistically significant
when determining the probability of crisis. de­Ramon et al. (2012) also
came to same conclusion with emphasis on real house price growth, lever­
age and liquidity ratios. It has captured the relationship between the changed
definition of Basel leverage ratio and crisis probability. This is an improve­
ment over previous EWS literatures that have looked at liquidity thresholds
and crisis probability.




] = − 0.082CAR − 0.060BLIQR − 0.113BLEVR
(2.11)
The sensitivity/marginal analysis from table 2.11 allows us to make an in­
ference on the impact these variables currently have on the probability of
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a crisis. In other words, the impact regulation is having on reducing the
crisis probability via these channels. These are; 8.12% for capital require­
ment ratio, 0.6% for bank liquidity and 11.3% for bank leverage. It can
be inferred that the use of unweighted average total assets denominator
when calculating the leverage has been especially useful in reducing the
crisis probability due to the fact it captures both on and off­balance sheet
items, given that significant risk has been moved off the balance sheet in
the period building up to the crisis. This measure has allowed regulation
to capture a significant amount of risk that is reflected in the probability of
crisis reduction. These ratios, as compared to the general model, have
shown significant improvement in reducing crisis probability. It is further
supporting the regulation set out in Basel III. Regulation of these thresh­
olds via changing what each of these ratios captures to better reflect the
nature of risk and evolution of the banking balance sheet has proved to
have an impact on reducing the chances of further crisis happen through
these channels. However, this does not suggest that these channels are
immune to be future sources of crisis in the presence of interaction with




This chapter examined whether the recent regulatory steps that were taken
after the crisis; in particular, Basel III has had an impact on crisis proba­
bility. To achieve this: the most recent data has employed that span from
1970 – 2018. The methodology used (Logit model) is similar to that used
by Barrell et al. (2009) and Davis and Karim (2008). However, we con­
tributed by using actual Basel III data as opposed to assumed increases
to Basel III threshold in previous literature (i.e. these analysis were done
prior to announcement and implementation of the new regulation). Another
contribution is that Basel III thresholds were not established as variables
for EWS model in previous analysis, this work has shown due to change in
regulation, these should now be considered as part of the EWS variables.
BMA was used to further justify including the new Basel III regulatory vari­
ables within the model. The analysis has shown that regulators have taken
into consideration the impact that non­balance items can have on the bank­
ing sector as reflected in the new Basel III ‘leverage ratio’ definition. The
analysis has distinctively shown the impact of this by dividing our sample
period to capture the impact our new leverage ratio has on reducing crisis
probability.
Our results show an inverse relationship between real economic growth
and the probability of a crisis occurring and a positive relationship between
growth in house prices and crisis probability. Basel leverage ratio behaves
inversely to crisis probability as shown further in the analysis, while tradi­
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tional bank leverage (debt to equity ratio) has a positive relationship. The
analysis shows that at a 10% level of significance, the interest rate is sig­
nificant in explaining the crisis. This is similar to the work of Demirguc­Kunt
and Detragiache (2005), where they found that crises occurred in periods
of low GDP growth and high interest rates.
Comparing Basel coefficients between the two sample period regressions
shows a clear improvement in the regulatory variables probabilities to re­
duce crisis. Where the regression from the full sample shows a modest re­
lationship of 2.4%, 1.5%, and 5.7% for capital adequacy ratio, bank liquid­
ity ratio, and bank leverage ratio to crisis dependent variable, respectively,
the shorter sample for the same variables shows 7.01%, 5.2% and 9.7%
respectively—highlighting the importance of sampling the data to capture
the recent regulatory effects more accurately. The results also show an
improvement over those of related literature such as Barrell et al. (2010a).
The BMA results show that the estimates from Basel III thresholds are ro­
bust.
The chapter also established the rationale for regulation and showed that,
like most previous major regulations, regulation after the 2007 crisis aligns
with public interest theory. The argument against deregulation was clearly
outlined, the rationale behind it discussed. It has been shown that reg­
ulation or deregulation is not necessary the answer but the right kind of
regulation that neither hampers growth or innovation.
The analysis has shown that, while regulation has proved to affect crisis
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probability, it acknowledges limitation in providing the cost of regulation.
As Barrell et al. (2009) stated that regulation can be seen as a tax to the
banking system, with cost not only limited to the banks but can spill over to
the economy at large via cost of borrowing to household and business that
can lead to a reduction in output. This onerous task is beyond the scope of
this chapter and can be especially difficult to undertake currently as issues
such as trade wars between the USA and China, and ‘Brexit’ would make
it especially challenging in determining this cost. Overall, the models and
analysis confirmed earlier assumptions made and the importance of Basel








Basel III new regulatory threshold comprising
of counter cyclical buffer, capital conservation
buffer, common equity, tier 1 and tier 2 capital











Basel III new regulatory threshold compris­
ing of liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and net
stable funding ratio (NSFR) that requires 100
percent attainment, while traditional liquidity












Basel III new regulatory threshold defined as
tier 1 capital dividing average total asset (un­









Inflation Inflation as measured by the consumer price
index reflects the annual % change in the cost
to the average consumer of acquiring a bas­
ket of goods and services that may be fixed or
changed at specified intervals, such as yearly.









Real interest rate is the lending interest rate
adjusted for inflation asmeasured by the GDP











­ refers to financial resources provided to
the private sector by financial corporations,
such as through loans, purchases of non­
equity securities, and trade credits and other
accounts receivable, that establish a claim
for repayment. The financial corporations
include monetary authorities and deposit
money banks, as well as other financial cor­
porations where data are available (including
corporations that do not accept transferable
deposits but do incur such liabilities as time
and savings deposits). Examples of other fi­
nancial corporations are finance and leasing
companies, money lenders, insurance corpo­
rations, pension funds, and foreign exchange














The indices of residential property prices over
time. Included are rent prices, real and nom­
inal house prices, and ratios of price to rent
and price to income; the main elements of
housing costs. In most cases, the nominal
house price covers the sale of newly­built
and existing dwellings, following the recom­
mendations from RPPI (Residential Property
Prices Indices) manual. The real house price
is given by the ratio of nominal price to the
consumers’ expenditure deflator seasonally
adjusted, from the OECD national accounts
database. The price to income ratio is the
nominal house price divided by the nominal
disposable income per head and can be con­
sidered as a measure of affordability. The
price to rent ratio is the nominal house price
divided by the rent price and can be consid­
ered as a measure of the profitability of house
ownership. This indicator is an index with













This is the sum of currency outside banks; de­
mand deposits other than those of the central
government; the time, savings, and foreign
currency deposits of resident sectors other
than the central government; bank and trav­
eler’s checks; and other securities such as
certificates of deposit and commercial paper.










as a % of
GDP
General government deficit is defined as the
fiscal position of government after accounting
for capital expenditures. Comprising of ”Net
lending” where government is providing finan­
cial resources to other sectors, while ”net bor­
rowing” means that government requires fi­
nancial resources from other sectors. Gen­
eral government net lending is calculated as:
gross savings plus net capital transfers (re­
ceivable minus payable) minus gross capital
formation, followed by the subtraction of ac­
quisitions minus disposals of non­produced,
non­financial assets. This indicator is mea­












as a % of
GDP
The current account balance of payments is
a record of a country’s international transac­
tions with the rest of the world. The current
account includes all the transactions (other
than those in financial items) that involve eco­
nomic values and occur between resident and
non­resident entities. Also covered are off­
sets to current economic values provided or
acquired without a quid pro quo. This indica­
tor is measured in million USD and % of GDP.













Annual % growth rate of GDP at market prices
based on constant local currency. Aggre­
gates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dol­
lars. GDP is the sum of gross value added
by all resident producers in the economy plus
any product taxes and minus any subsidies
not included in the value of the products. It is
calculated without making deductions for de­
preciation of fabricated assets or for depletion
and degradation of natural resources. Yearly








The Impact of Regulation on
systemic risk
3.1 Abstract
The financial crisis, its cost to taxpayer and the real economy has brought
about an extensive regulatory change affecting the entire financial system.
Using quarterly delta conditional value at risk (∆CoVaR; a proxy for sys­
temic risk) from 2000­Q1 – 2019­Q4, alongside bank­level panel­data, we
analyse the impact of regulation after the financial crisis of 2007 on sys­
temic risk in the UK financial system. We estimated CoVaR using quantile
regression and the Garch model before applying Kupiec (1995), Christof­
fersen and Pelletier (2004), and Lopez (1999) tests to establish the accu­
racy of our results. Our result shows that variables that capture Basel III
regulation have a significant impact in reducing systemic risk. In contrast,
UK specific regulation shows little to no impact in reducing systemic risk.
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3.2 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has brought about a sweeping set of financial
regulations that the financial industry has not had for a long time. We ar­
gue that part of the reason for these regulations is due to the cost of the
crisis on the real economy. However, such a regulatory framework is hard
to design and implement in practice. Indeed, historical evidence suggests
that the response from authorities to financial crises may engender perva­
sive behaviours and encourage excessive individual risk­taking (Barth et
al., 2013). It is therefore not enough that regulation or cost­benefit mea­
surements are in place, but the analysis of the impact regulation is having
on systemic risk is required to understand and further policy development.
This chapter is a contribution toward such direction.
Our main contribution to the literature is analysing the impact of regula­
tion using our systemic risk measure (∆CoVaR) on bank­level targeted
variables. We do this by establishing when regulations were announced,
the compliance window from regulatory authorities, and bank­level data to
show when changes fully took place. These allowed us to divide our sam­
ple into the pre­regulatory period (2000 – 2013) and post­regulation period
(2014– 2019) to establish this impact. This is different from the analysis of
Brunnermeier et al. (2012). Although they used conditional value at risk
(CoVaR) as applied in this analysis and systemic expected shortfall (SES),
their study measured the systemic risk for all commercial banks in the US
for the period 1986 to 2008. Saunders et al. (2016b) also looked at the
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concept of “ring­fencing” in the United States with a sample divided into
pre and post­crisis period. What we have done differently here is using
data that reflects more accurately the time regulation came into effect (as
opposed to pre and post­crisis without considering regulation, therefore
capturing the impact of regulation). Whereas they used only ordinary least
squares for their analysis, we started by establishing delta conditional value
at risk (∆CoVaR); a proxy for identifying the systemic risk level in our anal­
ysis. Unlike most research in this area that looked at the US or Europe,
our sample used UK Banks. Other variables within our study that were
differently analysed in the literature include the works of; Puzanova and
Düllmann (2013); Elayan et al. (2018); Brunnermeier et al. (2012); Allen
et al. (2018); Saunders et al. (2016b); Laeven et al. (2016). However,
just like with the work of Saunders et al. (2016b), all these analysis use
data prior to the regulatory compliance period, therefore failing to capture
the impact of regulation. Meaning, our analysis considers the regulatory
change in the UK and Basel III. It analyses how these regulatory variables
affect systemic risk before and after they are put in place.
Our second contribution relates to the analysis of systemic risk. Previ­
ous literature (e.g. Girardi and Ergün, 2013, Huang et al., 2012a, Tobias
and Brunnermeier, 2016) have used both models (i.e. CoVaR and Garch)
applied here when estimating systemic risk. However, we have added ac­
curacy tests to show the model that is more accurate when assessing sys­
temic risk (on bank regulatory variables). This analysis provides a quantile
regression (henceforth; QR) and bivariate GARCH model estimation and
100
use an accuracy test to establish the more appropriate model for estimat­
ing ‘CoVaR’ that enhances the accuracy of our empirical findings.
This analysis also covers a critical gap in the literature. In comparison,
some (e.g. Benoit et al., 2013, Brunnermeier et al., 2012, Engle et al.,
2014, Huang et al., 2012a, Laeven et al., 2016, Saunders et al., 2014,
Saunders et al., 2016b) have looked at some variables used here within
the context of a financial crisis. This study considers variables that were
either newly introduced (such as ring­fencing) or those that are calculated
differently (e.g. leverage ratio, regulatory capital) because of changes in
the regulation. Therefore, providing a clear understanding of the impact,
these policies have created on systemic risk. To our knowledge, no study
has specifically analysed the new set of regulatory variables in relation to
their impact on systemic risk. Equally, we do not know of any research
that had differentiated between the period before these regulations were
in place and afterwards to established their impact or shows the behaviour
they exhibit to systemic risk between the two different periods. Therefore,
making a significant contribution to the literature.
The fact that financial markets move more closely together during times of
crisis is well documented. Giglio et al. (2016) highlighted the crisis of 2007
occurred after a build­up of systemic risk. This led to a focus to under­
stand systemic risk and ways governments can effectively regulate their
economies to reduce it. To properly mitigate systemic risk or regulate the
economy to stop its build­up, a generally agreed definition of this concept
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is essential. However, Guerra et al. (2016) stated that there is no unique
definition of systemic risk. They highlighted this issue by acknowledging
systemic risk, unlike other risks, is recognized for its effects rather than
causes. It also occurs from different features due to the interconnection of
many factors, making a single agreed definition currently inconclusive.
Additionally, Taylor (2010) reiterated that there is no conclusive definition
of system risk; nonetheless, any definition must consider: the risk of a sig­
nificant triggering event such as shocks from central bank policy, shock
from external events like natural disasters or shock from the failure of a
large private financial firm. It must also consider the risk of propagation
(contagion) due to direct or indirect linkages between firms, and finally,
any definition should include the macro­economic risk that accompanies
the disruption caused. Furthermore, López­Espinosa et al. (2012); Re­
serve (2001); Richardson (2014); Drehmann and Tarashev (2013); Mishkin
(1995); Giglio et al. (2016); Krainer (2012); Vickers (2011) and Constâncio
(2015) amongst others, all defined systemic risk with different caveats.
For the purpose of this analysis, we adopt the definition provided by Kauf­
man and Scott (2003). They defined systemic risk as the risk or probability
of breakdowns in the entire system as opposed to individual parts that are
evidence by the correlation (co­movement) amongst all other parts. They
also stated; it can refer to macro shocks that produce near­simultaneous
large adverse effects for most or all the economy domestically or at least
a sector. The understanding here is that systemic risk is the initial stage
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or the build­up of a toxic situation in the financial industry that, if not dealt
with properly, can trigger a crisis. Consequently, our systemic risk mea­
sure captures the potential for the spreading of financial distress across
institutions by gauging this increase in tail co­movement.
Themost commonmeasure of risk used by financial institutions is the value
at risk (Varotto and Zhao, 2018). It focuses on the risk of an individual in­
stitution in isolation. However, a single institution’s risk measure does not
necessarily reflect its connection to overall systemic risk. What is, there­
fore, suitable for our analysis is a measure that considers not only an insti­
tution’s individual risk but also risk associated with tail co­movement for the
entire system. To achieve this, we apply the novel procedure put forward
by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), the CoVaR methodology. We then
apply panel regression to analyse its relationship to regulatory variables at
the bank level in the UK.
As put by Richardson (2014) about economic regulation, ‘regulate where
there is a market failure’. The 2007 crisis is the ultimate justification for the
changes witnessed in the regulatory environment of banks, hence estab­
lishing the justification for this analysis. It is not only essential to understand
what are the factors that bring about systemic risk (as is the focus of the
literature in this area) but to measure systemic risk before and after the
crisis to establish how much impact regulation is having on systemic risk.
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In essence, this chapter uses the ‘CoVaR’ method in determining systemic
risk in the UK from 2000 to 2019 using quarterly data. We identified six ma­
jor variables that regulation addressed after the crisis and used panel data
regression to establish the impact these variables have on systemic risk.
We estimated CoVaR using the QR and Garch model. We then applied
accuracy tests to decide the best model for the analysis. We sample our
data to capture the pre­regulation period and post­regulation period and
analysed the impact of our variables on the systemic risk. Where previous
studies have examined these variables against systemic risk proxies, we
contributed by diving our sample to effectively capture the impact regula­
tion is having on systemic risk. Our methodology also established QR as
a more effective model when analysing systemic risk.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows; Section 2 is the
literature review. Section 3 describes the data used and sources. Section
4 describes our methodology. Section 5 is the presentation of empirical
findings, and section 6 is the conclusion.
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3.3 Literature Review
Previous studies have established various channels that give us an un­
derstanding of why and how systemic risk evolves. For example, Adrian
and Brunnermeier (2011) showed externalities that lead to spillover effects
occur when an institution accepts fire­sale prices. Within the context of
an incomplete market situation, this brings about an outcome that is not a
‘Pareto efficient’ constraint. This was empirically shown in a banking con­
text by Bhattacharya et al. (1998). This spillover effect was also shown in a
general equilibrium market setting by Stiglitz (1982) and Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1986). Furthermore, funding liquidity of institutions can
also be subject to runs that lead to externalities (Adrian and Boyarchenko,
2012). Equally, systemic risk can be the result of risks in big firms or a
herd of small firms’ spillover effects. It can also result from a build­up dur­
ing low volatility. We can deduct from these that; systemic risk has both
cross­sectional and time­series dimension that supports the application of
CoVaR developed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) that is used for this
analysis.
Bisias et al. (2012) conclude that the starting point for all the recent regu­
lation is the accurate and timely measurement of systemic risk. Puzanova
and Düllmann (2013) argued that the recent crisis has brought about a
paradigm shift in banking regulation that moved away from a micro to a
macro approach, reflecting the effects of negative externality from banks
that contributes to systemic risk. They stated that the focus of macropru­
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dential regulation should be solid capital base throughout the financial cycle
and de­correlation of banks’ asset values.
Allen et al. (2018) implemented an event­study analysis to determine the
market’s reaction to the elimination of “too big to fail” (TBTF). He concluded
the market reacted negatively to the passage of Dodd­Frank and to the
elimination of TBTF announced within the regulation. Brunnermeier et al.
(2012) and Saunders et al. (2016b) agree that all regulatory proposals in
the US, UK and the EU have the concept of “ring­fencing”. They showed
that banks with higher non­interest income have a higher contribution to
systemic risk. They also concluded that banks with higher leverage and
nonperforming loans increase systemic risk, whereas those with more liq­
uidity and interest income lower systemic risk. Laeven et al. (2016) esti­
mated that systemic risk grows with bank size and is inversely related to
bank capital.
Given the nature of systemic risk (as earlier highlighted), it tends to be
measured differently, depending on what aspect of it is being captured.
Drehmann and Tarashev (2013) propose the use of the generalised con­
tribution approach (GCA) when measuring systemic risk. They empirically
applied this method to 20 major US banks to assess whether interconnect­
edness drives systemic importance and how it affects different participants
in the interbank market. They state that systemic importance rises in the
presence of an interbank market, with the rise being greater for banks with
greater interbank market activity. Billio et al. (2012) propose a systemic
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risk measure that relies on Granger causality among firms. Their results
suggest that hedge funds can provide early indications of market disloca­
tion, suggesting systemic risk arises from a complex and dynamic network
of relationships among hedge funds, banks, insurance companies, and
brokers. In contrast, Giglio et al. (2016) use a nonparametric approach to
derive bounds of systemic risk from CDS prices.
Huang et al. (2012a) measured the systemic risk of a banking sector as
a hypothetical distress insurance premium. They defined their systemic
risk measure as the insurance cost to protect against distressing losses
in a banking system. They used this method on a portfolio of twenty­two
major banks in Asia and the Pacific from 2005 to 2009 to illustrate the dy­
namics of systemic risk effects of the financial crisis to the region. They
concluded that; the evolution of market perception on the systemic risk of
Asia­Pacific banks was mainly driven by the risk premium component and
that the marginal contribution of each bank (or bank group) to the systemic
risk suggests that size is important in determining the systemic importance
of individual banks. Furthermore, Huang et al. (2012b) applied the same
methodology using 19 Banks covered by the US stress test to show that
the elevated systemic risk in the banking sector is driven initially by the
rising default risk premium and later by the heightened liquidity risk pre­
mium. They also show that the marginal contributions of individual banks
to the systemic risk indicator are determined mainly through bank size that
is consistent with the “too­big­to­fail” doctrine.
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Acharya et al. (2017) focus on high­frequency marginal expected shortfall
(MES) as a systemic risk measure. MES addresses the question of which
institutions are most exposed to a financial crisis as opposed to the com­
ponent of systemic risk associated with a particular institution. Each finan­
cial institution’s contribution to systemic risk is measured as its systemic
expected shortfall (SES). Meaning they do not address the stylized fact
that risk builds up in the background during boom phases characterized by
low volatility and materializes only in crisis times. They demonstrate em­
pirically the ability of SES components to predict emerging systemic risk
during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Elayan et al. (2018) and Acharya
et al. (2012) develop a closely related SRISK measure (Marginal Expected
Shortfall) which calculates capital shortfall of individual institutions condi­
tional on market stress. They both agree that non­interest income is posi­
tively correlated with total systemic risk for a large sample of U.S. banks.
Usingmethodologies of Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES),∆CoVaR, SRISK,
and individual­bank systemic risk premia, Weiß et al. (2014) found no em­
pirical evidence supporting the analysis that: bank size, leverage, non­
interest income or the quality of the bank’s credit portfolio are persistent
determinants of systemic risk across financial crises. In contrast, their re­
sults show that characteristics of the regulatory regime drive systemic risk.
Using a sample of EU and American banks from 1991 to 2004, they showed
European banks contribute more to global systemic risk when compared to
American banks due to lower quality of loan portfolios and higher intercon­
nectedness with the global financial system. They also found higher capital
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regulation reduces banks’ exposure to systemic risk. Benoit et al. (2013)
also used MES, ∆CoVaR and SRISK to capture SIFIs of US financial insti­
tutions. They concluded that these measures capture different aspects of
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) and a one­factor linear
regression is able to explain 83% to 100% of the variability of the systemic
risk estimates, which they understand to indicate that standard systemic
risk measures fall short in capturing the multiple facets of systemic risk.
Laeven et al. (2016) using ∆CoVaR and SRISK find strong evidence that
systemic risk increases with bank size. Their results suggest a one stan­
dard deviation increase in total assets increases the bank’s contribution
to systemic risk by about one­third its standard deviation when measured
by ∆CoVaR, and by about half its standard deviation when measured by
SRISK. They also find evidence that systemic risk is lower in better­capitalized
banks, with the effects particularly pronounced for large banks. Using data
of 281 Banks from 16 European countries for the period of 2012 to 2006,
Derbali and Hallara (2016) reports that high correlation between Banks
returns and market returns increases to the region’s systemic risk. While
these measures do capture different aspects of systemic risk, ∆CoVaR ad­
dresses the stylized fact that risk builds up in the background during boom
phases characterized by low volatility and materializes only in crisis times
that is very important for policy monitoring, making it an appropriate mea­
sure for this study.
109
3.4 Data
This section provides the details of our sample construction; the variables
used to calculate VaR, the ‘state variables’ that allows the calculation of
time­variation in a joint distribution of returns (CoVaR) and the choice of
independent variables included in the analysis.
Given our focus on the regulatory impact and CoVaR methodology’s ap­
plication, our analysis focuses on publicly traded banks in the UK. The
data used covers a period starting from 2000 (Q1) to 2019 (Q4). By def­
inition, our financial system is the total number of banks in the UK gen­
erated from Thomson Reuters DataStream and S&P Global Market Intel­
ligence databases. This includes all ‘dead firm’ list, along with acquired
and defunct banks. To construct the sample, we started from all publicly
traded financial institutions whose headquarters is in the UK and list pri­
mary business as banking. We then screened out all securities and In­
vestment banks, along with insurance and special finance trusts. Applying
these criteria left us a total number of 16 banks from the initial population
of 191 financial service institutions. For the purpose of this analysis, these
criteria are essential, as the focus of regulation is mainly on banks.
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3.4.1 Systemic Risk Measure and State Variables
Our systemic risk measure is ∆CoVaR. It forms the first part of our method­
ology and empirical analysis that relies on the VaRiq of individual banks. To
calculate VaR, we use growth rates of market­valued total financial assets
as our benchmark (Xi). This is similar to previous literature such as Laeven
et al. (2016) and Tobias and Brunnermeier (2016) . More formally, Xi is
calculated as
Xi =
(MEit x LEVit)− ( MEit− 1 x LEVit− 1 )
(MEit− 1) x (LEVit − 1)
(1)
Where: ME = market value of bank’s i total equity
LEV = is the bank’s ratio of total assets to book equity.
Note that the total market value weighted sum of the Xit across all institu­
tions gives the growth rate of market valued total assets for the financial
system as a whole as applied within CoVaR.
To estimate CoVaR using quantile regression, we need ‘state variables’
(Tobias and Brunnermeier, 2016). This is because it allows us to capture
the time variation in a joint distribution of returns for the system and individ­
ual institution. Therefore, making it possible to model the evolution of joint
distributions over time. However, we are not to interpret these variables as
systematic risk factors but rather as conditioning variables that are shifting
the conditional mean and the conditional volatility of the risk measure. We
restrict ourselves to a small set of state variables to avoid overfitting the
data. Our state variables are:
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(i) Short term ‘liquidity spread’ defined as the difference between the three­
month repo rate and the three­month bill rate. This measures short­term
liquidity risk.
(ii) The change in the three­month Treasury bill rate from the Bank of Eng­
land. We use this because the change, not the level, is considered as most
significant in explaining the tails of financial sector market­valued asset re­
turns.
(iii) The change in the slope of the yield curve, measured by the yield
spread between the ten­year Treasury rate and the three­month bill rate
obtained from the Bank of England.
(iv) The change in the default spread, measured as change in credit spread
in 10­year BAA corporate bond and 10­year T­bond rate from the Bank of
England.
(v) The quarterly market return computed from all share FTSE index.
(vi) The quarterly real estate sector return as measured by FTSE UK Real
Estate index returns.
Other macro­control variables that have been included due to impact on
market­valued total financial assets that could reflect the business cycle in
the literature (e.g. Chen et al., 1986, Birz and Lott Jr, 2011, Cenesizoglu
and Timmermann, 2008, Fama and French, 1993, Festic and Beko, 2009,
Ludvigson and Ng, 2007, Petkova, 2006, Vassalou and Xing, 2003) are:
(vi) Industrial production growth index; measured by industrial growth index
over industrial production index.
(viii) GDP growth; measured as the annual growth rate of GDP at market
prices based on constant local currency.
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(ix) GDP per capita growth; measured as gross domestic product divided
by midyear population.
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3.4.2 Bank level Variables:
The focus of this analysis is establishing the impact of recent regulations
(Basel III and UK Independent Commission on Banking (ICB)) have had
on systemic risk in the UK. To this end, bank­level variables that these
regulations introduced or calculated differently are use as proxies to show
the impact regulation is having on systemic risk indicator (∆CoVaR). These
consist of:
(i)Bank Size: Part of the recent regulation reduced the ‘too­big­to­fail’ phe­
nomena that led tomany financial institutions being bailed out with taxpayer
resources, causing a huge public outcry. To mitigate the reoccurrence of
such a situation, ICB put in place structural reforms and remove implicit
guarantees that aim at reducing bank size. As in Laeven et al. (2016),
we use the natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets as proxy for bank
size. Therefore, it serves as a proxy for ‘too­big­to­fail’. We expect that the
larger the relative size of a bank, the higher its contribution to systemic risk.
(ii) Executive Pay: The Financial Service Authority (FSA) identified po­
tential market failures in the structures of remuneration practices in finan­
cial services. It suggested that an emphasis on short­term profits by insti­
tutional investors had encouraged executive remuneration to be focused
on ‘variable compensation’ (bonuses) related to the most recent earnings,
without any consideration of the exposure to risk­taking (Morgan and Rob­
son, 2009). In addition, variable compensation schemes tend to be pro­
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cyclical since downside bonuses are capped at zero. In response to these
perceivedmarket failures, Treasury (2009) recommended a series of changes
to remuneration practices: alignment of compensation and its risks made
the responsibility of remuneration committees; transparency of the process
and levels of executive pay; deferral of incentive payments; and perfor­
mance criteria related to long­term profitability. These recommendations
and eight key principles on executive remuneration are identified in Hall
(2009) and enacted in an updated code for UK banks and building soci­
eties that became effective from January 2010. Consistent with this new
regulation we use total executive pay to capture this regulatory change that
is not limited to bonuses (e.g. stock­options that are tradinally perceived to
increase risk). We use the growth of total senior executives’ compensation
that is measured by the total compensation paid to all senior executives. It
acts as a proxy for reducing moral hazards associated with senior execu­
tive pay. It is expected to have a positive relationship with systemic risk.
(iii) Ring­Fencing: Ring­fencing is broadly designed to focus a bank on
its traditional interest­generating retail and wholesale financial intermedi­
ation activities, such as deposit­taking and consumer/commercial lend­
ing. With non­core or non­traditional activities shifted into non­bank sub­
sidiaries. Part of the main objectives of ring­fencing banks is to isolate
retail­banking activities that are deemed essential and still have deposit
insurance cover to continue operating even in difficult financial situations.
Saunders et al. (2016a) show that Interest Income represents income re­
ceived from all earning assets such as loans and investment securities.
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It includes but is not restricted to; Interest and fees on loans, Interest on
federal funds, Interest on bank deposits, along other interest­earning in­
struments. This serves as a proxy for ring fence activities of the banking
group that has deposit insurance support. Bostandzic and Weiß (2018)
also used interest income to capture ‘ring fenced’ banking activities and
‘non­interest income’ to represent activities outside the fenced banks are
have been deemed more risky, such as investment banking.
(iv)Non­Ring­Fence Activities: DeYoung and Roland (2001) stated; non­
interest income ismore volatile than stable interest­income activities. Brun­
nermeier et al. (2012) show that banks with higher non­interest income
have a higher contribution to systemic risk. The authors trace this notion
back to the fact that non­core banking activities like, e.g., investment bank­
ing, is different from the traditional deposit­taking and lending functions of
banks. Non­Interest Income represents all other operating revenues of
the bank besides interest income that core ring­fenced banks do not carry
out, instead done as part of ancillary services within the banking group
(non­ring fence). It includes but is not restricted to; Investment securi­
ties gains/losses, Trust & fiduciary income, Commission & fees, Income
from trading accounts, Foreign exchange income Banks, Other Financial
Companies. Therefore, non­interest income serves as a proxy for non­ring
fence activities of the banking group that has been deem more risky.
(v) Regulatory Capital: The newly introduced Total Capital Ratio repre­
sents the value of total net capital sources of financing available to a bank
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or a financial institution, calculated in accordance with Basel III accords. It
is also be referred to as total regulatory capital; a high­quality buffer aims
to absorb losses during periods of economic distress. It is aimed at improv­
ing stability and reducing the probability and impact of systemic financial
crises in the future. It is to maintain the efficient flow of credit to the real
economy and the ability of households and businesses to manage their
risks and financial needs over time; and to preserve the functioning of the
payments system and guaranteed capital certainty and liquidity for small
savers, including small and medium­sized enterprises (Vickers, 2011).
(vi) Leverage ratio: This represents the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total risk
exposure, used to estimate risks arising from the leverage of a financial
institution’s assets, expressed as a %. This ratio is a proxy for the level of
a banks solvency. Total risk exposure includes the sum of all on­balance
sheet exposures such as; gross loans, derivative exposures, securities fi­
nancing transaction exposures and off­balance sheet exposures. This was
calculated differently prior to the implementation of Basel III using the total
asset to common equity to capture leverage.
Weiß et al. (2014) shows that a bank can become systemically important
simply if its leverage is too high as losses during a stressed market situa­
tion could quickly cause such a bank to become undercapitalized. Brunner­
meier et al. (2012) as well as Beltratti and Stulz (2012) confirm hypotheses
that highly levered banks contribute more to systemic risk and performed
worse than lower levered banks during the recent financial crisis. These
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findings are also underlined by Shleifer and Vishny (2010) who confirm that
highly levered banks do not only contribute more to systemic risk, but also
to higher economic volatility.
Table 3.1: Panel Summary statistics 2000­Q1 – 2019­Q4.
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max kurtosis Skewness
Senior Executi∼pay 535 17.321 1.051 15.000 22.00 4.411 1.301
Total Asset 610 19.001 2.511 14.001 25.213 1.911 ­0.541
Total Capital Ratio 575 4.401 1.000 1.801 5.006 3.501 ­1.053
Non­Interest Inc. 607 13.011 1.801 4.601 17.114 4.122 ­0.782
Interest Income 591 14.514 1.601 3.221 16.109 3.002 ­0.753
Leverage Ratio 590 3.100 0.914 ­0.914 6.312 4.132 ­0.422
Notes:Descriptive statistic of quarterly regulatory­targeted variables use
for bank­level panel data regression. The table presents bank­specific
balance sheet and income statement variables of UK banks covering the
2007 financial crisis period, regulation announcement and compliance win­
dow. The data are taken from the Thomson Reuters Financial DataStream
and ThomsonWorldscope databases. Absolute balance sheet and income
statement items are given in $ billion while ratios are given in per cent.
The mean value of Total Asset has the highest mean value within all panel
variables, while Leverage Ratio (3.1%) has the lowest mean value. This is
consistent with bank­level data, where there is a drive to increase assets
and reduce the cost of financial investments. The standard deviation of To­
tal Asset is also the highest, reflecting volatility that resulted from the crisis
that affected banking assets more than all the other variables. Normally
distributed data are assumed to have a symmetrical distribution around
the mean, implying zero skewness. Thus, datasets with skewness deviat­
ing from zero deviate from a normal distribution. In Table 3.1, skewness
is negative for all variables except the Senior Executive Pay, which has a
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positive skewness. Negative skew means the distribution has a longer left
tail, meaning greater probability of tail risk that is consistent with empirical
evidence of the crisis. Whereas, the positive skewness of Senior Exec­
utive Pay is consistent with the rationale provide by Morgan and Robson
(2009) earlier discussed, and further shows the rationale why we included
this variable within the analysis.
Kurtosis with values above three indicates leptokurtosis in the data distri­
bution. Meaning, the distribution has a higher peak and fatter tails than the
normal distribution. Further, this implies that more of the variance in the
data is due to extreme deviations from the mean than would be the case if
the distributions were normally distributed. Kurtosis from Table 1 supports
the evidence data has fat tails. As pointed out by Engle (2004), kurtosis
from real data sample is mostly above 3, which is the evidence of substan­
tial extremes not suitable with normal random variables.
Finally, our dataset has an unequal number of observations amongst vari­
ables. Total Asset having the highest number of observations. In order to
overcome the issue of missing data in our panel, we use the multiple im­
putations (mi) method. It was derive using the Bayesian paradigm that is
shown to be statistically valid from the frequentist (randomization­based)
perspective. This method used the definition from Rubin (1996) of statis­
tical validity that implies approximately unbiased point estimates and im­
plies confidence intervals achieving their nominal coverages when aver­
aged over the randomise distributions induced by the known sample. The
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posited missing­data mechanisms used allows parameter estimates to be
unbiased and the uncertainty of parameter estimation in the missing data




The measure of systemic risk applied is; delta CoVaR (∆CoVaR) as devel­
oped by Adrian and Brunnermeier et al. (2012) and Adrian and Brunner­
meier (2011). It is based on theoretical research on externalities across
financial institutions that amplify liquidity spirals and persistent distortions.
It also relates closely to recent econometric work on contagion and spillover
effects. ∆CoVaR captures conditional tail­dependency
3.6 CoVaR
To understand ∆CoVaR, we need to go back to a common measure of risk
use by banks, i.e. the value­at­risk ‘VaR’. The VaR focuses on the risk of
individual banks. It provides the confidence level ‘q%’ that a bank will lose
at most in a period. VaR does not tell us the risk for the complete financial
system i.e. systemic risk. However, the risk of a certain institution or herd
of banks can potential spillover to other institution and leave the system at
risk. To understand this, we look at conditional variance (CoVaR). Where
institution i’s CoVaR relative to the whole system is defined as the VaR of
the financial sector conditional on institution i being in a particular state.
Making the systemic risk measure (∆CoVaR), the difference between the
CoVaR conditional on the distress of an institution and the CoVaR condi­
tional on the median state of that institution.
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Essentially, ∆CoVaR measures the component of systemic risk that co­
moves with the distress of a particular institution. That is, the systemic risk
measure associated with institution’s i, ∆CoVaRi , differs from that institu­
tion’s own risk measure, VaRi . Therefore, systemic­risk regulation should
be base how individual risk affects the financial sector – a macro, outlook
as oppose to individual risk factors only.
The application of CoVaR within empirical analysis is recent, however un­
like other literatures, where estimation is via either quantile regression or
Garch models, we have estimated CoVaR using both models and then ap­
plied 3 different accuracy tests of; Kupiec (1995); Christoffersen and Pel­
letier (2004); and Lopez (1999) in adopting the more accurate model for
our analysis.
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3.6.1 Estimating CoVaR via Quantile Regression






Where, Xit is the (return) loss of institution i for which the Variq,t is defined
at time t.
CoVaRj |C (Xi)q is referred to as the VaR of the financial system j conditional
on some event C (xi) of institution i. That is, CoVaRj |C (Xi)q is implicitly de­
fined by the q% ­quantile of the conditional probability distribution:
Pr ( Xj | C(Xi) ≤ CoVaRq j | C (Xi) ) = q% (3.2)
Part of j’s systemic risk (portfolio of all banks within the financial system)






Note for specification above, j will be the financial system (i.e., portfolio
consisting of all publicly trading banks in our universe (UK). It is important
to remember at this point that to obtain CoVaR we condition on an event
C that is equally likely across institutions. Usually C is institution i ’s loss
being at or above its VaRiq level, which, by definition, occurs with likelihood
(1 − q) %. Importantly, this implies that the likelihood of the conditioning
event is independent of the riskiness of i’s business model. It then follows
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that ∆CoVaR captures the change in CoVaR as one shifts the conditioning
event from the median return of institution i to the adverse VaRiq.
To see the attractiveness of using quantile regression, consider the pre­
dicted value of a quantile regression of financial sector losses X qj on the
losses of a particular institution i for the q% ­quantile,
X̂system|Xi = ∝̂+ β̂Xi (3.4)
Where, X̂j | Xiq denotes the predicted value for a q%­ quantile of the system
conditional on a return realization Xi of institution i. From the definition of
value at risk, it follows directly that CoVaRj|Xi = Xj|Xiq
That is, the predicted value from the quantile regression of system return
losses on the losses of institution i gives the value at risk of the financial
system conditional on Xi. The CoVaRj|iq given Xi is the conditional quan­
tile. Using the predicted value of Xi = VaRiq yields the CoVaRiq measure
(CoVaRj|iq = VaRiq). More formally, within the quantile regression frame­
work, our CoVaRj|iq measure is given by:
CoVaRj|iq =VaR
j|Xi=VaRiq
q = ∝̂iq + βVaRiq (3.5)










q,t − VaRi50,t) (3.6)
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3.6.2 Estimating CoVaR via Garch
Above equations (3.1 to 3.6) allows us to analyse systemic risk using state
variables over time. We also follow the work of Girardi and Ergün (2013), to
estimate CoVaR using GARCHmodel to obtain the time varying covariance
between an institution and the financial system. As above, we use the
portfolio of all UK banks as proxy for the financial system.
The estimation process is done in 3 stages. In stage 1, we start with the
VaR for each institution that is computed by estimating the model:
Xit= µit + ϵi,t (3.7)
Where;
µi,t = ∝ 0 + ∝ 1Xit−1;
i,t = ζi,tσi,t,
ζi,t is i.i.d with zero mean and unit variance and the conditional variance
has the standard GARCH (1,1) specification
σ2i,t = βi0+ βi1 ϵ
2
t−1 + βi2 σ
2
i,t−1 (3.8)
In stage 2, for each institution i, we estimate the bivariate GARCH model
with Engle’s (2002) DCC specification for the returns (Xi) and the financial
system (Xj).
Let Xt = (Xi,Xj) whose joint dynamics be given by




Where Σt is the (2 x 2) conditional covariance matrix of the error term ϵtµt
is the (2 x 1) vector of conditional means.
The standardized innovation vector Zt = Σ
1
2 (Xt − µt) is i.i.d.
Σ (zt) = 0
And V arzt = I2
We define Dt to be the (2 x 2) diagonal matrix with the conditional variances
σ2x,t and σ2y,t along the diagonal so that {Dxx}t = {Σxx}t, {Dyy}t= {Σyy}t, and
{Dxy}t = 0 for x, y = s, j.
The conditional variances are then modelled as GARCH (1,1).



























Let Ct = D−1/2t ΣtD−1/2t = {ρxy}t be the (2 x 2) matrix of conditional corre­




t x Qt x diag Q
−1/2
t (3.12)
Qt = (1− δ1− δ2) Q+ δ1 (Ut−1U‘t−1) + δ2 Qt−1 (3.13)




x = s, j and
diaq(Qt) is the (2 x 2) matrix with the diagonal of Qt on the diagonal and
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zeros off­diagonal.
At stage 3, we estimate the bivariate density, pdft(Xit;X
j
t) for each Xt =
(Xit;X
j
t) pair in step 3.11. We proceed to obtain our CoVaR
J|Xi
t measure for
each financial institution i and time period t. Given the definition of CoVaR






∣∣∣∣ Xjt≤VaRiq, t) = q, (3.14)
Pr ( Xjt ≤ CoVaR
j|i
q, t | X
j
t ≤ VaRiq, t)
Pr ( Xj ≤ VaRiq, t)
= q. (3.15)










∣∣∣∣Xjt ≤VaRiq, t) =q2. (3.16)
If we let x, y = i, j given the VaRjq, t estimates obtained in stage 1, we can





. pdft (x,y)dydx = q
2 (3.17)
In order to compute CoVaRj|iq, t we follow the same three­step procedure.
























As stated earlier, previous literatures have use either of the two methods
above to obtain CoVaR. Whichever one was adopted in the main analysis,
the other tends to be use for robustness of results obtained. However, what
is done differently here is applying robustness checks on results obtained
from QR and Garch (1,1) by using standard Kupiec (1995), Christoffersen




Backtesting is an important part of the Value­at­Risk model evaluation pro­
cess (Ragnarsson, 2011). It takes the values calculated by the selected
model and tests if the model has been accurate enough to justify its use
on a given portfolio. Using the definition of CoVaR from equation 3.5, al­
lows us to test the accuracy of quantile regression and Garch models to
establish the more accurate model for our data set. We use Kupiec (1995);
Christoffersen and Pelletier (2004); and Lopez (1999) tests to establish our
result.
3.7.1 Kupiec Test
This is an unconditional coverage test and it measures whether the number
of violations (when actual loss exceeds expected loss) is consistent with the
chosen confidence level. The number of exceptions follows the binomial
distribution and it is a hypothesis test, where the null hypothesis is:




Where p represents the violation rate from the chosen Value­at­Risk level,
p̂ represents the observed violation rate and x represents the number of
observed violations. T is the number of observations. It is conducted as a
likelihood­ratio test (LR test) and formulated as:
LRUC= 2ln
 p̂x (1−p̂)T− xpx (1−p)T− x
 , p̂= xT (3.21)
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Therefore, under the null hypothesis test LRUC is asymptotically chi­square
distributed with one degree of freedom. If the LRUC statistic exceeds the
critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected and therefore the model seems
inaccurate (Borges and Ragnarsson, 2011). Therefore, our alternative hy­
pothesis becomes
H1 = LRuc > X
2. (3.22)
3.7.2 Christoffersen Test
This is a test of violations, serial independence and conditional coverage.
Like the Kupiec test, it collects data for violations and if they happen sub­
sequently. The results from this data are used to create the test results.
The observations can have two values as shown below.
It =
 1, if violation occurs0, if no violation occurs
These results are categorized in the following manner: if there was a vi­
olation followed by non­violation, a non­violation followed by a violation,
a non­violation followed by a non­violation and a violation followed by a
violation, as shown below:
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Table 3.2: Violation matrix
I t−1 = 0 I t−1 = 1
I t = 0 n00 n10 n00 +
n10






Notes:Test table that captures how violations are categorized as explained
above. Where n00 = non violation followed by non­violation, n01 = non­
violation followed by violation, n1 = violation followed by non­violation and
n11 = violation followed by violiation.
From table 3.2 above, values for π0 and π01 are calculated. They represent
the sample probabilities of a violation occurring conditional on the presence
or absence of violation in the previous day. π is then calculated and it









n00 + n10 + n10 + n11
(3.23)
The likelihood­ratio test is calculated under the null­hypothesis that all vi­
olations should be independent of each other. The null­hypothesis takes
the form:
H0 : π0 = π1
The likelihood statistics is calculated as:
LRind= −2ln
(
1−π n00+ n10 πn00+ n10
(1−π0)n00 π0n01 (1−π1)n10 π1n11
)
(3.24)
This is asymptotically chi­square distributed with one degree of freedom.
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If the test statistics is above that value, the null hypothesis is rejected, and
the model is considered to have independence problems. Therefore, our
alternative hypothesis becomes:
H1 : LRind > X
2.
A test statistic under the critical rate assumes the model to be better (Niep­
pola, 2009). Christoffersen further created a joint test consisting of the pre­
viously described tests for unconditional coverage and for independence.
The test statistic is as follows:
LRcc = LRuc +LRind (3.25)
Please note: test for unconditional coverage and Christoffersen test for
independence are summed to get the test results for conditional cover­
age. The test for conditional coverage is also asymptotically chi­square
distributed and has two degrees of freedom. Making the model pass the
test if its test statistic is under the critical value (Christoffersen & Pelletier,
2004).
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3.7.3 Lopez loss function
This is neither an independence test nor a test for unconditional coverage.
It looks at the losses made when there is a violation and by how much
the losses exceed the projected Value­at­Risk number. Every observation
gets a value, similar to the independence test where every violation got a
value of one otherwise zero. For observations with no violation the value
is set at zero, alternatively when there is a violation the value is one plus
the magnitude of the exceedance squared. As shown below:
L(V aRt (∝) , rt =
 1+ (rt + V aRt (∝))
2, if violation occurs
0, if no violation occurs
}
(3.26)
Where V aRt (∝) represents the projected Value­ at­Risk number for time
t, ∝ represents the
chosen confidence level and rt is the observed return at time t. To get a






L(V aRt (∝) , rt) (3.27)
Note that there are some shortfalls with the Lopez Loss function since the
returns’ actual distribution is unknown. It is also hard to know how much
exceedance is actually appropriate and how much leads to a rejection of
the model. Therefore, the Loss function serves as a good remedy for com­
paring different models to establish some extraordinary exceedances pre­
vailing (Lopez, 1999).
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Finally, to establish the impact of regulatory variables, we use panel re­
gression that takes a form of
∆CoVaRij, t = β0 + βB
ij
t + ϵit (3.28)
where ∆CoVaRiq, t is a measure of risk of bank i within system j, computed
over period t, β0 is the panel fixed effect, βijt is a vector of bank charac­
teristics computed at time, and ϵi,t is the error term. We use lags of these
variables to correct for endogenous risk persistence. Please note, all ex­
planatory variables are standardized to have zero mean and unit standard
deviation in all the panel regressions. An estimated coefficient thus rep­
resents the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the explanatory
variable on the systemic risk measure.
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3.8 Empirical Results
Our analysis builds on previous work undertaken by Tobias and Brunner­
meier (2016). What is different here is that we start by calculating panel
VaR and systemCoVaR using both quantile regression andGarchmodels. Using
the results1 from both methods, we performed backtesting analysis using
Kupiec (1995), Christoffersen (1998) and Lopez (1999) tests in order to es­
tablish which of the two estimationmethod is more accurate for our dataset.
Whereas most of the literature in this area focus on individual banks con­
tribution to systemic risk, the focus of this analysis is the impact regulatory
target variables have had on systemic risk, to this end we use ran panel
regression to establish this relationship.
Our analysis start by calculating quarterly VaR95 and VaR50 on panel of
banks in our data from 2000 to 2019 with quarterly data. The result from
this is then use to calculate CoVaR95 and CoVaR50. The four results are
then used for accuracy tests as presented below. Table 3.3 present our
initial accuracy test results from VaR and CoVaR calculations.
1 See appendix for estimation results.
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CoVaR ­ QR CoVaR ­
Garch
5% signifance
n1 93 9 37 9
n0 454 538 511 539
q 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
pi 0.170 0.016 0.067 0.016
LR1 15.009 17.333 3.205 1.403
p­value 1.224 3.145 0.073 3.025
Note:summary of our unconditional coverage tests. It shows the accuracy
of VaR and CoVaRmodels estimated fromQR and Garch models using 5%
level of significance.Where n0 = non violation and n1 = number of violations.
Comparing the p­values and likelihood ratio (LR1) figures from the table
shows that both models are acceptable, although accuracy from the Garch
model is better when looking at Panel VaR calculation. Results show the
QR model is more accurate in dealing with CoVaR analysis. A plausible
explanation for this may be due to the fact that QR takes into consideration
‘state variables’ when analysing CoVaR, therefore factoring in other vari­
ables that capture the relationship between institutions and their impact on
these conditional risk relationship. By conditioning on another institution’s
financial distress, CoVaR goes beyond idiosyncratic risk and captures pos­
sible risk spillovers among financial institutions. Therefore, further support­
ing our choice of methodology.
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n00 400 528 481 533
n01 54 9 30 5
n10 53 9 29 5
n11 39 0 7 4
pi01 0.118 0.016 0.058 0.009
pi11 0.423 0.000 0.194 0.004
pi2 0.170 0.0164 0.067 0.016
LR2 41.747 0.301 6.979 22.680
p­value 0.582 0.804 0.924 0.008
Note:This test produces result that takes into consideration volatility clus­
tering in order to avoid serial correlation in the violation sequence.Where
n00 = number of non violation followed by non­violation, n01 = number of
non­violation followed by violation, n1 = number of violation followed by
non­violation and n11 = number of violation followed by violiation..
Our result supports the accuracy of the Garch estimation method over
QR when calculating the VaR of individual banks. Tobias and Brunner­
meier (2016) also show that showed Garch estimates perform better for
the ninety­fifth percentile, while the quantile estimates perform consider­
ably better for the ninety­ninth percentile. Our result supports the idea that;
the QR is a more parsimonious measure of systemic risk that captures the
tail­dependency between an institution and the financial system as a whole
(White et al., 2015).
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LR3 46.756 17.635 10.184 40.081
p­value 0.001 0.363 0.981 0.006
Note:It is a combination of unconditional and independence tests above.
The test for conditional coverage is also asymptotically chi­square dis­
tributed and has two degrees of freedom. The critical value at 95% con­
fidence level is 5.99. Making the model pass the test if its test statistic is
under the critical value (Christoffersen and Pelletier, 2004).
It also follows the same trend, supporting the accuracy of Garch over QR
when testing on VaR and vice versa when considering CoVaR. Finally, we
ran the Lopez loss function. The results in Table 3.5 below are also in
line with all previous accuracy test. That is panel VaR using Garch more
produce a better model, while QR model produces more accuracy with
CoVaR.










Violation Ratio (G) 0.170 0.016 0.067 0.016
Lopez (L) 0.183 0.016 0.067 0.029
Difference (L – G) 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.013
Note:It looks at the losses made when there is a violation. It also provides
the more accurate model using the least (L­G) difference.
Brunnermeier et al. (2012) also stated that QR are a more efficient way to
estimate CoVaR. Given the results from our accuracy tests, the rest of this
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analysis therefore correctly uses QR for calculating ∆CoVaR that is use for
panel regression in later part of this analysis.
3.8.1 Analysis of CoVaR using Quantile Regression (QR)
Given our datasets and accuracy test results, QR is more robust when ap­
plied to CoVaR. In order to further justifying the estimation of CoVaR using
QR, it is important to establish that all state variables used are significantly
different from an OLS regression at quantile of interest, in our case 5%.
Figure 3.1 below shows that all coefficients and confidence interval of state
variables use to estimate CoVaR have differential effects at different quan­
tiles outside the OLS estimation and captures the time­varying tail be­
haviour of these variables that are important for systemic risk. It justifies
the application of QR beyond capturing time variation in the conditional
moments of asset returns and the existence of tail events that would be
missed if average effects of state variables were considered on systemic
risk variable. For example, the average impact of liquidity spread on Co­
VaR is ­8%, whereas at 5% quantile it is ­1%, showing different effects for
outlier tail events.
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Figure 3.1: Quantiles of state variables
Note: the black hard dash lines represent the OLS regression line and the
slim lines around them represent the confidence intervals. The green lines
however show the QR at different quantile intervals. All our variables show
significant differential effects from OLS. Source: Author.
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Table 3.7: Quantile Regression using state variables
Ri t QR05 Ri t QR50
Industrial Prod. Growth 0.117***
0.000










Per Cap Growth 0.034**
0.010
Per Cap Growth 0.036
0.517
Real Estate Growth 0.047***
0.000










Change in 3month T­bill 0.522***
0.000










Pseudo R2 = 0.496 Pseudo R2 = 0.417
Note:The Table shows the result of state variable when estimating QR at
5% and 50% significance level.
This is similar to the result from Tobias and Brunnermeier (2016). It shows
at high percentile, QR captures tail risk more accurately (with all variables
performing better).
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Figure 3.2: The movement of VaR and CoVaR over our whole sample pe­
riod.
Note: Time series of VaR and CoVaR over the entire sample period of 2000
­ 2019.Source:Author.
The plot for VaR time series for the panel shows a relatively stable pattern
when compared to CoVaR plot over the same period. Hence, applying
financial regulation solely based on the risk of an institution in isolation will
not be sufficient to insulate the financial sector against systemic risk.
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Figure 3.3: The movement of CoVaR (VaR_system) and ∆CoVaR (delta­
COVAR) over our whole sample period
Note: These graphs highlight individual bank systemic risk contribution
(∆CoVaR) against the risk within banking system (CoVaR) for the period of
2000­Q1 – 2019­Q4. Source: Author.
It shows the plot of the time series ∆CoVaR against CoVaR for all insti­
tutions in our sample. It shows there is a strong time series relationship.
Meaning, the contribution of each bank is closely related to movement of
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systemic risk within the system. This supports the change in regulation
that is macro in outlook as opposed to the micro nature of regulation prior
to the crisis.
Next, we discuss the main impact regulation is having on systemic risk in
the UK. We use the result from above (∆CoVaR) and relate it to a set of
bank­specific variables in panel data regressions. We regress the values of
the systemic risk proxy on six identified bank level regulatory variables us­
ing fixed effect panel regressions to account for unobserved heterogeneity
across our sample banks and across time.
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Observations 888 480 488
R­squared 0.441 0.552 0.512
Note:Note: We estimate the regression ΔCoVaR = ατ + βSenior Executives
Compensationit + βTotal Assetit + βTotal Capital Ratioit + βNon­Interest In­
comeit + βInterest Incomeit + βLeverageit + βDummyit + εit to evaluate the
impact regulation is having on systemic risk in the UK, using banks indi­
vidual variables i, at time t , while εit is a Gaussian error term assumed
to be uncorrelated with the regressors. from 2000 (Q1) to 2019 (Q4). To
estimate the coefficients, we run 3 regressions that covers 3 different sam­
ples. The t­statistics in parentheses are computed using standard errors
robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Significance: *p < 0.10,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Our results offers a number of interesting implications for UK regulatory
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bodies to reconsider its approach. Our panel regression consist of vari­
ables that combine regulatory changes in the UK and Basel III set out for
banks to comply with from the time of announcement in 2010 to end of com­
pliance period in 2019 (other than few parts that have been extended and
not relevant for this analysis). We ran 3 different panel regressions. Re­
gression 1 (Complete sample period) covers the whole sample, i.e. 2000­
Q1 to 2019­Q4. Regression 2 (Post­regulation period) forms our main con­
tribution to the literature. It covers the time­period from 2014­Q1 – 2019Q4,
this is the regulatory compliance period by all banks on examined vari­
ables. Regression 3 (Pre­regulation period) covers the crisis period and
time before the crisis, given us a good understand on the relationship of
these variables with systemic risk leading up to the crisis. We refer to these
different sample periods as regression 1, 2 & 3 for the remaining of this dis­
cussion.
Generally, our R squared for all 3 respective regressions (0.441, 0.552, and
0.512) are acceptable as other explanatory variables that likely impact sys­
temic risk such as interconnectedness and bank concentration that have
not been factored into the analysis. The reason being that there is no ex­
plicitly regulation within Basel III or the UK regulation that have tried to in­
fluence these variables directly. Although, UK regulation allows customers
to switch bank accounts more easily in a bid to increase competition, this
does not capture interconnectedness or level of concentration.
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Basel III was announced in November 2010 and implementation started in
January 2013. It also had an initial full compliance date of January 2019,
however at the time of this analysis the date is extended to 2022 for some
of the variables like the liquidity coverage ratio and net stable fund ratio.
The earliest compliance date for a Basel III variable – The core capital ra­
tios was January 2015. For this reason we use ‘total capital ratio’ to capture
Basel III tier I and tier II capital requirement. King and Tarbert (2011) also
stated these are arguably the most important aspect of the regulation. Al­
though these ratios were phased in from the time Basel III was announce,
and supervision by Basel committee for compliance started in 2011, empir­
ical data show that Banks in the UK already meet this requirement before
the end of 2010. Therefore, for empirical accuracy when analysing the im­
pact of regulation, we choose 2014 as starting point for regulation as the
data show that all banks where compliant with all the variables use in this
analysis in 2013­Q2. Next we discuss variables used for this analysis.
Table 3.8 shows that Total capital ratio – a variable that captures the abil­
ity of banks to absorb losses during periods of economic distress has no
statistical significance with respect to our systemic risk dependent vari­
able – ∆CoVaR, for the period building up to the crisis (regression 3).
This supports the effectiveness of the regulation and why capital ratio is
made a priority. Regression 2 shows the expected nature of its relation­
ship to systemic risk with statistical significance. It suggests that imple­
mentation of capital requirement has reduce to likelihood of banks not
absorbing their losses and therefore reducing systemic risk by 0.016%.
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Laeven et al. (2016) also find some evidence that systemic risk is lower in
more­capitalized banks, with effects particularly more pronounced for large
banks.
Basel III Leverage ratio introduction is a result of banks being able to show
they had sufficient capital while holding excessive risk before the crisis
(King and Tarbert, 2011) . It therefore serves as a reinforcing risk measure.
It is important to remember here that Basel III leverage is also calculated by
comparing Tier 1 capital with “total exposure,” without reference to RWAs
(i.e. including off balance exposures). The overall target is a minimum of 3
percent. Our result show that the relationship of leverage ratio to systemic
risk is positive at 0.09% before regulation and about ­0.23% afterwards.
This is an important difference as it shows that prior to implementation of
regulation, higher ratio suggests more risk, while post regulation banks are
expected to meet a minimum threshold and the further it is from the thresh­
old the more risky it seem. Both results are statistically significant at 5%
and 10% level respectively. Also, note the result of leverage ratio from the
full regression is not significant, although it shows a positive relationship.
This could result from the fact that Basel III leverage and normal leverage
calculations and relationship are different. From a sample of international
banks, López­Espinosa et al. (2012) concluded that leverage seem to pro­
vide little incremental information about systemic risk. This is similar to our
full sample result, but significant different from our conclusion. An explana­
tion could be that out analysis did factor in the changes of how leverage is
calculated under the new rules and differentiate sample periods to account
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for these changes. Our data also factored in a reasonable amount of the
new leverage ratio data that most studies have not use (an advantage due
to how recent we collected the data).
In the UK, regulation of banks after the crisis went beyond Basel III require­
ments. As a package, UK regulation official announcement was made in
September 2011. The most prominent of these being ring fencing of banks.
We use interest income to capture this (as consistently done within the lit­
erature). Overall, regression 1 and 3 show that interest income has a neg­
ative relationship with systemic risk at 1% level of significance, reducing
∆CoVaR by about 0.13% and 0.09% respectively. However, regression 2
does not show the expected relationship or statistical significance. It shows
that while this regulation can be econometrically justified prior to imple­
menting the regulation, our analysis shows it has no impact on systemic
risk. Therefore, UK regulatory agency should revisit the imposition of ring
fencing on banks as our result does not support empirical economic justi­
fication. It highlights the need to insulate core­banking activities that can
continuously access deposit insurance even during crisis. Others equally
argue it reduces the benefits that come from diversification. Brunnermeier
et al. (2012) also found that interest incomemarginally decreases systemic
risk at the 10% level of statistical significance. Overall, neither the literature
nor our analysis (after exclusively looking at the regulatory phase period)
show that ring fencing as captured by interest income reduces systemic
risk. Using a set of global banks, Bostandzic and Weiß (2018) find that the
ratio of non­interest income to interest income ratio to be associated with a
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significant decrease in a bank’s contribution to global systemic risk. They
suggested from their result one could hypothesize that a more traditional
business model does not necessarily stabilize the financial sector. Further
supporting our findings on interest income.
We did not find any relationship with non­interest variable (this is the proxy
to non­ring fence activities within banking group) and our systemic risk
measure. The results from all 3 regressions are not statistically signif­
icant. Although, this may be attributed to the fact that our sample use
only banks in the analysis and leaving out investment banks and other
financial institutions that likely capture activities outside ring fence activi­
ties more accurately. However, Brunnermeier et al. (2012), find that the
ratio of non­interest income to total assets is strongly positively correlated
with∆CoVaR, suggesting that non­interest income contributes adversely to
systemic risk. On the other hand, like our result, Engle et al. (2014); Weiß
et al. (2014); and Saunders et al. (2014) found no relationship between
non­interest income and systemic risk. This mix results further questions
the regulation of ring fencing and suggests room for future further research.
Gandhi and Lustig (2015); Bostandzic and Weiß (2018); Laeven et al.
(2016); all used total asset as proxy to bank size in their analysis as adopted
here. An important part of the regulation is making the system robust
that government overcome the issue of ‘too­big­to­fail’ banks by not bailing
them out as they did at the time of the crisis. While regression 3 does not
show any relationship between size and systemic risk, both regression 1
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and 2 have statistically significant results. That is banks size affected sys­
temic risk at about 0.30% and ­0.18% respectively. The results show dif­
ferent relationship signs. Suggesting that before regulation, size affected
systemic risk positively and banks have reduce their size after regulation
and as a result reduce their contribution to systemic risk, justifying the im­
plementation of this regulation.
The variable of executive pay impacts risk of banks and therefore systemic
risk at some level (Hubbard and Palia, 1995). The crisis questioned not
only the justification that top executives are paid but the amount as well.
Therefore, part of the regulation was to cap the amount top executives are
paid and bonuses being paid using company shares. This is supposed to
act as a proxy for reducing moral hazards that can contribute to systemic
risk. Our regressions for before and after the implementation of regula­
tion (regression 2 and 3) do not show any statistically significant results,
although the signs of the relationship do suggest a positive relationship.
However, the full regression from 2000­Q1 to 2019­Q4 show a statistically
significant relationship that suggests top executive pay do have a relation­
ship with systemic that is positive in nature. The result show that executive
pay increases systemic risk by about 0.04%. Using data for US banks be­
tween 1992 – 2008, Guo et al. (2015) find that bank risk increases with
both the %s of short­term and long­term incentive compensation. How­
ever, greater proportion of incentive pay decreases the likelihood for a bank
to become a problem or failed institution. While, Palia and Porter (2004)
find that the level of salary and bonus of CEO compensation is negatively
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related to bank risk, consistent with the theory of Kotter (2000), that bank
risk (measured by the standard deviation of stock returns) decreases when
managers’ salary and bonus increase. Finally, we use a dummy variable
to capture the overall effect of regulation within the whole sample period.
The result shows that our dummy beta is significant with a co­efficient that
is interpreted as the intercept shifting effect at around ­0.287. Showing that
the overall introduction of regulation within that period as reduced systemic
risk as captured by ∆CoVaR by around 0.287%.
As a robustness check, we estimate∆CoVaR using aGARCHmodel (DCC)
and find that this method produces estimates quite similar to the quantile
regression method, leading us to the conclusion that the quantile regres­
sion framework is sufficiently flexible to estimate ∆CoVaR.
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3.9 Conclusion
During financial crises, tail events tend to spill across financial institutions.
Such spillovers are preceded by a phase in which risk builds up. CoVaR is
a parsimonious measure of systemic risk that captures the tail­dependency
between an institution and the financial system as a whole. It broadens risk
measurement to afford a macroprudential perspective in a cross­section
and complements measures designed to assess individual financial insti­
tutions’ micro­prudential risk.
Adopting the method from Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), along with
Garch (1,1) as used by Girardi and Ergün (2013), we calculated CoVaR
of Banks in the UK for the period of 2000 – 2019. We build on the literature
by applying accuracy tests that show QR is more efficient when estimating
CoVaR as compared to a Garch model.
The analysis contributed to the literature by investigating some of the vari­
ables that are the focus of regulation after the financial crisis. We divided
our sample to capture post and pre­ regulatory periods by using announce­
ment/compliance dates and as shown by the data. Our results present im­
portant findings to some of regulations implemented after the crisis period
in the UK. The main one being ring fencing. Using interest income as a
proxy for this regulation, our analysis show that this variable has no sta­
tistical significance in reducing systemic risk after regulation (as oppose
to its statistical relevance in our pre­regulation regression analysis). This
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is further supported when we look at the result of our non­interest income
(a proxy for non­ring fence activities) that was expected to increase sys­
temic risk but showed no such relationship in the post­regulatory period.
Thus, making us suggest that this policy needs further research in terms
of its impact to systemic risk. As it could be harming the system, instead
of reducing system risk as expected. Similar conclusion was reached by
De Jonghe et al. (2015). They showed that from a systemic risk point of
view, forcing banks to go back traditional activities is good only for small
banks. On the other hand, systemic risk increases when large banks are
ring­fenced. Equally, Engle et al. (2014); Weiß et al. (2014); and Saun­
ders et al. (2014) found no relationship between non­interest income and
systemic risk.
Our result show that measures taken to reduce bank size to be of statistical
significance with an inverse relationship systemic risk. This is in line with
results from Laeven et al. (2016), that find strong evidence that systemic
risk increases with bank size. Allowing us to conclude that the effort by
regulatory agency to reduce bank size is effective.
Finally, our results show that Basel III variables provide strong and valid
justification in the attempts made by regulation to reduce systemic risk. It
shows that more capitalised banks are better able to reduce systemic risk
and the change in the way leverage ratio is calculated to further capture
all off balance sheet items that potentially increase systemic is statistically
significant. This is similar with the results of Berger and Bouwman (2013)
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who show that bank capital increases a bank’s survival probability, showing




This Appendix explains how to use quantile regressions to estimate VaR
and CoVaR. As discussed the model considered here is a special case of
the stylized financial system analyzed in Section II, with particularly simple
expressions for µj (*) , σji (*), and σjj (*). Specifically, we assume that
losses Xti have the following linear factor structure
Xj t + 1 = ϕ0 + Mt ϕ1 + Xi t + 1 ϕ2 + (ϕ3 + Mt ϕ4) ∆ Zj t + 1 (4.1)
where Mt is a vector of state variables. The error term ∆Zj t +1 is assumed
to be i.i.d. with zero mean and unit variance, and E[ ∆Zj t +1 | Mt + Xi t + 1]
= 0. The conditional expected return µj [Xj t + 1 | Mt, Xi t + 1] = ϕ0 + Mt ϕ1
+ Xi t + 1 ϕ2 depends on the set of state variables Mt and on Xi t + 1, and
the conditional volatility σjj t [ Xj t + 1| Mt, Xi t + 1] = (ϕ3 + Mt ϕ4) is a direct
function of the state variablesMt. The coefficients ϕ0, ϕ1, and ϕ2 could be
estimated consistently via OLS of X t i+ 1 onM t and X t i+ 1. The predicted
value of such an OLS regression would be the mean of Xj t + 1conditional
on Mt and Xi t + 1. In order to compute the VaR and CoVaR from OLS re­
gressions, one would have to also estimate ϕ3, and ϕ4, and then make
distributional assumptions about ∆Zj t +1. The quantile regressions incor­
porate estimates of the conditional mean and the conditional volatility to
produce conditional quantiles, without the distributional assumptions that
would be needed for estimation via OLS.
Instead of using OLS regressions, we use quantile regressions to estimate
model for different percentiles. We denote the cumulative distribution func­
tion (CDF) of ∆Zj by F∆Zj (*), and its inverse CDF by F−1∆Zj (q) for the q%
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­quantile. It follows immediately that the inverse CDF of Xj t +1 is
F−1 Xjt+1(q | Mt,X
j
t+1) =αq +Mt γq +X
i
t+1 βq
where αq = ϕ0 + ϕ3 F−1 ∆Zj (q) , γq = ϕ1 + ϕ4 F−1 ∆Zj (q), and βq = ϕ2 for
quantiles q ∈ (0, 100). We call F−1Xt+1 (q | Mt, X
i
t+1) the conditional quantile
function. From the definition of VaR, we obtain
V aR
j
q,t+1 = inf {Pr (Xt +1 | { Mt, X
i
t+1 } ≤ VaRq,t+1) ≥ q%} = F
−1






The conditional quantile function F−1Xt+1 (q | M
t, Xit+1) is the V aR
j
q,t+1 con­
ditional on Mt and Xit+1. By conditioning on = V aR
j
q,t+1, we obtain the
CoV aR
j |i
q,t+1from the quantile function:
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We estimate the quantile function as the predicted value of the q% ­ quan­








∣∣∣Xit+1 − αq −Mtγq − Xit+1βq ∣∣∣ if (Xit+1 − q −Mtγq − Xit+1βq) ⩾ 0
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the Impact of Regulation
4.1 Abstract
Using a Markov Switching VAR, we investigate the impact regulation has
had on CDS indexes in the US and UK. In so doing, we are able to show
the existence of contagion prior to the implementation of regulation and In­
terdependence after that. We then employed Regime dependent Impulse
Response Functions to show the indexes that react most to shocks from
the system. We also applied DCC­GARCH to check the robustness of our
results that show the Transport, Telecommunications and Electric Power
CDS sector indexes exhibit the highest contagion effects in the US, while
Banks, Manufacturing and Other Financial Services sector CDS indexes
had the most contagion impact in the UK.
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4.2 Introduction:
The financial crisis of 2007 that started within the US housing market led to
the worst economic collapse since the Great Depression of 1929 (Temin,
2010). The subprime mortgage market in the U.S., where the crisis origi­
nated, was less than 4 per cent of the financial system (Settlements, 2009).
Yet, this had a substantial impact in the U.S. and around the world. Risk
propagation and its transmission across economic sectors and financial
markets havemany implications for investors, firms, employees and policy­
makers. Examining the interplay between different sectors is increasingly
important as it helps market participants understand how default probabil­
ities evolve and spread during and after crisis periods. This is important
because such an understanding provides information about the direction
of future defaults, helping market participants’ price credit derivatives and
hedge credit exposure in the sectoral credit market appropriately. It allows
policymakers to formulate their regulation more effectively and holistically.
An ongoing argument is that the excessive use of financial derivatives led
to an unprecedented contagion level that affected all economic sectors dur­
ing the crisis. This chapter’s first and principal contribution is analysing the
impact regulation has had on credit default swap indexes in reducing con­
tagion. To achieve this, we employ a methodology similar to Guo et al.
(2011) and Guidolin and Pedio (2017), i.e. a two­state Markov Switching
Vector Autoregressive model (MS­VAR hereafter). The initial state reflects
the period of the crisis (high volatility period). The second state accounts
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for the period regulatory changeswere fully phased­in within the derivatives
market (announcement started from 2011). The analysis aims to show how
the change in the regulatory regime that introduced; central counterparty
clearing (henceforth CCP), a Collateral requirement for OTC derivatives,
liquidity requirement and Changes to accounts reporting that includes off­
balance sheet derivative products is having an impact on reducing the risk
of contagion within CDS indexes.
The second contribution of this analysis establishes (using credit default
swap spread, henceforth CDS spread) if there was contagion or interde­
pendency within sectors of the economy in the US and the UK during the
crisis and if this has changed after introducing regulation. This distinction
between interdependence and contagion is of importance to policymak­
ers and investors. That is, in a contagious case, policy intervention could
be effective; conversely, in the case of interdependence, a similar action
is unlikely to have any significant effect. For example, in the case of in­
terdependence, investors market risk can be reduced by portfolio diver­
sification. However, if contagion occurs, then the degree of dependence
between markets increases, and portfolio diversification may not be an ef­
fective strategy to follow. Due to the different effects they have on the
economic decision process, the identification of interdependence and con­
tagion effects cannot be overemphasized. We follow similar steps used
by Celık (2012) to establish this relationship using a two­sample one­sided
t­test. It involves testing the change in correlation coefficient between dif­
ferent sample periods that capture the period of volatility (crisis period) and
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the stable period (after introducing regulation).
Although the concepts of contagion and interdependence are close, there
is a subtle and important difference. Longstaff (2010) adopted the defini­
tion of contagion use within the literature (such as Bae et al., 2003, Dorn­
busch et al., 2000, Kaminsky et al., 2003) to be an episode in which there
is a significant increase in cross­market linkages after a shock occurs in
one market. In comparison, Dornbusch et al. (2000) describe the spillover
channels from trade and markets that strengthened linkages or intercon­
nections between sectors and economies as interdependence. Forbes and
Rigobon (2002) also define co­movements during stable periods driven by
strong connections among markets as “interdependence”. Therefore, the
term interdependence here refers to normal co­movements of shocks and
provides a baseline to compare the excessive or incremental impact that
shocks might have had during crisis periods i.e. Contagion.
The third contribution shows through which channel contagion occurred.
That is, which CDS index contributed to the propagation of risk within the
economy through the application of Impulse Response Functions (IRF’s).
This is similar but different from the work of Longstaff (2010), who analysed
the linkages between asset­backed CDO returns, Treasury returns, corpo­
rate bond, stock market returns, and changes in the level of the VIX index
in three different periods (pre­crisis, the subprime turmoil, and the global
crisis periods). His analysis focused on cross­asset contagion within the
financial sector and did not consider the impact of regulation as done here.
161
His analysis is based on simple regressions that assume breaks to be ex­
ogenously given while we deal with breaks and instability in the data using
Markov regime­switching model. Again, our analysis deals with sectors of
the economy as opposed to a single sector.
Another importance of this analysis lies within the regulatory changes in­
troduced after the crisis. Basel III requires all users of OTC products to set
aside collateral and report all exposure. There is the introduction of liquidity
requirements for using OTC derivatives. The regulation also introduced the
CCP’s within major national in international regulatory authorities such as;
Liineken report in Europe, the Independent Commission on Banking report
in the UK and Dodd­Frank Wall­Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act in the US. Their objective is reducing contagion exposure within the
sellers and buyers of OTC instruments, especially CDS. This is important
as CDS spreads reflect the market’s assessment of credit risk (Longstaff,
2010). CDS also serves as an essential indicator of the depth of the cri­
sis and, therefore, suitable for understanding the impact regulation has on
contagion (Wang and Moore, 2012). Again, these regulatory measures are
aimed at providing safety in terms of increased liquidity, collateral and third
party intervention (CCP), all of which further enhance stability and reduce
default risk.
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Our motivation comes from the understanding that a substantive part of
the recent regulation is focused on changing the way financial derivative
products are: used, reported, and regulated in order to reduce exposure
and contagion. This study aims to better understand the impact regulation
is having based on the theme within this thesis. Previous chapters showed
the impact of regulation on the probability of financial crisis and systemic
risk.
In summary, the literature in this area has focused on either cross­country
contagion using homogeneousmarkets/asset or cross­asset contagion within
a single sector. Therefore, we contribute by providing cross­sector conta­
gion using CDS spread within a Regime Switching VAR model to show
the impact of regulation on CDS. We establish the existence of contagion
or interdependence by comparing the correlation coefficient between the
regimes in the MS­VAR model and apply Dynamic Condition Correlation
Multivariate Garch (henceforth DCC­GARCH) to check the robustness of
our results. Note, while MS­VAR detects regimes from the sample data,
for the DCC­GARCH model, we used regulation announcement and com­
pliance dates to differentiate between the two regimes (2007 – 2013 as the
period prior to full regulation and 2014 – 2020 as fully regulation compli­
ance period).
Finally, we apply IRF’s to establish channels of contagion. Our full sample
consist of weekly five year CDS spread Index from January 2007 to Jan­
uary 2020. It covers nine economic sectors that include; 1. Banks, 2. Other
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financial Services, 3. Manufacturing, 4. Energy, 5. Telecommunications,
6. Consumer Goods, 7. Transportation, 8. Services, and 9. Sovereign
Spread. The 2007 crisis provided us a textbook environment to test these
relationships. This is because the crisis that started within the subprime
market and increased its CDS spread also led to growing CDS spread for
all sectors, and the whole economy suffered as a result.
The remaining of this chapter is divided as follows; Section 2 reviews the
literature, Section 3 provides explanation of the methodology applied, Sec­
tion 4 is explanation of the data used for analysis, Section 5 provides the
empirical findings of the analysis and we conclude in Section 6.
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4.3 Literature Review
When considering the global scope and the devastating effects of the finan­
cial crisis, regulatory agencies have placed emphasis on the risks that arise
from derivatives. Moreover, the failure of prominent financial giants, such
as Lehman Brothers,Bear Stearns, or bailing of American Insurance Group
by the government has been widely attributed to their heavy involvement
in the CDS market (Borio, 2009). Before the recent crisis, the literature
mainly had focused on the dynamics of cross­country contagion applied to
homogeneous asset markets (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002, Markwat et
al., 2009). However, since the 2007–2009 US subprime crisis, researchers
have shown an increasing interest in cross­asset contagion. This analysis
extends the literature by looking into sector contagion/interdependence.
We start by briefly looking at literature from theoretical analysis before look­
ing into the empirical analysis.
Kodres and Pritsker (2002) developed a multiple asset rational expecta­
tions model of asset prices to explain financial market contagion. Their
model allows contagion through several channels with a focus on conta­
gion through cross­market rebalancing. They showed investors transmit
idiosyncratic shocks from one market to others by adjusting their portfo­
lios’ exposures to shared macroeconomic risks. The pattern and severity
of financial contagion depend on markets’ sensitivities to shared macroe­
conomic risk factors and on the amount of information asymmetry in each
market. Calvo and Mendoza (2000) used a basic model of international
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portfolio diversification with incomplete information to show that the glob­
alization of securities markets can reduce incentives for information gath­
ering and hence produce high volatility in capital flows as a result of con­
tagion.
Ballester et al. (2016) highlighted the global financial crisis and subsequent
Eurozone crisis has further raised issues associated with interdependence
and contagion across firms and industries that disrupt economies as a
whole. This, however, does not negate the importance of the network that
exists through the interbankmarket, the payment system, financial markets
and so on. Similarly, economies have interconnections through financial
and trade linkages. This point to the importance of understanding the ex­
act relationship that exists between sectors (e.g. Coudert and Gex, 2010,
Samarakoon, 2011, Guo et al., 2011, Alexakis and Pappas, 2018).
Contrary to the rationale provided for the establishment of CCPs, Arora et
al. (2012) pointed out that the OTC derivatives market already have ex­
isting arrangements in place to deal with counterparty risk, including the
posting of collateral by both counterparties and the use of International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) master agreements and credit
support. If these arrangements are effective solutions to the problem of
counterparty risk, central clearing will not contribute to a further reduction
in counterparty risk.
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Equally, Culp (2015) shows that the imposition of CCPs could lead to many
issues such as:(1) Adverse Selection; i.e. the extent that CCPs try and pro­
vide clearing and settlement services for non­standardize OTC derivatives
as CCP risk managers are likely to be at a serious informational disadvan­
tage to clearing members. (2) Excessive Standardization; counter to the
original raison d’etre of the OTC derivatives market – this may pose too
many practical problems for CCPs to clear. (3) Margin and Liquidity Risk;
i.e. the cost of margin and collateral can be much higher during periods in
which derivatives participants have liquidity constrained. This considera­
tion has led to increased interest in understanding the cost of regulation as
evidence by the literature.
Furthermore, Heath et al. (2016) illustrate that the concentration in risk
can lead to its crystallization if a participant defaults on its obligations to
a CCP, given that the CCP must continue to meet its obligations to all of
the non­defaulting participants. However, a previous study by Loon and
Zhong (2014) tested a similar hypothesis. They used an event­study with
the commencement date of central clearing as the event date (day 0) on
a sample of 132 reference entities (obligors) for voluntary central clear­
ing between 2009 and 2011. Their results suggest central clearing reduce
counterparty risk. On the other hand, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) showed
that correlation coefficients are conditional on market volatility. Under cer­
tain assumptions, it is possible to adjust for this bias. They concluded that
using this adjustment in an empirical study that there was virtually no in­
crease in unconditional correlation coefficients (i.e., no contagion during
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the 1997 Asian crisis, 1994 Mexican devaluation, and 1987 U.S. market
crash). There was, however, a high level of market co­movement in all
periods. Suggesting these regulations will not necessarily have an impact
on contagion.
These theoretical arguments against the new set of regulations increase
the need for rigorous empirical analysis of the impact of regulation. In
February 2013, theOver­the­counter Derivatives CoordinationGroup (ODCG)
commissioned the assessment of the macroeconomic implications of over­
the­counter (OTC) derivatives regulatory reforms that was undertaken by
theMacroeconomic Assessment Group onDerivatives. Their findings show
that counterparty exposures related to derivatives traded bilaterally in OTC
markets helped propagate and amplify the global financial crisis that erupted
in 2008. They concluded that the main benefit of the reforms arises from
reducing counterparty exposures through ’netting’ as central clearing be­
comes more widespread and through more comprehensive collateralisa­
tion (as set out in recent regulation). Their analysis (using a projection
of low, central and high­cost scenarios) show that in the central scenario,
regulation lowers the annual probability of a financial crisis propagated by
OTC derivatives by 0.26 % points.
Given the vastness of the empirical analysis of contagion and Interdepen­
dence, we highlight only the most relevant to this analysis here. In trying
to understand if the CDS market was subject to contagion in 2005 Gen­
eral Motors and Ford crisis, Coudert and Gex (2010) applied Exponentially
168
Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) and DCC­GARCH to check for corre­
lations between CDS premia. They sampled 226 CDSs on major US and
European firms. Their results show that correlations significantly increased
during the crisis. The crisis also triggered a surge in all CDS premia, mak­
ing them conclude the presence of industry contagion effect.
Jorion and Zhang (2007) examined the intra­industry information transfer
effect of credit events, as captured in the credit default swaps (CDS) and
stock markets in the US. They showed that positive correlations across
CDS spreads imply that contagion effects dominate, whereas negative cor­
relations indicate competition effects.
Using bank CDS data and its spread as an indicator of credit risk, Ballester
et al. (2016) evaluated the contagion among banks in different countries
and regions during the crisis via the Generalized Vector Auto­Regressive
(GVAR) approach. To distinguish between systematic and idiosyncratic
contagion, they applied Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to extract the
common factors underlying the correlations among the CDS returns series
of individual banks over the sample period. Showing that systematic con­
tagion captures the spillover effects due to changes in global factors that
affect all banks, whereas idiosyncratic contagion measures the spillover
effects caused by changes in bank fundamentals. They concluded both
types of contagion were present from 2007, although the spillover dynam­
ics changed over time.
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Longstaff (2010) used a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) framework in testing
for contagion from subprime asset­backed collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs) and their effects on other markets. His results show that Treasury
bond prices increase in response to negative shocks from asset­backed
CDO values, consistent with a flight­to­quality pattern. He concluded that
contagion appeared to spread from the ABX market at the beginning of
the crisis when subprime losses were the primary concern. However, the
ABX market no longer functioned as the vector of contagion (and no longer
Granger­caused returns) in other markets as the crisis deepened.
Boutabba (2019) analysed the crisis in Thailand’s exchange market us­
ing the VAR model. He showed evidence of financial contagion between
exchange markets, monetary markets, and stock markets and Interdepen­
dence with seven other Asian countries. Using weekly Eurozone data from
2007–2014, Guidolin and Pedio (2017) applied a two­state Markov switch­
ing model VAR to show contagion effects in a crisis regime. Their find­
ings, mainly explained by a flight­to­quality channel, show that the 2010–
2011 European sovereign debt crisis to be a case of cross­country, cross­
asset contagion, in which shocks spread from low credit­quality govern­
ment bonds to corporate bonds and stock markets.
Alexakis and Pappas (2018) applied the multivariate ADCC­GJR­GARCH
model within European countries to estimate the dynamic conditional cor­
relations and the Markov­Switching model to identify crisis transition dates
for sectorial equity indices (that consist of Financials, Consumer Goods,
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Telecommunications, Health Care and Industrials sectors) during the 2007
Crisis and European Sovereign Debt Crisis (ESDC). They adjusted the an­
alytical framework to allow for three variants of financial contagion. They
first examine each business sector in isolation but across countries. Then
analyse specific countries but across sectors and finally looked at financial
contagion at cross­country and cross­sector level. Their results confirm
contagion for all business sectors under the crisis and ESDC, with Finan­
cials and Telecommunications sectors being the most affected, while In­
dustrial and Consumer Goods are the least affected. In addition, all coun­
tries experienced financial contagion at varying magnitudes, with those in
the Core EU being the most affected in both crises.
Guo et al. (2011) also applied Markov regime­switching VAR to investi­
gate contagion effects among the stock market, real estate market, credit
default market, and energy market in the US. They used weekly data of
oil price, stock index, CDS index and housing price index from October
2003 through March 2009. Their results showed that the contagion effects
among these markets are characterized by nonlinearity with two distinct
regimes with stock market activities generating higher volatilities in the
CDS market. The contagion effects between stock and energy markets
also appear to be larger, while the impacts from the credit default market
on the real estate market are not as significant.
Samarakoon (2011) examined the transmission of shocks between the
U.S. and foreign markets to differentiate interdependence from contagion
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during the crisis by constructing VAR shock models for partially overlap­
ping and non­overlapping markets. He concluded that with the existence
of important bi­directional yet asymmetric interdependence and contagion
in emerging markets. In contrast, Interdependence was driven more by
U.S. shocks, while contagion is driven more by emerging market shocks.
Wang and Moore (2012) investigated the correlation of the CDS markets
of 38 countries with the US market during the subprime crisis period by ap­
plying dynamic conditional correlation from a multivariate GARCH model.
Their results provide evidence of correlation during the US subprime­crisis
period, particularly highlighting the impact before and after the Lehman col­
lapse and concluded that it would negatively impact risk diversification on
international debt.
This discussion provides a synthesis of contagion literature from a theo­
retical and empirical point of view, with a focus on analysis more relevant
to this study. It further clarifies the contribution that this analysis is making
to the literature in terms of sector and regulation impact analysis. We now
highlight part of the literature that informs the rationale of our methodology
choice.
Hou and Nguyen (2018) showed that the MS­VAR model does not restrict
the size of the change when a structural break occurs, but it often assumes
a small number of in­sample breaks. It also allows for regime recurrence—
a feature not assumed in the traditional structural break models. Allowing
the regime recurrence does not only tend to improve the estimation ac­
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curacy but also helps us to understand more about the interrelationship
among the detected regimes. In general, three standard methods can be
applied to detect regime­switching. The first method is that we can sim­
ply split the sample estimation into different subsamples and test whether
there is a structural break.
For example, to study the volatility and the effectiveness of the mone­
tary policy, Blanchard and Gali (2008) and Nakov and Pescatori (2010)
simply chose a particular point in time as a breakpoint. With this tradi­
tional method, we have to accept the assumption that all model parame­
ters change simultaneously, which is not necessarily the case. More im­
portantly, prior knowledge is often required for determining the break date,
which is likely to incur an issue of model misspecification (Boivin and Gi­
annoni, 2006).
Another method often used to study the structural instability in the litera­
ture is threshold models. This class of models allows for discrete shifts in
the model parameters, like the MS­VAR model, but the researcher has to
specify a threshold value or transition variable. Unlike threshold models,
the number of regime changes detected by the MS­VAR model is based
on a latent Markov process directly estimated from data. In other words,
the main advantage of the MS­VAR model over threshold models is that
we do not predetermine the threshold value or transition variable before
estimation.
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The third popular approach in the literature is the time­varying parameter
model. This class of non­linear models has been widely used in study­
ing the relationships between macroeconomic variables (e.g. Chan and
Eisenstat, 2018, Clark and Ravazzolo, 2015, Cogley and Sargent, 2005,
Primiceri, 2005). The time­varying parameter model possesses features
that allows it to model gradually changing relationship among the variables
of interest. However, the changes in economic structure, like crisis and
announcement of regulation did not happen in a gradual manner. In this
case, we believe that the MS­VAR model serves as an appropriate tool for
modelling structural instability.
Flavin and Sheenan (2015) also pointed out that MS­VAR has certain ad­
vantages in that it allows both themean parameters and variances to switch
discretely between two regimes. Regimes are determined endogenously
by the data, giving a potentially cleaner delineation betweenNon­Regulatory
Regime andRegulatory Regime. TheRegime switchmodels the heteroskedas­
ticity and overcomes the problem of assuming a constant covariancematrix
of innovations.
Finally, Celık (2012) applied the DCC­GARCH model to test the existence
of contagion during the Global Financial Crisis. He stated that a major ad­
vantage of using this model is the detection of possible changes in condi­
tional correlations over time, which allows the detection of dynamic investor
behaviour. Equally, the model is appropriate to investigate possible conta­
gion effects due to herding behaviour in emerging financial markets during
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crises periods (see Chiang et al., 2007, Corsetti et al., 2005, Syllignakis
and Kouretas, 2011). Another advantage of the DCC­GARCH model is
that it estimates correlation coefficients of the standardized residuals and
so accounts for heteroscedasticity directly (Chiang et al., 2007). Since the
volatility is adjusted by the procedure, the time­varying correlation (DCC)
does not have any bias from volatility. DCC­GARCH continuously adjusts
the correlation for the time­varying volatility. Hence, DCC provides an effi­
cient measure for correlation (Cho and Parhizgari, 2009).
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4.4 Methodology
The focus of this analysis is to investigate the impact of regulation on sec­
toral CDS indexes. We further analyse the existence of contagion or in­
terdependence between CDS indexes of sectors. Finally, we examine the
channels through which these occur. To this end, we apply two different
models, i.e. the Markov Switching VAR (MS­VAR) and DCC­GARCH, for
this analysis. Under the MS­VAR model, we compute impulse response
functions (IRFs) to allow us to disentangle channels of contagion. We start
by discussing the models individually.
4.4.1 Markov Switching Vector AutoRegression (MS­VAR)
The initial discussion of the MS­VAR model lies in the VAR model. Gener­
ally, the VAR approach models every endogenous variable in the system
as a function of the lagged values of all of the endogenous variables in the
system. Thereafter, the MS­VAR detects regime­switching that necessi­
tate that changes in regimes inherently relates to what occurred in the past
regime. This is significantly different from a simple regime model that sug­
gests the break between regimes are not related. This difference is vital to
our analysis as we are looking at the impact regulation has had as a result
of past volatility.
An essential part of estimating a VAR is dealing with lag length. To choose
the appropriate leg length for both our models, we consider the models
Akaike information criteria (AIC), the Schwartz information criteria (SIC)and
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Ajyt−j+µt, µt ∼ IIDN (0, εu) (4.1)
Where p indicates the number of lags N x 1.
yt = (y1, t...., yt)
′ is a N x 1 random vector of endogenous variables.
Ai = (a0, . . . aN, 0) is a N x 1 vector of intercepts, Ai for i = 1,…,ρ are the N
x N vector autoregressive coefficient matrices, and
ut=(u1, t...., uN, t)
′ is a N­dimensional white noise innovation process, such














= 0 for s ,t (Enders, 2008).
From above specification, we move to adopt the MS­VAR model that offers
a range of benefits as it capture features of the series that a single­state
VAR fails to feature, such as; fat tails, heteroskedasticity, skewness, and
time–varying correlations (Ang and Timmermann, 2012).
Consider the k­regimesMS­VARprocess with heteroskedastic components,
compactly MSIAH (k, p) (Markov switching intercept autoregressive het­
eroskedasticity), defined as:





St et,et IIDN (0, IN) (4.2)
Where, St= 1, 2 . . . .k, k is the number of regimes, p is the number of VAR
lags, A0,St is the vector collecting the k regime­ ­dependent intercepts, and
A1,St . . .Aj,St are the regime–dependent N x N autoregressive coefficient
matrices.
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Ω1/2St is a lower triangular matrix and represents the factors applicable to
the regime St in a state–dependent Choleski decomposition of the covari­
ance matrix ΩSt . In our specification of MS models, we assume that al­
ternative states are possible, that is, k > 1, and that regimes are hidden,
meaning that, at all times, investors fail to observe St. Moreover, in MS­
VAR model, the state St is assumed to be generated by a discrete– state,








=(St= j | St−1= i) Pi,j=ϵ (0,1) (4.3)
where Pi,j is the generic [i, j] element of the k x k transition matrix P with
elements
Pi,j=Pr (St+1=j | St= i) ,
k∑
j= 1
Pi= 1∀i, j=ϵ {1 . . . ..,k} (4.4)
The elements of the main diagonal of the transition matrix from equation
4.4 estimate the probability of remaining in regime i in two consecutive peri­
ods and allow us to capture a persistence in the data that is not linear1. MS
models are estimated by maximum likelihood (MLE) and estimation is per­
formed through the Expectation–Maximization (henceforth, EM) algorithm
proposed by Hamilton (1990). Given the matrix Yt−1, which collects lagged
1 The equation in (4.2) requires us to estimate many parameters, especially if the num­
ber of variables included in the system is large. As an alternative, it is possible to estimate
models that require a lower number of parameters than a fully­fledged MSIAH(k,p) frame­
work. For example, in a MSIH(k,0) (Markov switching intercept heteroskedasticity) we
have p 1/4 0 and only the intercepts and the covariance matrix of the error terms are
regime–dependent. Our specification search selects instead a MSIH(k, p), with p > 0 but
the VAR coefficients matrices not linked to the state variable.
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values of the variables, and a regime, the density function of ytconditional
on the realization of the regime k is Gaussian:











If we consider that the information set available at time t­1 includes only
the pre–sample values collected in Yt−1, the sample observations, and the
states of the Markov chain up to St−1, then the St, Yτ conditional density of

















The information about the Markov chain is collected in the vector ξt . Be­
cause at time t­1 the only information yt available is the realized time se­
ries, we need to estimate, alongside the parameters, also the unobserved




Pr (St= 1 | Yτ
...
Pr (St= k | Yτ

To include the probabilities of being in regime k given the information set.
If we collect the densities of yt conditional on and yt−1 in the vector ηt, the
conditional probability density of yt given yt−1 in equation 4.6 can be written
as p(yt| yYt−1) = ηtP ̂ξt−1|τ−1 where ηt≡ p(yt|ξt= 1Yt−1) . . . .p(yt| ξt= kYt−1)′.
Following the same derivation applied to the single observation yt , we
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derive the conditional probability density of the whole sample. The EM
algorithm can be used to carry out an iterating process to jointly estimate
the parameters and the Markov state probabilities.
Next, we discuss DCC­GARCHmodel. In doing so, we follow the same as­
sumption applied by Celık (2012), where the test of conditional correlation
is used to determine to presence or absence of contagion.
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4.4.2 DCC GARCH
In our DCC­GARCH model, we use the same idea in Longstaff (2010), i.e.
assuming from our sample that the high volatility period (crisis phase) is
exogenous. This coincides with a weekly spread from June 2007 (when
Two Bear Stearns funds sold $4billion of assets to cover redemptions and
expected margin calls arising from subprime losses). The new set of reg­
ulations were effective from July 2010 (i.e. The US Dodd­Frank Act) and
fully phased in by the end of 2013 (which includes; The EU’s European
Market Infrastructure regulation (EMIR), Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive (MiFID) and the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (Mi­
FIR)). Therefore, our sample, when testing for the impact of regulation on
contagion/Interdependence, starts from 2014.
Let Xt = [X1t , X2t ] be two asset returns with zero means. The returns are





















Following Engle and Sheppard (2001) and Engle (2002), the decomposi­
tion of the variance–covariance matrix can be written as:
Ht= DtRtDt (4.8)
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Where Dt is the diagonal matrix of the conditional standard deviations and
Rt the matrix of the conditional correlations, i.e.
Dt=
 σ1, t 00 σ2, t
 ,Rt=
 1 ρtρt 1

By replacing Ht with this decomposition in the log­likelihood, the equation















The maximisation of the log­likelihood is done in two steps. The first one
consists in maximising the likelihood on matrix Dt. To do so, volatilities are
estimated through univariate GARCH:
Dt= D (1−A−B)+ Axt−1x′t−1+BDt−1 (4.10)
where A and B are diagonal matrixes. In a second step, the returns Xt
are divided by their estimated standard deviations. The reduced returns
εt= D
−1xt












where α and β are matrices with diagonal elements equal to a and b, re­
spectively. To obtain the correlation matrix, the elements of Qt are normal­
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Following the analysis of Celık (2012), we further use t­statistics to test
consistency of dynamic correlation coefficients between the two samples
of all CDS indexes in both countries in order to establish the existence
of contagion/interdependence effects. We use a one­sided test for mean
differences between samples that allows us to conclude if the means of
conditional correlations are different between crisis period (before regula­
tion) and tranquil period (regulation period). If conditional correlations were
higher during crisis periods, this would constitute a contagion effect. We










Where µcrisisρ and µ
regulation
ρ are the conditional correlation coefficient means
of population in the crisis and regulatory periods. If the sample sizes are
ncrisis and nregulation, the population variances σ2crisis and σ
2
regulation are dif­
ferent and unknown. Then the means of dynamic correlation coefficients
estimated by DCC are ρ̃crisisij and ρ̃
regulation




























































Therefore, If t­statistics is significantly greater than the critical value, H0 is
rejected supporting the existence of contagion effect. Given the discus­
sions above on MS­VAR and DCC­Garch, we can finally we look at IRF’s.
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4.4.3 Impulse Response Functions (IRFs)
According to the general definition, an IRF represents the difference be­
tween the conditional expectation of yt+h at time t in case yt has been
subject to a shock and the conditional expectation of yt+h at time t in case
yt has not been subject to any shock. In practice, we can define the h–step
ahead IRF as follows
IR∆u (h)= E[Yt+h| yt (ω
′
)]−E[Yt+h| yt (ω)] (4.18)
Where, the sample path yt (ω
′
) differs from the sample path yt (ω) because
the initial value of yt has been subject to a shock. This general definition
can be extended and adapted to a MS framework. In this case, we obtain
the following representation:
IR∆u (h)= E[Yt+h|ξt, ut+ ∆ut,Yt−1]−E[Yt+h|ξt, ut+ ∆ut,Yt−1] (4.19)
The h­step ahead IRF thus depends on the state prevailing at time t, when
the shock occurs. However, when computing IRFs in a MS framework we
need to deal with the additional issue that regimes are latent and therefore
the prevailing state at time t is unobservable. For this reason, we compute
regime–dependent IRFs under the assumption that we know the regime
prevailing at the time the shock occurs. Both reduced­ form VAR and MS­
VAR models are subject to identification problems. Therefore, we apply
a Choleski decomposition to the regime–dependent covariance matrices
(as we do in the case of single state model). A Choleski triangular factor­
ization allows solving the identification problem without imposing structure.
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Because it forces asymmetries in the model, the ordering of the variables
becomes crucial. To control for this drawback, we apply different orderings
to the series and verify that the results are stable. In addition, to account
for the uncertainty of the estimated values, for each IRF we also construct




We use only 5­year CDS spreads because these contracts are the most
liquid and constitute over 85%of the entire CDSmarket. Tomaintain unifor­
mity in contracts, we only keep CDS quotations for senior unsecured debt
with a modified restructuring (MR) clause and denominated in US dollars.
Our choice of sector follows the literature such as Guo et al. (2011), How­
ever, given our understanding of how regulation is focused towards impact­
ing the whole CDS market directly, we choose the most relevant sectors in
the economy that show high use of CDS according to the data and litera­
ture. These include 1.Banks, 2.Other financial Services, 3.Manufacturing,
4.Energy, 5.Telecommunications, 6. Consumer Goods, 7. Transportation,
8. Services, and 9. Sovereign Spread.
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Figure 4.1: UK CDS spread
Note: Weekly UK sectors CDS spread series over the sample period.
Source: Author.
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Figure 4.2: US CDS spread
Note: Weekly US sectors CDS spread series over the sample pe­
riod.Source: Author.
A cursory look at the Graphs above may suggest that our weekly sector
CDS series are non­stationary. We, therefore, transform all series by taking
the first difference. Please note that while both series show spikes around
the same period, a careful look will suggest that the spike in the UK is
a little later than in the US (although difficult to show using weekly data
for the time period). In addition, Graph 1 has Y­axis that reaches 6500,
while Graph 2 peaks at 3500, showing that volatility in the US was much
more when compared to the UK. The volatility also lasted much longer in
the US than UK from comparing both graphs. Below is the CDS indexes
descriptive data table.
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Table 4.1: Weekly CDS Descriptive Statistics
CDS INDEX mean max min sd skewness kurtosis ADF
US BANKS 117.7 511.96 21.77 71.85 1.93 7.73 ­18.17
US CSM GOODS 127.74 343.91 76.81 43.55 1.57 6.1 ­15.99
US ELEC POWER 192.68 663.21 78.22 121.26 1.09 3.59 ­22.06
US MNFG 192.08 765.95 68.22 101.63 2.95 13.03 ­20.98
US OTHER FIN 309.69 984.76 145.1 146.3 2.02 7.72 ­14.59
US SERVICE CO 267.55 1186.4 132.77 140.95 3.28 16.02 ­16.79
US TELECOMM 245.07 1454.43 107.09 138.16 3.09 17.99 ­15.49
US TRSP 307.48 1363.3 53.74 193.58 1.72 5.77 ­13.36
US SOVR 27.45 95 6.10 14.70 1.23 4.97 ­19.35
UK BANKS 120.77 305.47 33.96 57.65 0.65 3.02 ­18.61
UK CSM GOODS 79.08 227.58 49.04 25.19 3.11 14.71 ­15.62
UKELEC POWER 103.88 419.51 41.55 68.77 2.52 9.69 ­15.52
UK MNFG 180.79 1029.17 66.8 138.02 4.02 19.98 ­11.40
UK OTHER FIN 155.74 932.16 78.75 129.31 3.76 18.29 ­11.33
UK SERVICE CO 140.12 402.59 74.41 58.72 2.36 8.91 ­16.72
UK TELECOMM 149.58 409.88 79.94 52.51 1.74 7.10 ­16.49
UK SOVR 40.15 165 10.76 26.68 1.55 5.86 ­18.84
Notes:Table 4.1 contains descriptive statistics of weekly CDS spread for
the indexes chosen within the US and UK economies from January 2007
to January 2020 (for US/UK abbreviations are: Consumer goods (csm
goods), Electric power (elec power), Manufacturing (manufacturing), Other
financial services (other fin), Service companies (Service co), Telecommu­
nications (Telecomm), Transport (Trsp), Sovereign (Sovr). Full names of
CDS index in index). For the ADF test, the critical values at 1%, 5% and
10% significant levels are −3.47, −2.88 and −2.58, respectively.
Prior to the identification of possible long­term relations of the variables
specified in the MS­VAR system, it is necessary to verify that all variables
are stationary since lack thereof can make any empirical results deceptive.
Table 4.1 presents the stationarity results for all the variables, based upon
the Augmented Dickey­Fuller unit root test, which corrects any possible
presence of autocorrelation in the standard ADF test in a non­parametric
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way. We find that all series are I(0).
The table consists of all indexes used for the analysis in the UK and US.
The Sovereign spreads for both countries has the smallest mean values,
supporting the understanding that it pays out only in circumstances of debt
default, whereas corporate debts payout in situations of bankruptcy, re­
structuring or any other defined credit event. This suggests the stability of
sovereign CDS as compared to CDS indexes within sectors of the econ­
omy. The mean of US other financial index is the highest, supporting the
evidence that the crisis was more prominent this sector as it covers all
financial services other than banks, with the literature showing that the fail­
ure of firms like Lehman and Bear Stearns propelled the crisis (they were
also heavily invested in the CDS market).
The table also shows that the index with the highest minimum value is
also the US other financial index. Looking at the kurtosis and the skew­
ness of all the series, it shows a generally positive skewness of the spread
and peaked Kurtosis that confirms fat tails. This is evidence for abnormal
events or large shocks. The highest mean values for the UK CDS indexes
are the manufacturing and Banking sector. They also exhibit compara­
tively higher standard deviations, suggesting these series suffer more fluc­
tuations through the sample period.
While it is possible to sample the data into different periods to gain some
basic understanding, we use the whole sample period instead (as our anal­
ysis uses MS­VAR to detect different regimes in the data). This also allows
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us to appreciate the movement of spread over the sample period. The
CDS spread graphs (for US and UK) above capture this movement, show­
ing some level of a spike in 2007 when the crisis is said to have started
and a significant spike that captures the height of the crisis in 2008. It also
shows some level of stability that is consistent with the regulatory period.
We use weekly data for this analysis as it allows us to capture the fluc­
tuations within these sectors without incorporating the noise that is often
found in daily data. On the other hand, monthly data produces too few data
points for VAR analysis and therefore not used in our analysis. The CDS
data is retrieved from DataStream, covering the period from January 2007
through January 2020. This constitutes the longest recent sample in any
study within similar literature. Also note, similar to the way a stock index
is created as a portfolio of individual stocks, a CDS index is essentially a
portfolio of single­name credit default swaps.
From our methodology discussion, we indicated one of the important is­
sues in constructing a VAR model is a proper choice of the lag length. This
is sometimes a matter of judgement based on the theory and nature of the
data used for analysis. However, there are statistical procedures that de­
termine the appropriate lag length, such as the Akaike information criteria
(AIC), the Schwartz information criteria (SIC) and the likelihood ratio test
(Barrell et al.). Equally, a range of standard information criteria (IC) that
trade­off in sample fit with model parsimony provides heterogeneous indi­
cations about what should be the appropriate number of VAR lags. The
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table shows the criteria use here.
Table 4.2: Selection Criteria (US)
Lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 ­27225.8 3.409 87.154 87.182 87.255*
1 ­26941.7 568.1 100 0 1.909 86.565 86.869* 87.346
2 ­26841.1 201.34 100 0 1.909 86.563 87.142 88.054
3 ­26766.5 149.17 100 0.00 2.005 86.644 87.501 88.845
4 ­26618.3 296.43 100 0 1.251* 86.495* 87.621 89.401
5 ­26549.2 138.15 100 0.07 1.909 86.589 87.996 90.210
6 ­26453.6 191.15 100 0 1.909 86.604 88.286 90.934
7 ­26374.9 157.5 100 0 2.109 86.671 88.631 91.718
8 ­26307.9 133.5* 100 0.01 2.302 86.777 89.012 92.523
Notes: The table shows four information criteria as well as a sequence
of likelihood ratio (LR) tests for the US. These are; SBIC(The Bayesian
information criterion), HQIC (Hannan–Quinn information criterion), Akaike
information criteria (AIC) and Final prediction error (FPE). Strictly speak­
ing, the FPE is not an information criterion, though we include it in this dis­
cussion because, as with an information criterion, we select the lag length
corresponding to the lowest value; and, naturally, we want to minimize the
prediction error. Star shows the most efficient criteria at the relevant lag.
lag.
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Table 4.3: Selection Criteria (UK)
Lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 ­1745 2.601 55.879 55.901 55.936
1 ­1723 462.280 64 0 1.505 55.345 55.543 55.856*
2 ­1709 255.700 64 0 1.208 55.141 55.512 56.106
3 ­1699 196.361 64 0 1.108 55.031 55.583 56.451
4 ­1687 253.840 64 0 9.001 54.829 55.558 56.704
5 ­1671 319.572 64 0 6.607 54.523 55.428 56.852
6 ­1657 267.271 64 0 5.309 54.304 55.382 57.084
7 ­1645 249.821 64 0 4.409 54.105 55.363 57.343
8 ­1631 271.941*64 0 3.519* 53.875* 55.309* 57.567
Notes:The table shows four information criteria as well as a sequence of
likelihood ratio (LR) tests for the UK. These are; SBIC(The Bayesian infor­
mation criterion), HQIC (Hannan–Quinn information criterion), Akaike in­
formation criteria (AIC) and Final prediction error (FPE). Strictly speaking,
the FPE is not an information criterion, though we include it in this dis­
cussion because, as with an information criterion, we select the lag length
corresponding to the lowest value; and, naturally, we want to minimize the
prediction error. Star shows the most efficient criteria at the relevant lag.
From above, we can therefore conclude that the appropriate lag length for
the US is lag 4. This is based on the results in Table 4.2 that shows at
lag 4 we have the minimum AIC and FPE tests result. Although, the HQIC
and SBIC support no lag and lag one, we think that just one lag may not be
enough to investigate the causal relationship over long periods. Therefore,
we used the lag length suggested by the AIC test (four lags for the period
before the crisis and six lags for the period after the crisis). The UK series
lag length base on selection criteria test is lag 8. This is because all the
tests synonymously (other than the SBIC) show that it is the appropriate
lag length.
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4.6 Key Empirical Results
We start by discussing results from our main model, MS­VAR and then the
Garch model before interpreting our IRF results. Remember that the MS­
VAR model does not require any assumptions on the timing of the regime
episodes; It infers the probability of being in a specific state as well as the
probability of switching from one state to the other (as explained earlier in
the model). The transition between the different regimes is modelled as
a hidden Markov chain. The transition matrix allows for a differentiated
analysis of the dynamics of entering and exiting regimes, allowing for a
non­symmetric analysis of all turning points.
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4.6.1 MS­VAR
We start by discussing regime probabilities and duration before looking at
index mean values. Table 4.2 shows that our US data exhibit two different
regimes. This is in line with the data we collected that covers the crisis
period with high volatility i.e. 2007­2013 and stable period, i.e. period
where regulation was put in place (2014 – 2020). Our initial regime p1,1
shows a high regime 1 probability of 0.89%, reflecting the nature of volatil­
ity witnessed during the crisis. p1,2 represent the transition probability of
regime 1 moving into regime 2. This probability of 39% seem low as the
US government did swiftly acted to restore market confidence even before
regulation was put in place.
The empirical evidence for this is that on December­12­2007, The US Trea­
sury launch the temporary Term Auction Facility (TAF) to address pres­
sures in short­term funding markets. On February­13­2008 President Bush
signed the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 into law. By March 2008, Fed­
eral Reserve announce creation of TermSecurities Lending Facility (TSLF).
On September­16­2008 Federal Reserve authorized lending up to $85 bil­
lion to AIG. In October 2008, Congress passes Emergency Economic Sta­
bilization Act, providing $700 billion to the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP). Furthermore, in November 2008 Federal Reserve Board announces
creation of Term Asset­Backed Securities Lending Facility (TALF) and in
December 2008 U.S. Treasury authorizes special loans for General Mo­
tors and Chrysler (Longstaff, 2010). Perhaps with these interventions we
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expected the Regime p1,2 to be much higher. This shows how endemic
the crisis was and the impact it had on CDS indexes, supporting the imple­
mentation of a wide and unprecedented set of regulations.
The US Regime 2 has a probability of 0.60% as shown by p1,2, this is
relatively lower than regime 1. The transition probability of regime 2 going
back to regime 1 is also comparatively higher at about 0.40%. Both figures
highlights the impact the crisis has had on CDS market. Where before
the crisis, the CDS notional values was around $62 trillion, however during
the crisis it dropped to about $10 trillion and in 2019 to about $4 trillion.
The result also points to the probability of indexes being more likely to
experience volatility, consistent with the nature of CDS markets. Regime 1
is expected to last for 47 weeks, while Regime 2 expected duration is 157
weeks. This is reasonable considering the swift reaction by the authorities
and the impact of regulation on CDS indexes.
Table 4.3 shows CDS index regimes in the UK. These results are similar
to US results with respect to regime probabilities and transitions. Like the
US, the UK also had in place measures that supported the economy before
the implementation of the regulation. However, the table shows that in the
UK, Regime 1 had a shorter duration (36 weeks), while Regime 2 has a
longer duration (177 weeks) when compared to the US. This result sup­
ports empirical evidence that shows the UK experienced a shorter crisis
period, fewer failed institutions and faster response by authorities as com­












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































more impact on CDS indexes as Regime 2 is longer and the probability of
transitional back to Regime 1 (a period that is more volatile) is lower than
the US.
We now discuss the mean CDS index through both regimes in table 4.2 &
4.3 above, where µ1 regime 1 are the mean values in Regime 1, and µ2
regime 2 the mean values in Regime 2. Both tables show the expected im­
pact that regulation has had on these indexes. Meaning, all CDS indexes
in both countries have moved from being negative in Regime 1 to positive
in Regime 2. This is a strong evidence of the impact regulation has had on
these indexes.
Table 4.2 provide some interesting results on US CDS indexes. Starting
with SOVR index. This is consistent with what we expected to have oc­
curred. It shows the least fluctuation between the two regimes, while the
CDS index in other economic sectors declined in regime 1, Sovereign CDS
Index shows only a comparatively slight decline at ­0.257. It has the least
increase in regime 2, therefore comparatively more stable. The intuition
here is that sovereign CDS backed by government is associated with more
investor confidence and perceived to be less risky than other sectors. The
unexpected result is with Transport (TRNSP) and Electric Power (Elec. P)
sector CDS indexes. They witnessed the most fluctuations between the 2
Regimes, with Regime mean index drop of ­5.454 and ­2.455 and growth
of 15.536% and 7.841% respectively.
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Our explanation for these is that the slowdown in economic activities has
affected companies in these sectors relatively hard. Whereas, Banking
(Banks), Other Financial Institutions (Other F.I) and Service Companies
(Serv. Co) sector indexes display somewhat similar regime changes, al­
though given the crisis seemingly had more effect on institutions covered
by these indexes, we expected them to have the highest drop in Regime
1. The growth we see in them can be explained by the fact that these sec­
tors received a lot government support and regulation aimed at restoring
confidence was focused on the activities of these sectors.
Table 4.3 shows themean changes betweenRegimes in UK indexes. It has
a slightly different result from the US, as the Electric Power not Sovereign
CDS index shows the least fluctuation. Banking and Service Companies
CDS indexes experience the highest change between the means of the
two Regimes. This is in line with empirical evidence as UK government
intervention meant ownership of about 70% of most of the major Banks.
Having discussedRegimes, transition probabilities and index Regimemean,
the next part of the analysis discusses contagion and interdependence be­
tween CDS indexes over the two regimes. To discuss these we use a com­
bination of tables from 4.6 to 4.9 below. Table 4.6 & 4.5 provides us the
results of our Regime 1 MS­VAR models and tables 4.6 & 4.7 are Regime
2 results. Tables 4.8 & 4.9 show the results from t­statistics of regimes
correlations coefficients. Furthermore Table 4.10 & 4.11 are results from
index correlation coefficient t­statistics tests. Finally, tables 4.12 & 4.13
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are robustness results from DCC­Garch model.
Regime 1 covers the period of volatility (financial crisis) and prior to regu­
lation. Therefore, the existence of statistically significant index coefficient,
high correlation, along with t­test result as compared to Regime 2 shows
the existence of contagion. While Regime 2 covers the period that regu­
lation has been fully phased­in and complied with, therefore more stable.
The presence of statistically significant index coefficient, t­test result and
low correlation as compared to Regime 1 shows interdependence. Please
note we only report few correlation results2 from Table 4.10 & 4.11 below
that highlights results different from what we expected in our analysis. This
is because we have 9 CDS sector index in the US and 8 in the UK that re­
sulted in producing index correlation combinations amounting to 46 in the
US and 28 in the UK.
2 I have presented the whole result in the index section.
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Table 4.6: MS­VAR US Regime 1
Variable Coeff Std. Er­
ror
T­ Stat Signif
1 TELECOMMS ­0.666 0.578 ­1.152 0.249
2 BANKS ­1.272 0.464 ­2.735 0.006
3 CSMGOODS ­0.521 0.216 ­2.415 0.016
4 ELECT.POWER ­0.661 1.187 ­0.556 0.577
5 MANUFACTURING ­0.818 0.344 ­2.374 0.017
6 OTHER FIN.INST ­2.071 1.005 ­2.058 0.039
7 SERVICE COMP ­1.067 0.511 ­2.085 0.036
8 SOVEREIGN ­0.119 0.086 ­1.385 0.165
9 TRANSPORT ­0.046 1.582 ­2.557 0.010
Notes:This table shows period of volatility (i.e. pre­regulation period) MS­
VAR index results in the US. The indexes are: Consumer goods (csm
goods), Electric power (elec power), Manufacturing (manufacturing), Other
financial services (other fin), Service companies (Service co), Telecommu­
nications (Telecomm), Transport (Trsp), Sovereign (Sovr).
Table 4.7: MS­VAR UK Regime 1
Variable Coeff Std. Er­
ror
T­ Stat Signif
1 TELECOMMS ­0.964 0.314 ­3.071 0.002
2 BANKS ­0.611 0.285 ­2.144 0.032
3 CSMGOODS ­0.333 0.128 ­2.586 0.009
4 ELECT.POWER ­0.443 0.187 ­2.359 0.018
5 MANUFACTURING ­0.914 0.488 ­1.873 0.060
6 OTHER FIN.INST ­0.244 0.309 ­0.790 0.029
7 SERVICE COMP ­0.465 0.193 ­2.408 0.015
8 SOVEREIGN ­0.358 0.147 ­2.431 0.015
Notes:This table show tranquil period (i.e. regulation period) MS­VAR in­
dex results in the UK. The indexes are: Consumer goods (csm goods),
Electric power (elec power), Manufacturing (manufacturing), Other finan­
cial services (other fin), Service companies (Service co), Telecommunica­
tions (Telecomm), Transport (Trsp), Sovereign (Sovr).
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Tables 4.6 & 4.7 show the results from Regime 1 US and UK MS­VAR
models. All the coefficients reflect the negative impact of crisis. Looking
at US indexes, The Telecomms, Electric Power and Sovereign indexes
coefficients are not statistically significant at the 5% level. Therefore, we
cannot draw the conclusion that these indexes suffered from the impact
of contagion within Regime 1. This is consistent with earlier results from
regime switching mean values in Regime 1 that showed Telecomms and
Sovereign indexes suffered the least fluctuations throughout the period.
The model confirms what we suspected, i.e. Other Financial Institutions
and Banks indexes experienced the most negative impact of contagion
within the model. This is consistent with the result in Guo et al. (2011)
and supports the earlier discussion that these sectors used CDS products
more within the economy.
Contrary to Table 4.6, the UK Regime 1 MS­VAR model in Table 4.7 above
that shows all index coefficients to be statistically significant, showing the
existence of contagion in all indexes. Here, the Telecomms and Manufac­
turing indexes coefficients show higher negative impact compared to the
remaining indexes. This is despite the empirical evidence with Northern
Rock failing and HBOS taken over by Lloyds Bank, as a result of exces­
sive use of CDS (Ballester et al., 2016). Perhaps an explanation for this
was the move by UK government to directly take over most of UK Banks
(unlike in the US) and therefore providing more stability to this sector, how­
ever not avoiding overall contagion within all indexes. This becomes even
clearer when we look at the results from Regime 2 that shows most of the
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UK indexes still exhibit high correlation to UK sovereign CDS index.
Table 4.8 provides US Regime 2 MS­VAR model. It shows that all indexes
in the system have been positively impacted by the introduction of regula­
tion. There is also a change in correlation between most of the indexes
that allows us to draw the conclusion that Regime 2 reflects a change
in relationship from contagion to interdependence, with the exception of
Telecomms index that is not statistically significant. The index of Banks,
Other Financial Institutions and Service Companies show themost change,
where their index coefficients have moved from ­ 1.271696, ­2.070563, ­
1.06744 in Regime 1 to 7.55356, 16.6562 and 8.08568 respectively. The
result remains consistent with respect to the Sovereign index that shows
least change.
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Table 4.8: MS­VAR US Regime 2
Variable Coeff Std. Er­
ror
T­Stat Signif
1 TELECOMMS 1.612 3.378 0.477 0.631
2 BANKS 7.553 1.121 6.733 0.000
3 CSMGOODS 3.808 0.332 11.438 0.010
4 ELECT.POWER 2.148 2.090 10.592 0.010
5 MANUFACTURING 7.075 0.843 8.390 0.001
6 OTHER FIN.INST 16.656 1.884 8.839 0.003
7 SERVICE COMP 8.085 1.421 5.688 0.011
8 SOVEREIGN 0.983 0.133 7.369 0.000
9 TRANSPORT 8.347 2.282 3.656 0.000
Notes:This table show tranquil period (i.e. regulation period) MS­VAR in­
dex results in the US.The indexes are: Consumer goods (csm goods),
Electric power (elec power), Manufacturing (manufacturing), Other finan­
cial services (other fin), Service companies (Service co), Telecommunica­
tions (Telecomm), Transport (Trsp), Sovereign (Sovr).
The UK Regime 2 MS­VAR results in Table 4.9 below, shows generally
the impact of regulation is positive on all the indexes, with the exception of
Electric Power index coefficient that is not statistically significant. It shows
that index of banks, Telecomms and Manufacturing experienced the most
positive change from the previous Regime. We therefore conclude after
comparing the correlation results that these indexes show a change in re­
lationship from contagion to interdependence after the introduction of reg­
ulation. However, the relationship between the Sovereign CDS index and
those of Banks, Consumer goods, Electric power, Other financial institu­
tion and Telecomms have increased from Regime 1 to Regime 2. Sug­
gesting that these indexes have greater relationship with Sovereign CDS
index than before the implementation of regulation. Leading us to suggest
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that while the intervention by UK government over failing institutions sup­
ported in overcoming the effects of contagion and therefore bringing sta­
bility to the system, it has also brought about closer relationship between
economic sector CDS indexes and that of the government. Implying that
the current risk associated with sector indexes is associated with that of
government CDS index. Hence, these close relationship between indexes
that government CDS index.
Table 4.9: MS­VAR UK Regime 2
Variable Coeff Std. Er­
ror
T­Stat Signif
1 TELECOMMS 1.668 0.491 3.396 0.000
2 BANKS 1.817 0.663 2.740 0.006
3 CSMGOODS 0.755 0.225 3.350 0.000
4 ELECT.POWER 0.043 0.416 0.103 0.917
5 MANUFACTURING 1.267 0.697 1.816 0.069
6 OTHER FIN.INST 0.653 0.580 1.125 0.060
7 SERVICE COMP 0.656 0.344 1.901 0.056
8 SOVEREIGN 0.796 0.225 3.534 0.000
Notes:This table show tranquil period (i.e. regulation period) MS­VAR in­
dex results in the UK. The indexes are: Consumer goods (csm goods),
Electric power (elec power), Manufacturing (manufacturing), Other finan­
cial services (other fin), Service companies (Service co), Telecommunica­
tions (Telecomm), Transport (Trsp), Sovereign (Sovr).
To support these conclusions, we applied the t­stat. test between regime
mean correlation coefficients. That is, we tested the null hypothesis that
Regime 1minus regime 2 is equal to zero against the alternative hypothesis
that Regime 1 is statistically higher than Regime 2 (see Celık (2012) &
Bratis et al. (2018)). The results are captured below in Tables 4.10 & 4.11
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for both countries.
Table 4.10: US Regimes test result
Variable Obs Mean Std.Err Std.Dev 95%Conf.Int
Crisis Corr.Coeff’s 36 0.411 0.035 0.214 0.338 ­ 0.484
Reg. Corr.Coeff’s 36 0.085 0.018 0.111 0.047 ­ 0.122
Combined 72 0.248 0.027 0.236 0.192 ­ 0.303
Diff 0.326 0.040 0.364 0.246 ­ 0.406
diff = mean (Crisis Corr.Coeff’s) ­ mean (Reg. Corr.Coeff’s) t = 8.109
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 70
H1: diff < 0 H1: diff = 0 H1: diff > 0
Pr(T < t)=1.000 Pr(T > t)=0.000 Pr(T > t)=0.0000
Notes: This table shows the t­stat test result for the US CDS correlation
coefficient regimes.
Table 4.11: UK Regimes test result
Variable Obs Mean Std.Err Std.Dev 95%Conf.Int
Crisis Corr. Coeff’s 28 0.514 0.035 0.187 0.442 ­ 0.588
Reg. Corr. Coeff’s 28 0.364 0.032 0.172 0.297 ­ 0.431
combined 56 0.439 0.025 0.193 0.387 ­ 0.491
diff 0.150 0.048 0.054 ­ 0.247
diff = mean (Crisis Corr.Coeff’s) ­ mean (Reg. Corr.Coeff’s) t = 3.1211
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 70
H1: diff < 0 H1: diff = 0 H1: diff > 0
Pr(T < t)=0.999 Pr(T > t)=0.003 Pr(T > t)=0.001
Notes: This table shows the t­stat test result for the UK CDS correlation
coefficient regimes.
The results from both tables confirm earlier results that show the evidence
of contagion in Regime 1. Table 4.10 has a test statistics of 8.1093 with
70 degrees of freedom. The p­value of 0.00 suggest that we reject the null
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hypothesis at 5% level of significance. Therefore, we fail to reject the alter­
native hypothesis that regime 1 is greater than regime 2. Table 4.11 equally
provides the same conclusion and therefore allowance us to conclude that
there was contagion in regime 1 for both country CDS indexes. Next, we
present tables that show the absence of contagion between indexes (not
between regimes) after applying t­test on CDS correlation coefficients. Al­
though we showed the existence of contagion between regimes, this does
not hold for all index correlation coefficients within regimes. Therefore, we
report those relationships that are different from our regimes conclusions.
The relationships between the indexes in tables 4.12 & 4.13 are different
from regime dependent relationships. Showing that while there was gener­
ally increase in correlation coefficients between CDS indexes that allows us
to draw the conclusion of contagion, there are sectors that had only inter­
dependent relationships i.e. no increase in correlation supported by t­stat
test. For example, we see that in the US the relationship between con­
sumer goods CDS index and sovereign CDS index was interdependent in
regime 1 (where most relationships where contagious) and the opposite is
true for the same indexes in regime 2. Suggesting consumer index had
greater correlation with sovereign at tranquil period. In the UK CDS in­
dexes for Banks and Other financial services showed greater correlation
after the crisis. This is not surprising as UK government became heavily in­
vested within these sectors. For example, the government currently owns
62% of royal bank of Scotland with intended date of divestiture in 2025.
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Table 4.12: US index Correlation
Regime 1 Coeff. Std. Err. t­stat Result
corr(CSMGOODS,SOVR) 0.072 0.090 0.024 Interdependence
corr(ELECPOWER,MNFRG) 0.140 0.069 0.042 Interdependence
corr(ELECPOWER,TRNSP) 0.225 0.054 0.013 Interdependence
Regime 2
corr(CSMGOODS,SOVR) 0.125 0.057 0.029 Contagion
Notes:These correlations coefficients show no contagion effects using t­
stat results. The indexes are: Consumer goods (csm goods), Electric
power (elec power), Manufacturing (manufacturing), Other financial ser­
vices (other fin), Service companies (Service co), Telecommunications
(Telecomm), Transport (Trsp), Sovereign (Sovr).
Table 4.13: UK index Correlation
Regime 1 Coeff. Std. Err. t­stat Result
corr(BANKS,SOVR) 0.232 0.059 0.041 Interdependence
corr(CSMGOODS,SOVR) 0.215 0.059 0.051 Interdependence
corr(ELECTRICPOWER,SOVR) 0.126 0.061 0.027 Interdependence
corr(OTHERFIN,SOVR) 0.242 0.059 0.019 Interdependence
corr(TELECOMM,SOVR) 0.174 0.061 0.015 Interdependence
corr(CSMGOODS,SOVR) 0.403 0.111 0.000 Interdependence
corr(ELECTRICPOWER,SOVR) 0.301 0.121 0.013 Interdependence
corr(TELECOMM,SOVR) 0.192 0.087 0.028 Interdependence
Regime 2
corr(BANKS,SOVR) 0.472 0.143 0.001 Contagion
corr(OTHERFIN,SOVR) 0.355 0.126 0.005 Contagion
Notes:These correlations coefficients show no contagion effects using t­
stat results. The indexes are: Consumer goods (csm goods), Electric
power (elec power), Manufacturing (manufacturing), Other financial ser­
vices (other fin), Service companies (Service co), Telecommunications
(Telecomm), Transport (Trsp), Sovereign (Sovr).
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For the purposes of robustness checks of the above model, we ran a DCC­
Garch model, this time choosing the dates between the two regimes base
on when regulation was introduced and the date set by national and in­
ternational regulatory agencies for full compliance with these regulations.
This is similar to process applied by Kalbaska and Gątkowski (2012) when
looking at contagion from CDS market in Eurozone. Where they exoge­
nously imposed dates based on empirical understanding. We recognise
that this is often a contentious issue, i.e. assigning both the start and end
dates e.g. in recent studies of the subprime crisis by Longstaff (2010). He
uses the calendar year of 2007 as the crisis period, while many others use
a later start date of July or August of that year (see: Duffie et al., 2015,
Guidolin and Pedio, 2017, Hatemi­J and Roca, 2011). However, given that
our analysis is focused on regulation and these regulations have both an­
nouncement dates and compliance dates provides us sufficient justification
to apply these dates (2007­2013 & 2014­2019) exogenously.
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4.6.2 DCC­GARCH
Tables below provides us results between the period from when crisis oc­
curred and the announcement of regulation for all derivatives markets.
Therefore covering the period of high volatility that is consistent with our
correlation results and Regime 1 discussed earlier. Figure 4.3, shows re­
sults from US CDS indexes. The mean equation (µ, panel A) shows that
all coefficients are statistically significant for all indexes except Sovereign
CDS index. It also shows CDS indexes coefficients to all be negative, this
is consistent with the effects of the crisis, volatility and results from earlier
analysis. Figure 4.3 mean equation results of UK CDS indexes also show
the same pattern with the exception that the Sovereign CDS index is sig­
nificant at the 10% level.
The variance equation in both Tables below consist the constant term (ω),
the Arch (α) and Garch (β) effects coefficients. The result are all statis­
tically significant. Indicating that the volatility persistence measure (α+β)
was close to one for all the CDS indexes examined. These results show
that the volatility in the GARCH models displayed high persistence. This
is similar to the result of MS­VAR regime persistence probability earlier
discussed. The last two rows of Panels in tables report the estimates of
the DCC parameters a and b. Both parameters are statistically significant,
revealing a substantial time­varying co­ movement. Moreover, the condi­
tional correlations also exhibited high persistence, with the average sum of
the two coefficients being over 0.90 during the sample period.
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Figure 4.3: US regime 1 DCC­Garch result
Note: Table shows US regime 1 DCC­Garch result. Standard errors are
shown in parenthesis while ***, ** * represent 1%, 5% 10% significance
level of respectively.
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Figure 4.4: UK regime 1 DCC­Garch result
Note: Table shows the UK regime 1 DCC­Garch result. Standard errors are
shown in parenthesis while ***, ** * represent 1%, 5% 10% significance
level of respectively.
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Tables 14 15 present the results that cover the period when regulation
was fully phased­in. The tables display results that show that Variance
equation results are mostly not statistically significant. These results are
largely consistent with what we expected from the sample period, as reg­
ulation meant little volatility as compared to the previous period. However,
the mean equation panel shows all indexes to be positively affected. This
shows that regulation has positively impacted the CDS indexes. However,
when we compare it to MS­VAR results, the positive mean results of both
tables are less than the results shown by the MS­VAR result. An expla­
nation for this might be that although regulation was fully phased in 2014,
most organisations likely met these requirements much earlier; therefore,
our Garch model has not fully captured this impact due to the exogenous
application of Regimes. Finally, we test the application of the DCC model
that reduces to the CCC model when the adjustment parameters that gov­
ern the dynamic correlation process are jointly equal to zero. We perform
a Wald test to test this hypothesis with results that support the application
of the model (i.e. chi2 (2) = 12.54 Prob > chi2 = 0.0019).
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Figure 4.5: US regime 2 DCC­Garch result
Note: Table shows US regime 2 DCC­Garch result. Standard errors are
shown in parenthesis while ***, ** * represent 1%, 5% 10% significance
level of respectively.
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Figure 4.6: UK regime 2 DCC­Garch result
Note: Table shows the UK regime 2 DCC­Garch result. Standard errors
are shown in parenthesis while ***, ** * represent 1%,5% 10% significance
level of respectively.
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4.6.3 Impulse Response Functions
The last part of this analysis deals with establishing the channels of conta­
gion. In this subsection, we trace the time paths of the invoked responses
of CDS indexes after economic shocks are imposed on the system. This
exercise allows us to identify the sign of association between the variables
and the respective market response paths over time as they explicitly re­
veal the interaction between these markets and the dynamic process of
the interaction. To achieve this objective, we apply the regime­dependent
impulse response function suggested in Ehrmann et al. (2003), which anal­
ogously describes the relationship between endogenous variables and fun­
damental disturbances within each Markov switching regime.
Since impulse responses trace the paths of different variables when they
return to equilibriums after a shock is injected to the system, the visual
aids provided by the impulse response functions are useful when the full
impacts of economic shocks on an economic system take long lags. In
each case, the shock to each equation is equal to one standard deviation
of the equation residual, and the impulse responses of all the variables to
the shock are traced out for a period of 10 weeks. As such, it facilitates our
comparison of the variable responses after different shocks hit the econ­
omy in two distinct regimes. This is an advantage of the non­linear VAR
model; it incorporates the asymmetric effects of economic shocks on the
economic system across different regimes.
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The impulse responses of CDS index to various shocks (from the crisis or
changes from regulation) imposed are presented in the tables below. Re­
sponses are divided between the two Regimes for both countries (i.e. US
and UK). Some dissimilarities between the 2 Regimes stand out. Over­
all, CDS indexes are more responsive to economic shocks in the “risky”
Regime (Regime 1). For instance, as shown in US Regime 1, most of the
index Y­axis that shows the % which an index response to a shock ranges
from a sharp drop of 120% to ­80%. Highlighting the impact of the crisis
on these indexes. While the Y­axis for US Regime 2 indexes ranges from
a moderate drop of 20% to ­20%. The same pattern is exhibit in the UK
index response functions. Where Regime 1 has Y­axis that dropped from
16% to ­4%, while Regime 2 highest impulse is 12% and lowest of 4%.
Generally, responses emanating from CDS index own shocks are found
have the most impact. Looking at US Regimes IRFs, the Banking CDS
index in Regime 1, in response to its own shock, dropped from a peak of
about 25% to about ­3% from week one to week 2 and further to its lowest
level in week 5 to approximately 6%. Compare this to Regime 2, where
it dropped from 4% in week 1 to ­1% in week 2 and returned to about a
base of zero, exhibiting stability consistent with the introduction of regula­
tion. By comparison, UK Regime 1 Banks CDS index jumped from 13% in
week 1 to ­1% in week 2. Whereas in Regime 2 the Banks CDS index re­
sponse due to its own shock, was 9% in week one to about 1.6% in week 2.
The indexes found to exhibit the highest jumps in US Regime 1 are Trans­
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portation, Electric Power and Other Financial Companies. They show a
jump between the first and the second week of 63% to ­13%, 57% to ­17%
and 28% to ­6% respectively. These same indexes in Regime 2 show
changes between the first and second week from 9.5% to ­1.2%, 5.7% to
1.2% and 20% to ­15% respectively. Service Companies and Telecom­
munications CDS indexes are the most affected with respect to impact of
other indexes on them other shocks from their lags. For example, Ser­
vice Companies CDS index moved from 11% in week 1 to ­4.8% in week
7. However, it was being impacted by: Banking index at 9.9% in week to
­2.3% in week 6, Manufacturing at 9.3% in week 1 to ­ 3.7% in week 10,
Consumer Goods at 9% in week 1 to ­1.6% in week 9 and by Transporta­
tion with 9.7% in week 1 to ­3.2 in week 9. On the other hand, Sovereign
CDS index is the least respondent to shocks from the system. It changed
as a result of lag shock from 3% on week 1 to 0 by week 2, thereafter re­
mained between 0% and 1%. While other shocks remain between 1% to
­0.5% throughout. These patterns generally stayed the same in Regime
2, i.e. the most and least affected indexes, however as highlighted earlier
these shocks are almost non­existent (other than fluctuations between 1%
to ­1%) due to stability/effects of regulation in Regime 2 (with exception to
index lags effects).
In the UK the indexes that exhibit the highest jumps in Regime 1 are; Bank­
ing and Other Financial Companies. They jumped from 13% in week 1 to to
­2% in week 6, and 14% in week 1 to ­0.5% in week 2 respectively. Further­
more, the Banking index exhibited the highest impact on Other Financial
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Companies index from 4% in week 1 to ­2% in week 4. This is greater
than the impact of its lag and more lasting. Manufacturing CDS index also
moved from 15% in week 1 to 0.6% by week 8, with Electric Power Index
impacting it from 2% in week to ­3.6% by week 4. The indexes that were
least affected in UK Regime 1 were Consumer goods, Service companies,
Telecomms and Sovereign CDS indexes. They show a jump from week 1
to 2 by; 5% to ­0.5%, 6% to 0%, 5.4% to ­1% and 6.4% to 0% respectively.
In Regime 2, IRFs show a large stability effects. Almost all indexes move­
ment remaining between 1% to ­0.5% with the exception of Banking index
that moved from 10% in week 1 to ­2.4% in week 4 (although still less than
jumps in Regime 1) and Sovereign index that showed the least movement
from 1.9% in week 1 to ­0.34% in week 2. Reactions of CDS indexes to
the Banking and Other Financial Companies CDS indexes shocks play the
most important role in the CDS market variations. In a similar fashion, the
impulse responses of CDS indexes to the Sovereign CDS provided stabil­




The 2007 subprime crisis provides an ideal opportunity for studying the ef­
fects of contagion at Sector level within the whole economy. We use data
from CDS indexes to examine whether contagion occurred across various
sectors and if the introduction of regulation resulted in changing this rela­
tionship to interdependence. This was motivated by the frequently adopted
definition of contagion in the literature as a significant temporary increase
in cross­market linkages after a major distress event.
We employ a MS­VAR methodology that allows us to assess pairwise re­
lationships across various CDS index of the whole system. Using weekly
data of 10 CDS sector indexes in the US and 8 CDS sector indexes in
the UK from January 2007 through January 2020 we investigated the ex­
istence of contagion and the impact of regulation. We then used IRFs to
show channels of contagion between sector indexes.
The results from the Markov switching VAR specification reveal the exis­
tence of two Regimes in our data and that there was contagion effects
among these CDS indexes that changed to interdependence due to the
introduction of regulation. This is consistent with the results of Longstaff
(2010) that showed the existence of contagion between subprime collater­
alized debt obligations (CDOs) indexes in the US. These are yet another
form of derivative instruments, further supporting the implementation of
regulation. On the other hand, Flavin and Sheenan (2015) did not find
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contagion effects between mortgage back securities and other financial
instruments. However, their result show contagion between liquid instru­
ments. This also supports our choice of liquid CDS in the analysis. Guo
et al. (2011) also confirmed the existence of contagion between stock mar­
ket, real estate market, credit default market, and energy market. We also
found the duration of a “stable” Regime to be longer than that of a “volatile”
Regime. This finding is consistent with the empirical observation that the
durations of economic stability tend to be longer than those of economic
crisis. Our results are similar to the findings of Guo et al. (2011).
A number of striking findings emerge from the study. Firstly, we find the
use of CDS was economy wide, i.e. most of the sectors in the economy
were heavily involved in the use of CDS instruments in some way (as op­
posed to the viewwe held that it wasmostly within the financial sector). The
results show that there was widespread contagion within CDS indexes in
the period of the crisis and prior to implementing regulation and the rela­
tionship changed significantly to Interdependence after the introduction of
regulation. Secondly, the results show that in the US the sectors that were
most affected by contagion effects are Telecomms and Transportation, with
Banks and Other Financial Services experiencing lesser contagion impact
(this is also contrary to the general assumption). While in the UK, most
affected sector were Banks, Manufacturing and then Other Financial Ser­
vices. Note that our results does not provide the source of this contagion,
rather the most affect sectors as a result of the contagion. We then per­
formed robustness checks, using Garch model we consistently found the
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evidence that supports our initial results.
Assessment of the relationships between the CDS indexes Regime­ de­
pendent impulse response functions reveals that they all respond more
significantly to various economic shocks in the “risky” Regime. That is, the
contagion effects among indexes is prominent during the financial crisis.
Our findings have important implications for policymakers regarding the
amplified contagion effects among the sectors during financial crisis, to
avoid lack of oversight. In particular, they should monitor the use of CDS
from the sectors that displayed most impact of contagion.
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4.8 INDEX


























4.8.5 FULL NAMES OF CDS INDEX
CDS INDEX Full names and Mnemonics (Eikon­Refinitiv DataStream)
US BANKS US Banking CDS index. DSNBS5
US CSM GOODS US Consumer Goods CDS index. DSNCG5
USELEC POWER US Electric CDS index. DSNEP5
US ENERGY CO US Energy CDS index. DSNEC5
US MNFG US Manufacturing CDS index. DSNMF5
US OTHER FIN US Other Financial Institutions CDS index. DSNOF5
US SERVICE CO US Services CDS index. DSNSC5
US TELECOMM US Telecommunications CDS index. DSNTL5
US TRSP US Transportation CDS index. DSNTR5
US SOVR US Sovereign CDS index. USV5EAC
UK BANKS UK Banking CDS index.DSUBK5E
UK CSM GOODS UK Consumer Goods CDS index. DSUCG5E
UKELEC POWER UK Electric Power CDS index. DSUEP5E
UK MNFG UK Manufacturing CDS index. DSUMF5E
UK OTHER FIN UK Other Financial Institutions CDS index. DSUOF5E
UK SERVICE CO UK Services CDS index. DSUSC5E
UK TELECOMM UK Telecommunications CDS index. DSUTL5E




5.1 Main Results and Contributions to Litera­
ture
The focus of chapter two is analyzing the impact of regulation (Basel III in
particular) on crisis probability. We sample our data to capture the period
of regulation. The results show Basel III leverage ratio behaves inversely
to crisis probability while traditional bank leverage (debt to equity ratio) has
a positive relationship. Reflecting the change in how leverage ratio is cal­
culated in Basel III that shows regulators have taken into consideration the
impact of non­balance items that are said to be instrumental in the crisis
(e.g. CDS). Comparing Basel III coefficients between our samples, the
regressions shows a clear improvement in the regulatory variables prob­
abilities to reduce crisis. The result show a change in; capital adequacy
ratio, bank liquidity ratio and bank leverage ratio affecting the crisis de­
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pendent variable from 2.4%, 1.5%, and 5.7% to 7.01%, 5.2% and 9.7%
respectively after regulation. The results show an improvement over re­
lated literature that calibrated the data to understand this impact, e.g. Bar­
rell et al. (2010a). The BMA results shows that the estimates from Basel
III thresholds are robust. Our analysis suggests the introduction of these
Basel III variables to the EWS literature for future analysis.
Furthermore, our result show an inverse relationship between real eco­
nomic growth and probability of crisis occurring and a positive relationship
between growth in house prices and crisis probability. The analysis shows
that at a 10% level of significance, interest rate is significant in explaining
the crisis, similar to the work of Demirgüç­Kunt and Detragiache (2005).
Chapter 3 analysed the impact of regulation to systemic risk. Our results
present important findings about regulation implemented after the crisis
period in the UK. The main one being ring fencing. Using interest income
as a proxy for this regulation, our analysis show that this variable has no
statistical significance in reducing systemic risk after regulation. This is
further supported when we look at the result of our non­interest income
(a proxy for non­ring fence activities) that was expected to increase sys­
temic risk but showed no such relationship in the post­regulatory period.
Similar conclusion was reached by De Jonghe et al. (2015). Therefore
important for policy makers to consider the implications of this policy. Our
result show that measures taken to reduce bank size to be of statistical
significance with an inverse relationship systemic risk. This is in line with
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results from Laeven et al. (2016), that find strong evidence that systemic
risk increases with bank size. Allowing us to conclude that the effort by
regulatory agency to reduce bank size is effective.
Finally, our results show that Basel III variables provide strong and valid
justification in the attempts made by regulation to reduce systemic risk. It
shows that more capitalised banks are better able to reduce systemic risk
and the new leverage ratio also reduces systemic risk. This is similar with
the results of Berger and Bouwman (2013) who show that bank capital in­
creases a bank’s survival probability, showing that the increase in capital
regulations reduces the exposure of banks to systemic risk.
Our main contribution to the literature is analysing the impact of regulation
using our systemic risk measure (∆CoVaR) against bank level targeted
variables. Our second contribution relates to the analysis of systemic risk.
Previous literatures (e.g. Girardi and Ergün, 2013, Huang et al., 2012a,
Tobias and Brunnermeier, 2016) have used both models (i.e. CoVaR and
Garch) applied here when estimating systemic risk. However, what we
have added is the application of accuracy tests to show the model that
is more accurate when estimating systemic risk (on bank regulatory vari­
ables). This study considers variables that were either newly introduced
(such as ring fencing) or those that are calculated differently (e.g. leverage
ratio, regulatory capital) because of changes in the regulation. Therefore,
providing a clear understanding of the impact these policies have created
on systemic risk.
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Chapter four studies the effects of contagion at sector level within the
whole economy. We use data from CDS indexes to examine whether con­
tagion occurred across various sectors and if the introduction of regula­
tion resulted in changing this relationship to interdependence. Our results
from the Markov switching VAR specification reveal the existence of two
Regimes in our data and that there was contagion effects among these
CDS indexes that changed to interdependence due to the introduction of
regulation. Guo et al. (2011) also confirmed the existence of contagion be­
tween stock market, real estate market, credit default market, and energy
market.
This chapter’s first and main contribution is analysing the impact regula­
tion has had on credit default swap indexes in reducing the contagion. The
second contribution of this analysis establishes if there was contagion or
interdependency within sectors of the economy in the US and the UK dur­
ing the crisis and if this has changed after introducing regulation. The third
contribution shows through which channel contagion occurred. That is,
which CDS index contributed to propagation of risk within the economy
through the application of Impulse Response Functions (IRF’s).
A number of striking findings emerge from the study. Firstly, we find the
use of CDS was economy wide, i.e. most of the sectors in the economy
were heavily involved in the use of CDS instruments. The results show
that in the US the sectors that were most affected by contagion effects
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are Telecomms and Transportation, with Banks and Other Financial Ser­
vices experiencing lesser contagion impact (this is contrary to the general
assumption). While in the UK, most affected sectors were Banks, Man­
ufacturing and then Other Financial Services. Our findings have impor­
tant implications for policymakers regarding the amplified contagion effects
among the sectors during financial crisis, to avoid lack of oversight. In par­
ticular, they should monitor the use of CDS from the sectors that displayed
most impact of contagion.
5.1.1 Concluding Remarks, Policy Implications and Fur­
ther Research
The precise understanding of how variables reacted to changes in regula­
tion goes beyond calibrating data (as necessary done before implementing
policy changes) to sampling empirical data in a manner that capture breaks
and models that are more accurate in showing these stylized impacts. This
thesis addressed gaps found in prior research. We addressed the changed
in relationship between crisis phenomena and variables identified to con­
tribute to crisis and therefore subject to recent regulatory changes. From
theoretical arguments of economics regulation, we explored the impor­
tance of banking sector and its regulation. We looked at the rationale pro­
vided for the various variables targeted by regulatory changes. We high­
lighted the difference in regulatory changes implemented in the UK and
US (being the most impacted countries by the crisis). Most importantly, we
analysed the impact of regulation after the crisis. We analysed the proba­
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bility of crisis, systemic risk, contagion and its channels of spread.
The literature in this area has been focused on variables that caused the
crisis, while the focus in our analysis looks at the variables that regula­
tion either changed or introduced. By dividing our samples, we were able
to highlight how variables behaved before the crisis, and most important
how regulation has impacted on them to make the system more resilient
afterwards. We have showed how the implementation of regulation has
reduce the probability of another crisis happening, reduced systemic risk
and changed the effects of contagion to interdependence. We have also
shown the channels through which systemic risk flowed via CDS within dif­
ferent economic sectors. Our analysis has also shown how some of the
individual national regulatory measures are not supported by our statistical
analysis.
Part of the implication of this study to policy makers relates to understand­
ing the impact regulation is having, therefore providing a basis for future
policy trajectory. We have highlighted already that regulation is not cost­
less. Therefore, this study sheds light on some variables that have not
to impact on crisis, therefore recommends further policy reconsideration.
Most importantly, the study has shown clearly the extent that regulation has
impacted the various aspects of the crisis, i.e. crisis probability, systemic
risk and contagion, and reached the conclusion that regulation is making
the whole system more resilient. Our findings also suggests policymakers
to monitor sector CDS effects to avoid oversight. In particular, they should
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monitor the use of CDS from the sectors that displayed most impact of con­
tagion.
Again, our data sets have shownmodels that are more accurate in measur­
ing the different concepts of crisis analysed here. Therefore sheddingmore
light in terms of academic discourse. Our analysis have also identified
variables to were not previously part of the early warning signal literature
and recommend the inclusion of these as supported by statistical results
and use within regulatory changes. The analysis also identified channels
through which contagion flows within CDS market, the variables that were
most affected by systemic risk and how regulation has made them and the
system more resilient to crisis. Therefore useful for market participants to
better understand risk from a regulatory and systemic point that can aid in
the process of decision making within firms.
Finally, this study acknowledges some areas of limitation that future studies
should consider. Our analysis focused on impact of regulation in relation to
crisis risk. However, we highlighted already that regulation is not costless.
Therefore, a cost/benefit analysis of regulation after the crisis will certainly
present a more holistic understanding on the impact of regulation after the
crisis. As Barrell et al. (2009) stated that regulation can be seen as a tax to
the banking system, with cost not only limited to the banks but can spill over
to the economy at large via cost of borrowing to household and business
that can lead to reduction in output.
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